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Numerous studies, books, and articles have been written on Britains retreat from its former 
empire in the 1960s. Journalists wrote about it at the time, many people who were involved 
wrote about it in the immediate years that followed, and historians have tried to put it all 
together. The issues of foreign policy at the strategic level and the military operations that took 
place in this period have been especially well covered. However, the question of military 
strategic alternatives in this important era of British foreign policy has been less studied. This 
dissertation discusses such high-profile projects as the TSR.2 and F.111, prospective VTOL 
aircraft and not least the CVA-01 fleet carrier, but most of all it focuses on the issue of military 
strategy. The rivalry between the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force was largely about the 
questions of carrier aviation versus land-based air power – and which strategic option would 
best answer the British need to maintain influence as the garrisons were being scaled down. The 
Royal Navy argued for replacement fleet carriers for their mobile seaborne strategy, while the 
Royal Air Force argued that land-based air power would be as effective and far less costly. By 
using this underlying strategic debate as the framework for understanding more specific debates 
on aircraft, ships and weapon systems, this dissertation aims to bring new light to our 
understanding of the dramatic restructuring and altered priorities these two military services saw 
during the 1960s. The story may be divided into three broad periods: From 1960 until mid 1963, 
it was a conceptual debate on ‘Carrier Task Forces’ and a concrete alternative ‘Island Strategy’. 
This ended in July 1963 with a Cabinet decision in favour of new fleet carriers. However, the 
Royal Air Force and the Treasury kept fighting this decision. Their continued resistance, together 
with the new Labour Government with Denis Healey as Secretary of State for Defence, changed 
the decision of 1963. The highpoint of the debate on carrier aviation and land-based air power 
came during 1965-66, ending with the decision of February 1966 to cancel the CVA-01 and 
gradually phase out the existing carrier fleet. Denis Healey then used the arguments for land-
based air power as a rationale for the decision. The dissertation rounds off with a discussion of 
the planned phase-out of the existing carrier fleet. However, the story saw a different end than 
planned, as new strategic challenges in home waters came about and the evolving VTOL Harrier 
aircraft and the ‘through-deck cruisers’ gave new possibilities. This is a historical study of the 
British debate about maritime air power and strategic alternatives in the 1960s. However, the 
detailed story and arguments used for and against both alternatives should clearly have relevance 
to any conceptual debates on carrier and land-based air power.  
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Traditionally we think of military forces in three main bulks; land, sea, and air power – with a 
natural extension of this thought into military organisations such as armies, navies and air forces. 
With such divisions, many conflicts between these military organisations, normally called 
services, arise. For the military services, we see this most evidently in the case of doctrinal focus 
and inter-service striving for resources and influence. Maritime air power, which includes both 
land-based and sea-based air power, constitutes such a field of military expertise which has 
suffered from being both sea and air power in nature and partly ‘owned’ by navies and air forces. 
In British modern military history, discussion regarding maritime air power has occupied much 
focus and laid the foundation for much controversy. This dissertation will examine the famous 
and much referred to 1960s British inter-service rivalry between the Royal Navy and the Royal 
Air Force.  
From the First World War until the start of the Second World War, the debate on the influence of 
air power on maritime warfare was philosophically visionary, but also challenging for the 
organisations. In Britain the Royal Air Force was established in 1918, and officially held 
command of all military aviation from 1918-1937 despite many attempts by the Royal Navy to 
gain control of the maritime air forces. The organisational debate peaked several times; during 
the Belfour Sub-Committee of 1923, the Trenchard-Keyes Agreement of 1924, in 1925 as the 
Admiralty approached the Colwyn Committee, and again in 1928 and 1932–1933. However, 
there came no major changes until 1937, by when the Royal Navy finally managed to gain 
control of their own sea-based forces – and the Fleet Air Arm was established.1 The Royal Navy 
soon acquired a greater amount of organisational influence over all maritime air forces, and in 
fact held the most prominent positions during the Second World War. During the war, a 
relatively effective command and control regime was established. However, at the end of the 
Second World War, as all existing military forces naturally were about to be decreased, two great 
inter-service issues emerged: Which of the services should be in control of the maritime air 
forces, and what was the true impact of the aircraft carrier, the new capital ship of the greater 
navies?  
The first question was solved by the famous ‘Dickson-Lambe Agreement’ in 1946. The 
command of the maritime air forces was decided to be upheld in conjunction with the 
conclusions reached by the Defence Committee (Operations) of the War Cabinet in December 
                                                 
1
 Gjert Lage Dyndal, Trenchard and Slessor; on the supremacy of air power over sea power (Trondheim, Norway: 
Tapir Academic Press, 2007), pp.14-19. 




            
   
 
 
1940. The command relationships of the maritime forces recognised that the naval command 
would normally be the predominant actor as of operations, but organisationally the Coastal 
Command would stay an integral part of the Royal Air Force. A similar debate was raised in the 
late 1950s, but also then decided to be upheld in the traditional British organisation from 1937, 
1940/41 and 1946.2 The organisational model was officially resolved, with both the Royal Air 
Force and Royal Navy holding stakes in the maritime theatre. However, this solution obviously 
gave, and still gives ground for inter-service rivalry over doctrinal focus and development.  
The second question, regarding the true impact and importance of aircraft carriers was not so 
clearly resolved in British military circles. For the great navies the carrier had proven the 
principal weapon of war, the capital ship. In the immediate post-war years only the US Navy and 
the Royal Navy had carriers, but France, Canada and Australia were before long set up with 
former British carriers. The development of larger jet-aircraft soon required sizeable carriers, and 
the US Navy led the course. The American developments came as a result of the experiences 
from the Korean War and the ongoing war in Vietnam, where carrier aviation was a great 
augmentation to the land-based aircraft. In the case of the British Armed Forces, the carrier 
advocates had harder times. The Royal Air Force had all along been sceptical and in opposition 
to the carriers as means of providing air power. This is well captured in a note by Trenchard in 
1946:  
With regard to Navies; here I consider we must face a major change in our traditional 
outlook. We must get away from all preconceived ideas of prestige being enhanced or 
even dependent upon the number and size of battleships kept by the nation. The days of 
the big ship are past. They can no longer operate in the face of Air Power. Carriers were a 
passing phase and could only be used when one power ruled the air and was predominant 
over its enemy.3  
 
However, as there were few greater investments required in the post-war period, this underlying 
difference in professional opinions did not spark any significant debates or inter-service rivalry. 
When debate on force structures emerged, it was rather about what should be phased-out. As for 
the individual services, the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy, it came more to an intra-service 
debate over balancing of forces. The Royal Air Force focused primarily on strategic forces, 
while the Royal Navy focused mainly on traditional sea warfare. Largely, the individual service 
focus did not challenge the responsibilities of the other. As Grove explained:  
                                                 
2
 Ibid, p.18. 
3
 Hugh Trenchard, ‘Air Power and National Security’, in Gjert Lage Dyndal, Trenchard and Slessor, p.63.  




            
   
 
 
The emphasis on the primacy of strategic air warfare was perhaps a little worrying for the 
Admiralty, but the requirement to fight a traditional sea war in defence of merchant 
shipping and troopships was enough to sustain naval force goals that were grand indeed.4  
 
Up until the mid-1950s, the need for carriers rested with the Anglo-American focus on the Soviet 
Navy in the northern and eastern Atlantic, the Channel, the North Sea and the Norwegian Sea, as 
well as the Mediterranean and the Middle East. There was also some focus on the global role, not 
least with the Korean War. However, it became generally accepted that full scale maritime war 
or power projection was not possible without joint efforts with the US Navy. There were some 
discussion in 1954-55 about the need for fleet carriers, but as the span of responsibility was 
extensive the Royal Navy managed to argue their case.5 From the mid-1950s, several issues 
influenced and changed British thinking, both regarding policy and military strategy. Anthony 
Eden became the new prime minister and was not so occupied with maritime issues and the 
Royal Navy. The Suez Crisis, where especially the helicopter and commando/amphibious forces 
proved their worth, had consequences for both the political leadership and the military forces. 
Generally, the British placed even greater reliance on nuclear weapons for home-security, and 
the concrete Sandys Defence Review of 1957 charted the course for international focus, the 
missile age and the down-sizing of the Army and Air Force.6 All these issues sat the scene for 
the late 1950s, as the question about replacement programmes for the old wartime-design 
carriers came to the forefront. It was clear that a longer and more difficult period of inter-service 
rivalry was bound to occur. The upcoming conflict was ignited by a fight for limited resources 
for defence in a generally poor period for British economy, and the general accepted view is that 
the changes that occurred both to British policy and military structures may be explained by 
economic reasons. However, the core of the inter-service rivalry we saw in the 1960s by the 
Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force was a true and lasting difference in professional opinion on 
the use of air power forces – be it land-based or sea-based and the cost-effectiveness of the 
alternatives, as well as whether they should be controlled by the Royal Air Force or the Royal 
Navy.  
The controversy over carriers was of course neither a new nor a purely British debate. It had 
been debated in the 1920-30s among most naval powers, and the US Navy for instance had to 
fight a long battle in the early 1950s for independence of their naval air force and their wish for 
                                                 
4
 Eric Grove, Vanguard to Trident (Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1987), p.33. 
5
 Ibid, pp.114-115.  
6
 Ibid, pp.174-175.  




            
   
 
 
super-carriers.7 For the immediate post-war period, the US Navy rested their rationale for large 
carriers on the nuclear offensive strategic land attacks. This role was soon taken over by the 
development of the long-range bombers and missiles. Following, from the early 1950s, the US 
Navy started focusing on a containment role for the large carriers, including intervention and 
support operations. The FORRESTAL class of large carriers was developed in this era, as well as 
the ENTERPRISE, the world’s first nuclear super-carrier, launched in 1961. These developments 
in the USA most likely influenced other nations, not least the British, to follow on with large 
carriers. However, there is no concrete evidence of the British actively relating to the US debates 
in the early 1950s, neither when arguing for new carriers in 1960-61, nor during the inter-service 
rivalry with the Royal Air Force throughout the 1960s.  
The great question whether carrier aviation is effective, or cost-effective in relation to other 
alternative forces, has been an ever lasting discourse since the early days of military aviation. 
Arguably, the British debate in the 1960s on carrier aviation versus land-based air power is the 
widest ranging of them all. For the 1960s, poor economic outlook, several great military 
procurement programmes, changes in British leadership, as well as a gradual change in NATO 
strategies, much due to the rising Soviet threat, especially in the maritime theatre, set the scene 
for a great inter-service rivalry between the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force over the this 
exact question. Both from military strategy and inter-service relationship perspectives, we may 
learn much from this historical case.  
 
The scene for the British debate and rivalry 
For the initial post-Second World War years the Royal Navy was balanced for a wide range of 
roles and responsibilities. The offensive strategic Anglo-American naval carrier forces were 
aiming at the Soviets, as well as becoming involved in the full scale war in Korea. However, by 
the mid 1950s the Royal Navy came to face a crisis of identity. With the development of nuclear 
strategic missiles and long-range bombers armed with nuclear weapons, the position of the Royal 
Navy sharply decreased in relation to the other services. As the Royal Navy largely lost their role 
in the home region, First Sea Lord Mountbatten turned the focus to the southeast, normally 
referred to as the East of Suez in British history. Under Lord Mountbatten the Royal Navy found 
                                                 
7
 For the initial years and rise of naval aviation in the USA, see: W. Trimble, Admiral William A. Moffett. Architect 
of Naval Aviation (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1994). For the US Navys fight for independence, and 
not least for their fight for large carriers in the post- Second World War period see: J. Barlow, Revolt of the 
Admirals (Washington: Brassey’s, 1998). 




            
   
 
 
a role in the nuclear era; they became an East of Suez navy ready to fill the gap of influence by 
use of carrier sea-mobile forces as the colonies and British garrisons were gradually being built 
down. By the Royal Navy, the experiences of the early ‘Malayan Emergency’, the Korean War 
and the Suez Crisis were argued as evidences on the effectiveness of carrier aviation. The same 
happened after the outbreak of the ‘Indonesia – Malaya Confrontation’ in 1962. This ‘East of 
Suez role’ for the Royal Navy dominated in British defence debates during the 1957 Sandys’s 
Defence Review, the annual Defence White Papers and the 1962 Defence Review. This strategic 
focus also continued within the naval circles into the dramatic years of inter-service rivalry over 
the great procurement programmes, as well as the debates on British defence policy and military 
strategic options in the 1960s.   
On the other side, also the Royal Air Force had a history, and used to a large extent the same 
conflicts and small wars to argue their case. The general air forces had effectively fought in 
Aden and the early ‘Malayan Emergency’ in the late 1940s, in Kenya, Muscat, Yemen and 
Oman, as well as Cyprus in the first half of the 1950s. Also the V-bomber nuclear strategic 
forces saw good times in the 1950s. The days of the fighter communities on the contrary were hit 
by the Sandys’s Defence Review in 1957, stating that: ‘Fighter aircraft will in due course be 
replaced by ground-to-air guided missile systems’.8 It was a gradual decrease in the late 1950s, 
but the Royal Air Force first became truly concerned over their future influence and position 
when the decision came to acquire the USN Polaris system in the early 1960s – at the expense of 
the V-bombers. The Royal Air Force had lost much of their fighter community in the late 1950s 
and the strategic role of the V-bombers in the early 1960s – and were therefore fully committed 
to increase their range of roles, and definitively not ready to lose any more influence and 
responsibilities to the other services.  
Throughout this post-war period, elements of inter-service rivalry followed the Royal Air Force 
and the Royal Navy. There were some peaks of discussion in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis, as 
well as after a missed attempt (again) by Lord Mountbatten and the Admiralty to include the 
Coastal Command within the Fleet Air Arm and the Royal Navy in 1958-59. However, until the 
1960s, the inter-service fighting was managed and did not escalate to a level where it obstructed 
British military capabilities and strategic interests. 
In addition, Britain’s economic problems in this period influenced all aspects of foreign and 
defence policies. Even though there are disagreements on the true nature of the economic 
                                                 
8
 PP, Defence Outline of Future Policy, HMSO 1957 (124).  




            
   
 
 
constraints and the devaluation of 1967, it clearly occupied much attention at the time and was 
central to the political perceptions of most politicians.9 Neither the Conservative nor the Labour 
Governments could turn the economy around, and both governments tried to turn to Europe for 
closer economic co-operation. The Conservatives applied for EEC membership in 1963, and the 
Labour Government in 1967. Both attempts were vetoed by the French president, De Gaulle. 
However, the economic policies between the conservative and central labour politicians did not 
differ much. The most widespread understanding is that there was a national ‘consensus’ on 
economy policy. The Conservative Government’s policies before 1964 have also been described 
as ‘Labour policies’.10 This perspective has been questioned in later years, and ‘consensus’ is 
perhaps not the best description – but the differences, and the possibilities for differences, were 
not too great due to the continuous pressure on the economy. It is impossible to judge whether 
any great differences would have come about if there had been a different government in charge. 
The British economy was under strain, and the defence sector lost out for the demands of 
increased costs of living. However, this was a trend throughout Europe, the US, and Japan – and 
not solely a British concern. Therefore, it is hardly useful to get into a discussion on ‘what ifs?’; 
if the Labour Party had not won that marginal victory in 1964, if Gaitskell had come to power in 
Labour instead of Wilson, had Heath and the Conservatives won power in 1966, etc. As for the 
debate on maritime air power, land-based air power versus carrier forces, this was not influenced 
by party politics, but the widespread feeling of sustained economic crisis across the political 
parties was important. This set the scene for the inter-service rivalry examined in this 
dissertation. 
 
Prevailing perceptions and sources  
As of today there has not been written a thorough study of the exact topic of land-based air 
power versus carrier task forces of this period, despite the fact that this ‘inter-service rivalry’ 
controversy has often been referred to by others as both important and comprehensive. 
However, much other literature exists, particularly concerning British imperial retreat and 
defence policy, as well as the famous technical programmes of the 1960s (e.g. the TSR.2 strike 
aircraft, the VTOL Harrier, and the CVA-01 fleet carrier). All these issues are full research items 
                                                 
9
 I have based my review of the economy debate impact on: Alec Cairncross, The British Economy since 1945 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), David Marsh ed., Postwar British Politics in Perspective (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1999) and Nicholas Crafts and Nicholas Woodward eds., The British Economy Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1991).  




            
   
 
 
in their own right, and have therefore been limited to being ‘technological prospects’ for the 
conceptual ideas of carrier forces and land-based air power. Even though the dissertation 
necessarily touches on these central and complicated topics, their stories are not the aim of this 
research per se. Due to the complexity of the inter-service rivalry – it has been necessary to stay 
focused on the main question of land-based versus carrier air power for the primary source 
research, as well as for the review of existing literature.  
Concerning British defence policy and empire retreat, a comprehensive body of literature exists. 
Much was written at the time, and some written by historians in retrospect. The most important 
works are Bartlett’s The Long Retreat and The Special Relationship. Carver’s Tightrope 
Walking, British Defence Policy since 1945, Darby’s British Defence Policy East of Suez 1947-
1968, M. Dockrill’s British Defence since 1945, and Kyle’s Suez, Britain’s End of Empire in the 
Middle East.11 Of the most recent books, S. Dockrill’s Britain’s Retreat from East of Suez, S. 
Dockrill and Hughes’s edited book Cold War History and Petersen’s The Decline of the Anglo-
American Middle East 1961-1969, A Willing Retreat, give new insight based on recent released 
archival sources, though an overweighed focus on American sources and the ‘special 
relationship’. Further recent and good articles include: S. Dockrill’s ‘Britain’s Power and 
Influence: Dealing with Three Roles and the Wilson Government’s Defence Debate at Chequers 
in November 1964’, Lane’s ‘Third World Neutralism and British Cold War Strategy, 1960-62’, 
Ovendale’s ‘Macmillan and the Wind of Change in Africa, 1957-1960’ and Tomlinson’s ‘The 
Decline of the Empire and the Economic “decline” of Britain’. Further have Johnson’s book 
Defence By Ministry, Phythian’s The Labour Party, War and International Relations, 1945-
2006, Snyder’s The Politics of British Defence Policy, 1945-1962, and Bradford’s PhD 
dissertation from 1999, Political aspects of strategic decision making in British defence policy, 
proved very helpful for giving an understanding of the general political processes in the period. 
This body of literature has been important for understanding the greater question about the 
retreat from empire, however, it does not provide much detailed information about the two 
alternative military concepts proposed and argued for by the military services. These studies 
which are focused on Britain’s changing foreign policy are little concerned with bureaucratic 
problems within the departments, e.g. the inter-service rivalry between the Admiralty and Air 
Ministry of the Ministry of Defence. This exemplified with a note by Saki Dockrill: ‘…the book 
confines itself to the debates at the highest levels, without getting bogged down in the details of 
                                                                                                                                                             
10
 E.g. the chapter title; ‘Conservative governments with labour policies, 1951-64’, in Malcolm Pearce and Geoffrey 
Steward, British Political History 1867-2001 (London: Routledge, 1992), p.463.  
11
 See bibliography for full reference on the background body of literature.  




            
   
 
 
inter-service rivalry or intra-service rivalries.’12 This dissertation discusses whether this 
simplification, which seems to have become a general accepted view among those who have 
researched the 1960s in British defence and foreign policy history, is correct. The hypothesis for 
this dissertation is that the planned run-down of the garrisons, possibly replaced by mobile 
reinforcement forces – be it carrier task forces or land-based air power, had influence on the 
greater policy discussion.  
As for the individual services and the specific procurement programmes, a great body of 
literature also exists. Concerning the East of Suez involvement and the story of the Royal Navy, 
the standard work for the last two decades has been Grove’s Vanguard to Trident. Additionally, 
Till’s latest The Development of British Naval Thinking and Hill’s Lewin of Greenwich, as well 
as Friedman’s British Carrier Aviation give an extensive overview of British naval thinking and 
the carrier programmes.13 Concerning the carrier controversy, Grove (as a naval historian) 
presents a critical examination of the choices made by the Royal Navy during this time frame, 
and presents a balanced view on the story. However, as Grove’s study also covers a far greater 
time frame, and has a purely naval focus, much detail regarding the carrier versus land-based air 
power debate is naturally missing. In fact, much of the archival sources available regarding the 
1960s were not yet declassified when Grove conducted his important study. Grove based his 
research on secondary sources, open unclassified sources and interviews. Despite of the lack of 
archival sources at the time, the main conclusions from Vanguard to Trident regarding the 
specific cancelation of CVA-01 still stand. The conclusions and the greater story are also readily 
available from the annual Defence White Papers. However, there are also some factors that have 
been underrated by former researchers. For instance do most naval historians, Grove included, 
regret that Mountbatten stepped down in 1965, and suggest that the outcome could have been 
different.14 This research will discuss whether this would have been the case. A further general 
perception among historians is that the ‘Island Strategy’ was more a sidetrack and brief 
alternative to carrier task forces. However, a comprehensive review of the new archival sources 
clearly indicates that the Air Ministry’s conceptual ideas for the use of land-based air power 
were thorough and of a great magnitude. In fact, the Air Ministry’s numerous studies of and 
                                                 
12
 Saki Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat from East of Suez (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p.7.  
13
 There are further many books on the Royal Navy of this period. I have had great pleasure of Donald and March’s 
Carrier Aviation 1950 – Present, Longstaff’s The Fleet Air Arm, Sturvivant’s British Naval Aviation, and 
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correspondence with the leadership of the Ministry of Defence and the Treasury (and others) far 
exceeded that of the Admiralty. The hypothesis of this research is that by methodically 
approaching the study of the troublesome 1960s from a two-service perspective, the land-based 
air power versus the carrier option, rather than the common single service (navy or air force) or 
programme (e.g. CVA-01 or the Harrier) approach – new and additional aspects and 
explanations may expand or challenge our knowledge.  
There are further a few specific articles on the CVA-01 project which use recent archival sources 
and offer ample insight: Bradford’s Thirty years on: reflections on CVA-01 versus TSR2 and 
Spellers article The Royal Navy, expeditionary operations and the end of empire, 1956-75.15 
Bradford makes a good comparative study of the two services, but limits himself to the concrete 
procurement programmes. Speller’s article gives a short, but satisfactory starting point to a 
debate on the inter-service rivalry. His conclusion suggest that the cancelation of CVA-01 and 
the planned build-down of the carrier force came to fruition because the tasks required changed 
and also because the Royal Navy did not, as opposed to the Royal Air Force, argue that their 
concept could alone meet the challenges of the future. This implies that the Royal Navy played a 
more gentleman’s political game, not arguing for an unrealistic case. However, this dissertation 
argues that the Royal Air Force stance and policy were a sincere scepticism to the cost-
effectiveness of fixed-wing carrier task forces, fleet carriers especially. Additionally, Beedall’s 
‘CVA-01’ from his website ‘Navy-Matters’ and Gorst’s article ‘CVA-01’ in Harding’s edited 
book The Royal Navy 1930-2000 are based on new material. However, these two latter articles 
focus predominately on technical aspects of the carrier programmes, and focus little on the 
impact of the changing strategic framework and the inter-service rivalry. The above mentioned 
literature partly deals with my topic. However, they focus primarily on Royal Navy sources and 
only briefly examine the inter-departmental debates that took place in the period. Starting the 
study, I had a hypothesis that the influence of the opposition from (primarily) the Air Ministry 
and the Treasury must not be underrated when searching for an explanation of e.g. the 
cancellation of CVA-01 and the carrier fleet.  
In the case of the Royal Air Force, fewer over-arching studies have been conducted. However, 
Armitage’s The Royal Air Force, Lee’s Flight from the Middle East, Hoffman’s British Air 
Power in Peripheral Conflict, 1919-1976, and Treuenen’s The Royal Air Force – The Past 30 
Years from 1976 give insight into the general developments and focus of the Royal Air Force in 
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this period.16 Regarding the background and conceptual content of the ‘Island Strategy’, there are 
no deep ranging studies dealing with these issues. This can probably be explained by the fact that 
that nothing came of the ‘Island Strategy’ proposal, as also the many procurement programmes 
needed for the alternative were cancelled in due course. Still, the conceptual ideas are interesting, 
both because they can be applied more generally to the ever lasting discourse, across countries, 
about land-based air power versus carrier air power, but also because the essence of the concepts 
argued was de facto used by the politicians when cancelling the CVA-01 in 1966. The debate 
clearly must have had influence. Additionally, this dissertation researches whether the Air 
Ministry policy, concepts and ideas had influence on the planned build-down of the Royal Navy 
carrier fleet. Broadly, the naval historians have naturally focused their studies from a naval 
perspective, and air force or air power historians have probably not found interest in and 
following hardly focused on the issue, because the consequences actually only hit the Royal 
Navy.  
This dissertation discusses the rationale behind and the full content of the two alternative 
concepts. Especially the land-based option is discussed as this has received little attention by 
researchers in the past, and there has been no broad ranging studies comparing and analysing 
both the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy alternatives and policy for the 1960s. This gives 
valuable insight and knowledge about military strategy; land- and sea-based air power, but also 
shows which ideas gave alternatives for and influenced the political leadership.   
The explicit study of the inter-service rivalry has been only partially researched in the past, and 
the hypothesis of this research is that such an approach will give new insight to many of the 
decisions there came in the 1960s. However much has been written on defence policy and 
procurement programmes, they are all only partially relevant to my focus. Therefore, this 
historical study relies heavily upon archival sources, most of which have been made available 
during the last decade. I started out with the Command Papers as these outline the grand 
narrative and the decisions made. Still, the main bulk of archives used for obtaining a full 
                                                 
16
 As for more specific books on aircraft and the RAF, there are a great number of books available which also have 
proven useful: Ashworth’s RAF Coastal Command: 1936-69, Ball’s The Bomber in British Strategy, Bowyer’s 
Fighter Command 1936-1968, Gething’s Sky Guardians, British Air Defences 1918-1993, as well as Jefford’s book 
on the RAF Squadrons. Books on aircraft and ships have always had a great number of readers. Many of the studies 
are not professional historians’ work, but they are often very detailed and accurate. They are written by genuinely 
interested researchers. I have had great pleasure and use of: Bowyer’s ‘Six decades of jet fighters’, Flintham’s 
Aircraft in British Military Service, Gunsten and Donald’s ‘Fleet Air Arm 1960-69’, Hobbs’s, Aircraft of the Royal 
Navy since 1945, Hunter’s edited book TSR2 with Hindsight, Laming’s Buccaneer, Segell’s Royal Air Force 
procurement: The TSR.2 to the Tornado, Straw and Young’s ‘The Wilson Government and the Demise of TSR-2, 
October 1964-April 1965’, JANE’s - All the worlds Aircraft 1969-70, and Thetford’s Aircraft of the Royal Air Force 
since 1918. 




            
   
 
 
understanding of the arguments for- and against land-based air power and carrier forces are from 
the Air Ministry, Admiralty, Ministry of Defence, Treasury, Cabinet, and Prime Minister files at 
the National Archives at Kew in London. These working-level and inter-departmental documents 
and correspondences best show how the debate evolved, officially and unofficially, and give us 
an understanding of the process and reasons behind the decisions that were made. Additionally, 
it soon became clear that national British maritime strategic thinking (relating to home-waters) 
had been reduced greatly in the era of nuclear deterrence. I therefore had to visit the NATO 
Archives in Brussels to examine NATO’s maritime strategic developments. British strategy for 
home-waters and Europe primarily rested upon NATO, especially from 1956 onward. The 
NATO documents are today released up to 1974, and cover my period of research.  
As this story unfolded more than 40 years ago, most of those involved are deceased. However, I 
have conducted interviews and correspondence with some who were involved: Peter Hudson, 
who was Assistant Secretary at S6 (Air), Air Ministry (1956-57), Head of Air Staff Secretariat 
(1958-61), Under Secretary of State, Cabinet Office (1969-72) and Assistant Under Secretary of 
State (MOD), 1975-76; Sir Michael Quinlan, who was Private Secretary to the Chief of the Air 
Staff from 1962-65. He has further been Private Secretary to the Parliamentary Under-Secretary 
of State for Air from 1956-58, and served in MoD and NATO positions up to 1992; Admiral of 
the Fleet Sir Henry (Conyers) Leach, who was Director of Naval Plans 1968-70, Commanded 
Commando Ship HMS ALBION in 1970, Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Policy) 1971-73, and 
First Sea Lord 1979-82. These interviews and correspondence proved very helpful. They largely 
confirmed the picture I have made from the archival research, but also challenge some of my 
perceptions of documents. However, as they are few, they do not justify interviews as data-
collection for a methodically balanced view. Sadly, I did not get the possibility of interviewing 
Denis Healey or get access to examine his personal papers. However, his books The time of my 
life and When shrimps learn to whistle, as well Pearce’s Denis Healey, A life in our times set out 
his view on many of the questions raised in this dissertation. Other important persons include 
Mountbatten and Zuckerman, especially for the early 1960s. I got to review both the 
Mountbatten Papers at University of Southampton and the Zuckerman Archives at the University 
of East Anglia. As the interviews are few, the memoirs and books on the most central figures of 
the period have contributed to a better understanding of their perspectives. A pit-fall is of course 
that they are naturally subjective, and often give favour to their authors’ participation in the 
processes. Especially useful, in addition to the books on and by Healey, were Zuckerman’s 




            
   
 
 
Monkeys, Men and Missiles. An autobiography 1946-88, Wilson’s The Labour Government 
1964-1970, a personal record and Macmillan’s At the end of the day, 1961-1963.17  
After an extensive review of existing literature, it is clear that the debate on land-based air power 
and carrier task force concepts have not been fully or explicitly studied. The greater story has 
been told and the decisions have been noticed, but former researchers have not made use of all 
the available documents to fully explain the underlying debate. It has been referred to by many 
as the great ‘inter-service rivalry’ in their studies of policy, navy and air force, or ship and 
aircraft history. Arguably, this was much more than an ‘inter-service rivalry’. This decade long 
debate was comprehensive, vigorous and complicated. Even though the debate was motivated 
from a fight for resources, it was mainly a conceptual debate. And for all who are interested in 
the field of maritime air power, the essence of this historical debate is important.  
 
Purpose of the dissertation 
 
…the only satisfactory course from the Defence point of view is to have the matter out 
fully and frankly. I do not think that any formula or palliative will solve the current 
difficulties, for these difficulties are right at the hart of the matter. The central fact is that 
there is a deep and sincere difference of professional military opinion about whether 
strike carriers give value for money as weapons of war in present and likely future 
circumstances. This is a real issue of high importance, not just an inter-service squabble 
which can be solved by shelving or bargaining or knocking a few heads together.18  
Michael Quinlan, 10 February 1965 
 
The British maritime air power story of the 1960s has been referred to by many. Still, due to its 
complexity and previous lack of archival sources it has only been partially researched and 
understood. Former studies have for instance largely focused on the CVA-01 QUEEN 
ELISABETH story, and therefore offered little depth as regard the Royal Air Force perspectives.  
The focus and purpose of this dissertation are twofold; to conduct a thorough study of the 
conceptual debate on land-based air power versus sea-based air power and secondly to examine 
the inter-service rivalry between the Admiralty and Air Ministry and the related discussion of 
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policy and opinion. It was clear that the established global presence of garrisons and bases would 
be built down. However, the British still wanted global political influence and the Admiralty and 
Air Ministry became interlocked in a political fight over which of their military strategies or 
concepts could best meet the challenges of the future. During this decade almost all possible 
arguments were raised, both for and against land-based air power and carrier air power. Keeping 
in mind that much was at stake, the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy found use for all their 
experience from the Second World War and the many limited wars of the post-war period. In 
addition to the historical interest, this debate should have great relevance for the Royal Navy and 
the Royal Air Force, as well as other nations, for similar current and future debates. The 
dissertation has no intentions of fully explaining the British retreat from its former empire, 
however the alternative military concepts of land-based air power and carrier forces argued by 
the two military services were fully integrated with and possibly influenced the greater debates 
on foreign and defence policy and strategy.  
Additionally, the narrative function of this dissertation should not be underrated. The 
comprehensiveness of the inter-service rivalry and the conceptual debate on land-based air 
power versus carrier aviation has not yet been fully laid out. This dissertation places the 
numerous studies on defence policy and military projects and suggestions, as well as the 
preliminary decisions and final decisions conducted throughout the 1960s, in order and context. 
This should be of great importance to other researchers studying British defence policy and 
military developments of the 1960s.  
 
Methodical approach and structure of the dissertation 
As for the methodical approach, both historical and theoretical perceptions of various social 
sciences could have been used for examining the problems raised in this dissertation. The 
rational actor’s perception does contribute to understanding the British retreat from empire. 
However, in the case of internal British decisions on the procurement programmes and ‘inter-
service rivalry’, it gives little insight into the politics and lobby leading up to the point of 
decision ‘by the rational actors’. For these cases, organisational theory and governmental theory 
are more helpful. Organisational theory reminds us of the complexity of governance. The many 
groups within and attached to a government are bound to follow their own agendas, but are 
restrained by governmental rules and processes. The governmental theory rather emphasised the 
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leaders (often many central actors) and the bargaining of the many choices available.19 Both 
these latter theoretical perceptions contribute to an understanding of the political processes. Due 
to the fact that the main aim of the dissertation has been to bring forward the underlying debate 
on land-based versus carrier-based air power, a stringent historical method has been used. I have 
therefore not found it useful to apply a structure based on a theoretical foundation on e.g. 
decision-making, be it international relations ‘rational actor’, political science ‘governmental’ or 
‘comparative’, economic or organisational theory approaches. However, this does not exclude 
their contribution to understanding the decisions that were made. The complexity and 
comprehensiveness of this decade long story is firstly in need of a complete research by 
historical method.  
Broadly, the research has been conducted in a chronological structure. Towards the end of the 
introduction chapter, some background information on the national departments involved is 
provided. The first chapter takes as its starting point the late 1950s, when the Royal Navy wanted 
to modernise their carrier fleet. The existing carriers would last until the 1970s, but it was argued 
that new larger carriers were needed for operating new and larger jet aircraft. By 1960, this 
evolved into the concrete question of the building of new fleet carriers for the 1970s. This was 
initially generally accepted within political circles. However, as this clearly would involve great 
strains on an already pressed economic situation for the other military services, the Royal Air 
Force soon confronted the Royal Navy in a vigorous inter-service battle. In addition to the 
economic reason for this political battle, the Royal Air Force were genuinely convinced that 
carrier aviation was not a cost-effective way of exercising air power. The first chapter explains 
the views of the Royal Navy arguing for the carrier task force concept and how the Royal Air 
Force land-based air power argument developed. Strangely, the ‘Island Strategy’, which they 
argued for, has not yet been given its rightful attention by previous researchers. This concept 
became a concrete military strategic alternative to carrier task forces. Following these two 
military strategic options, a neutral study-group under the chairmanship of the Chief Scientific 
Advisor, Sir Solly Zuckerman, was established to compare the two options. The first chapter 
ends with the conclusions of this enquiry, as well as a review of the British land-based and 
carrier-borne air power capabilities in question. The second chapter takes the arguments of the 
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two services into debate. Broadly, the Treasury and Air Ministry criticised the carrier task force 
concept, while the Admiralty and the Chief Scientific Advisor criticised the ‘Island Strategy’. By 
some, this may be seen as an ‘inter-service rivalry’ of little importance. I will argue that in order 
for a debate on land-based versus carrier-borne air power to be carried out, this outside criticism 
was crucially important in order to provide a comprehensive understanding of the question. The 
third chapter starts out with a short description of the change of government in October 1964, 
and a review of the NATO strategy debate and the British challenges East of Suez. However, the 
main bulk of the chapter reviews how the Royal Navy’s carrier task force concept again came 
under fire during the two-phased defence review the new Secretary of State for Defence, Denis 
Healey, started in 1965. The fourth chapter follows the previous, and focuses on the 
controversial end to the CVA-01 story. For the debate on land-based air power and carrier-based 
air power, the decision in itself is not particularly interesting. However, the way the Government 
and Healey argued that land-based air power would fill the previous roles of the carriers is very 
interesting. The fifth and sixth chapters examine and discuss the Soviet naval build-up and 
NATO’s changing strategies. I began my research with a hypothesis that the Soviet naval build-
up in the High North influenced the British retreat from its global role. The sixth chapter also 
reviews the British forces’ capability needs asked for by NATO. These two chapters are 
important for understanding the structuring of the British forces in the early 1970s, including the 
new ‘through-deck cruisers’ and the roles of land-based air power. The last (seventh) chapter 
unites those that came prior and brings together the British restructuring of the military forces, 
the retreat from the East of Suez decided by the Labour Government in 1966-68, the Soviet naval 
build-up, and NATO’s changing strategies. In the end, the fate of the carriers and the land-based 
air power option became something other than envisaged in 1966-68.   
 
Background of the main governmental departments involved 
As the research focuses on the debate on land-based air power versus the carrier task force 
concept that took place in Britain in the 1960s, an introductory explanation of the main 
departments involved is necessary:  
The Ministry of Defence 
From 1946 until 1964, five Departments of State made up what we today know as the Ministry 
of Defence (MoD). In addition to the Ministry of Defence, there were then the Admiralty, the 
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War Office, the Air Ministry, as well as the Ministry of Aviation. The military services had great 
independent influence in this period. The Ministry of Defence, during the pre-1964 period, was a 
small ministry, intended to co-ordinate the activities of the others. The total civilian and military 
staff of the MoD only counted some 1,300 for the early 1960s. By comparison, the British staff 
at the NATO headquarters counted more than 3,000.20 For my period of study, the Minister of 
Defence post was held by: Duncan Sandys (January 1957 – October 1959), Harold Watkinson 
(October 1959 – March 1962) and Peter Thorneycroft (July 1962 - 1964). 
In 1964, under the Conservative Government of Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the single service 
ministries of the Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry, were centralised in a new powerful 
Ministry of Defence.21 With the new organisation of 1964, the official title of its leader was 
changed to Secretary of State for Defence. Peter Thorneycroft, the current minister, became the 
first Secretary of State. He was succeeded by Denis Healey (October 1964 – June 1970) and 
Peter Carrington (June 1970 – January 1974).  
Up to 1964, the heads of the Admiralty, War Office, and Air Ministry had made the Chiefs of 
Staff Committee. This was the military advisory group of the Prime Minister and the 
Government. The group was from 1958 onward led by a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). This was 
a post that was intended to alternate between the services. Up to the unity of the MoD in 1964, 
the position was held by Marshal of the RAF Sir William F. Dickson (January 1956 – July 1959) 
and Admiral of the Fleet Earl Mountbatten of Burma (July 1959 – July 1965). With 
Mountbatten, the Chief of Staff became a more forceful factor in policy making. As described by 
Johnson: ‘He was no longer at the minister’s beck and call, but operated on more of a basis of 
partnership’.22 Mountbatten had been one of the key architects to create the new defence 
organisation. The vision was a closer integration of the services under ‘a decisive Minister of 
Defence and a powerful CDS’.23 The fragmented line of arguments by the services in numerous 
cases, which had caused much inter-service rivalry, was now to be co-ordinated and 
communicated from one man’s authority. Despite the visions of Mountbatten, from 1964 onward 
the Chief of Defence lost direct influence and became more of an advisor to the new Secretary of 
State and less linked to the Prime Minister and the Government. The reorganisation of the 
Ministry of Defence, with more power to the political leader, was supported by both the Labour 
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Party and Conservatives.24 Following the reorganisation Mountbatten continued for a while, but 
was soon relieved by Field Marshal Sir Richard Amyatt Hull (July 1965 – August 1967). The 
Chief of Staff continued to be the corporate advisor to the Cabinet regarding defence strategy. 
However, for the initial years after the 1964 reorganisation of the Ministry of Defence, the 
Secretary of State, Denis Healey, had strong influence on all aspects of defence. The Chief of 
Defence Staff post was for the last period held by Marshal of the RAF, Lord Elworthy (August 
1967 – April 1971), followed by Admiral of the Fleet Lord Hill-Norton.  
The Defence Board was further a central group of the MoD. It was also created in 1958. This 
group consisted of the professional heads of the services, the service Chiefs, and senior officials. 
The group was renamed the Defence Council in 1964. After the centralisation of the power to the 
MoD the same year, the Defence Council took over the executive roles previously held by the 
three service ministries. The previous roles of the Admiralty were covered by the new Navy 
Board and the roles of the Air Ministry were covered by the Air Force Board, or often called the 
Air Board or just the Air Staff. These became sub-committees of the Defence Council, and lost 
much of their own civilian bureaucracy.25  
Another group of experts that gained great influence in the early 1960s was the Scientific 
Advisors. For this period, this meant Solly Zuckerman as well as the Defence Research Policy 
Committee (DRPC). This group was charged with advising the Minister of Defence and the 
Chief of Defence Staff on technical developments and cost, as well as how this related to defence 
policy.26 For the period of the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, great belief and emphasis 
was placed on scientific developments. Historical determinism stood strong. The Scientific 
Advisors gained great influence on research and development, but also on cost and strategy 
developments. For the early half of the 1960s, the Chief Scientific Advisor practically ranked at 
level with the Chief of Defence Staff.27 As shown in this research, scientific developments and 
prospects very much set the scene for strategic thinking. (The evolving ‘Island Strategy’ being 
perhaps the best example.)  
The Air Ministry 
The Air Ministry was the civil service department of the Royal Air Force until the establishment 
of the greater MoD in April 1964. It was politically led by a cabinet level Secretary of State for 
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Air. 28 The professional head was the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS). For this period of research, 
the post was held by: Sir Dermot Boyle (January 1956 – January 1960), Sir Thomas Pike 
(January 1960 – September 1963), Lord Charles Elworthy (September 1963 – April 1967), Sir 
John Grandy (April 1967 – April 1971), and Sir Denis Spotswood (April 1971 – April 1974).  
In addition to the Chief of the Air Staff, central posts of the Air Ministry included the Deputy 
Chief of the Air Staff (DCAS),29 which was later abolished in 1968, and the Vice Chief of the 
Air Staff (VCAS).30   
As discussed above, the service ministries (Air Ministry and Admiralty in this case) lost 
autonomous and departmental power after the reorganisation of the Ministry of Defence in 1964. 
However, the Chief of Defence Staff position did not increase in influence at first. One reason 
for this was that the new Chief of Staff was ‘fragile’, meaning that the relatively good co-
operation of the first years could easily be damaged. Mountbatten, as Chief of Defence Staff, 
deliberately tried to keep the most controversial inter-service issues out of his staff for this 
reason. The other reason, which particularly makes the 1964-66 period exceptional, was that 
Denis Healey actively played the services to get the arguments out in the open. It was possibly 
also a means of playing them off each other, thereby achieving, and pushing forward more 
easily, his politics. This controversial topic is discussed at length in this dissertation.   
The Admiralty 
The Admiralty was the civil service department for the Royal Navy until 1964. In addition, it 
was the operational headquarters dealing with e.g. foreign deployments. The Admiralty has 
traditionally occupied a special position among the service departments. It is the oldest of the 
departments, and represents great maritime and imperial traditions. The department consisted of 
a Board of Admiralty, which was led by the First Lord of the Admiralty, a governmental 
minister.31 The Board of Admiralty normally met once a month. From 1964, the Admiralty 
became the Navy Department and its governing body, the Navy Board, became subordinate to 
the Defence Council. The name ‘Admiralty’ was however often used even after 1964. According 
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to Snyder, the Admiralty organisation was by far the most effective among the services. ‘In any 
discussion of the three services, the Admiralty is invariably the first mentioned and always first 
in any comparative ranking’.32 About the Air Ministry, Snyder concluded that the service was 
‘not credited with quite the same degree of strength and excellence as the Admiralty’.33 These 
perceptions will be debated and seriously questioned in this dissertation. Generally, much points 
to an opposite conclusion.  
The First Sea Lord was the professional head of the Royal Navy. He also held the title Chief of 
the Naval Staff (CNS). For this research period, the position was held by: The Earl Mountbatten 
of Burma (1955-59), Sir Charles Lambe (1959-60), Sir Caspar John (1960-63), Sir David Luce 
(1963-66), Sir Varyl Begg (1966-68), Sir Michael Le Fanu (1968-1970), Sir Peter Hill-Norton 
(1970-71) and Sir Michael Pollock (1971-74). 
Also the Admiralty had a Deputy-Chief of the Naval Staff (DCNS) 34 and a Vice Chief of the 
Naval Staff (VCNS). The Admiralty’s senior civil servant was the Permanent Secretary (PS)35. 
He was in charge of the Secretariat and responsible for official correspondence.  
The Treasury 
Her Majesty’s Treasury is the department responsible for the British economy and finances. 
Traditionally the Prime Minister holds the title First Lord of the Treasury. However, the  
HM Treasury is in reality led by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. For the period of study, the 
post was held by: Peter Thorneycroft (January 1957 – January 1958), Derick Heathcoat Amory 
(January 1958 – July 1960), Selwyn Lloyd (July 1960 – July 1962), Reginald Maudling (July 
1962 – October 1964), James Callaghan (October 1964 – November 1967), Roy Jenkins 
(November 1967 – June 1970), Iain Macleod (June – July 1970), and finally Anthony Barber 
(July 1970 – February 1974).  
For both the making of strategy and the procurement programmes of the 1960s, the influence of 
the Treasury should not be understated. The Treasury had great influence. If it could be avoided, 
none wanted to take on a discourse of the financial basis for future plans.36 The Treasury was 
also somewhat different than the service ministries and later staffs of the MoD, as it had a far 
greater and more stable civilian bureaucracy. In British politics, the bureaucracy is not shifted 
with the change of government (as e.g. in American politics). This fact is important for 
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understanding the relatively stable attitude of the Treasury across the 1964 shift of government 
in Britain, as will later be discussed.  
In 1961, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury37 post was established to support the Chancellor. 
The Chief Secretary became second in position in the Treasury, and was also normally given a 
junior position in the Cabinet. During the 1950-70s, the Paymaster-General38 was also organised 
under the Treasury. He was responsible for holding the working balances of government 
departments and other public bodies in high-level accounts at the Bank of England. The 
Paymaster was third in rank, after the Chancellor and the Chief Secretary, in the Treasury. 
                                                                                                                                                             
36
 Johnson, Defence By Ministry, p.84.  
37
 Henry Brooke (October 1961 – July 1962), John Boyd-Carpenter (July 1962 – October 1964), and John Diamond 
( October 1964 – June 1970). 
38
 Reginald Maudling (1957-1959), Lord Mills (1959-1961), Henry Brooke (1961-1962), John Boyd-Carpenter 
(1962-1964), George Wigg (1964-1967), (Vacant 1967-1968), Lord Shackleton (1968), Judith Hart (1968-1969), 
Harold Lever (1969-1970) and Viscount Eccles (1970-1973). 




            




Chapter 1: Carrier Task Forces and the Island Strategy, 1960-63 
 
…having no land base between the United Kingdom and Australia, there will be a 
need for aircraft carriers to provide floating airfields from which British air power 
can operate irrespective of whether this power is provided by the Royal Air Force 
or the Fleet Air Arm.1 
Lord Mountbatten, 1961 
 
The first part of this chapter deals with the carrier replacement programme, which saw light at 
the end of the 1950s in the naval community. The need for new carriers gradually reached the 
political scene in 1960-61. As the review of British defence policy continued the increased focus 
on the East of Suez challenges had made the carriers ever more important. However, as the 
dimension of the programme was realised, the Royal Air Force and Air Ministry came up with 
an alternative concept – the Island Strategy. The second part of this chapter therefore discusses 
the origins of the Island Strategy and how it became a direct and competing alternative to the 
Royal Navy’s carrier task force concept. As there now were two clear alternatives, the inter-
service rivalry escalated greatly during the last months of 1961, and this was a struggle which 
continued until the summer of 1963. In fact, the intricate inter-service rivalry over strategic 
concepts available to the British as the garrisons were steadily scaled down, and the new foreign 
and defence policies, occupied most of the defence debate of 1962-63.  
Due to inter-service rivalry, a common and neutral study comparing the alternatives had to be 
made. A study-group was formed with the Chief Scientific Advisor, Solly Zuckerman, in 1962. 
The third part of this chapter therefor examines the content and focus of this important study.  
As a final part of this chapter, a brief examination of the status of the British forces concerning 
air defence, anti-surface and amphibious capabilities has been made. These three capabilities 
were those mainly in focus at the time, also for Zuckerman’s study.  
 
                                                 
1
 NAUK DEFE 7/2353, Defence policy review: modernisation of aircraft carriers, 1959-1963, Letter from Chief of 
the Defence Staff to the Minister of Defence, 20 December 1961. 




            
   
 
 
Chapter 1-A: Carrier Task Forces 
The need for new carriers 
The first discussions on replacement carriers came about in naval circles in the late 1950s.2 
However, the question of new carriers did not reach the political scene until late in 1960.3 By 
then the fleet consisted of seven HMS ships: CENTAUR, VICTORIOUS, ARK ROYAL, 
EAGLE and HERMES,4 as well as BULWARK and ALBION which had just been converted to 
commando carriers. The quest for replacement came as a consequence of the increased interest in 
the East of Suez missions as well as the ageing of the current fleet, and not least the limitations 
of the current carriers for operating modern and larger jet aircraft. Previously, the naval forces 
had had a less important role in the doctrinal concepts for East of Suez missions than the Army 
with its garrisons and the RAF with the Transport Command. Now, by the early 1960s, there was 
a concept of naval task forces as well, especially mobile land forces and commando ships. By 
1962 HMS ALBION, the second commando ship, joined the HMS BULWARK in service East 
of Suez.5 These new, or revitalised6, requirements and operations evolved in parallel to the 
question of replacement of HMS VICTORIOUS.7 These forces were very much shield-off due to 
their success. As the Minister of Defence stated: ‘…I can not think of any better way of having a 
kind of mobile fire brigade which could be poised in any place where there might be trouble 
brewing’.8  
Presentations on the need for new carriers and the new construction programme were made on 
several occasions during the 1959-60 timeframe. By 1960, the question also reached the House 
of Commons. For instance Mr. Orr-Ewing, the Civil Lord of the Admiralty, spoke on the need to 
replace the existing fleet during a discussion in the House of Commons in November 1960:  
 
                                                 
2
 The Admiralty Ship Department stated that the first serious considerations for the replacement of the existing Fleet 
Carriers commenced in 1959. All the four ships were then envisaged to be replaced with two years interval, starting 
in 1970. See ‘Brief history of the project’ in NAUK ADM 1/29108, ‘Discussion, decision on timing, size, costs etc 
of proposed new Aircraft Carrier’, 1963-66, 16 December 1963.  
3
 NAUK ADM 1/29108. See historical cut-outs from carrier debates.  
4
 HMS CENTAUR (1953/22,000 tons), HMS VICTORIOUS (1941-58/30,000 tons), HMS ARK ROYAL 
(1955/43,000 tons), HMS EAGLE (1951 (under modernisation for 1964) /44,000 tons) and HMS HERMES 
(1959/23,000 tons). 
5
 NAUK DEFE 7/1677, Defence policy review: Admiralty provision of a second commando carrier, 1960-1962. 
6
 For a good discussion on this history, see: Ian Speller, ‘Amphibious Renaissance. The Royal Navy and the Royal 
Marines, 1956-1966’, in International Journal of Naval History (Vol.1, April 2002). 
7
 See for instance NAUK DEFE 7/2354, ‘Replacement of aircraft carriers’, 1959-1963: Record from meeting 
between the Minister of Defence and the Admiralty, 25th January 1962, as well as letter from Chief of defence Staff 
to Minister of Defence, 15th January 1962,  
8
 NAUK DEFE 7/1677, Quote from Hansard 29 February 1960.  




            
   
 
 
Four of our five operational carriers are comparatively new ships and the fifth, the 
‘VICTORIOUS’, was completely rebuilt a few years ago. They should all, therefore, be 
capable of playing a full part with the fleet until the 1970s. Nevertheless, we are 
considering the requirements of the ships which will succeed them.9  
 
The replacement was intended for the 1970s. The Admiralty planned from the beginning to build 
four new carriers, of about the size of HMS EAGLE and HMS ARK ROYAL. The initial 
proposal was to lay down the first ship at the end of 1964 and complete the fourth by 1975.10 
Still, outside the Admiralty, studies for replacement carriers and the discussions on the future of 
carrier policy did not really commence until the second half of 1961. Mountbatten, the Chief of 
the Defence Staff and the former leader of the Admiralty, was supposed to lead this process. 
With his history and heritage, he had to balance his official support delicately. Still, in 1961, as 
the inter-service rivalry had not yet fully peaked, he clearly and officially supported the 
Admiralty’s aim of four new fleet carriers. He brought the argument for three sea-borne task 
forces, supported by a modern Transport Command and mobile forces, directly to the Prime 
Minister.11 Solly Zuckerman, the Chief Scientific Advisor and a close friend, wrote to 
Mountbatten and explained his concerns about the Admiralty led lobby and independent 
studies.12 Zuckerman stated he was in favour of the carriers, and even argued they had expanded 
usefulness in the East of Suez region. However, he proposed that a broad study-group be 
established to discuss this issue, and thereby make it a ‘properly backed Ministry of Defence 
view’. Mountbatten and his private secretary were reluctant to get into this issue. As the 
secretary wrote to Mountbatten;  
 
The handling of this matter is tricky. On the one hand if you go ahead as suggested there 
will be trouble with the Admiralty. On the other hand if you take no action in the matter 
the news will soon spread round what has happened and that you are backing the Navy.13  
 
Clearly, Mountbatten was under pressure in his dual position; as the joint Chief of Staff and 
simultaneously a dedicated naval officer, having been the former First Sea Lord. It ended up, not 
unsurprisingly, that Mountbatten kept close ties with the Navy, and as the First Sea Lord, Caspar 
                                                 
9
 NAUK DEFE 7/2353, House of Commons extract from 16th Nov 1960. 
10
 NAUK DEFE 7/2354. 
11
 MB1/J102, Minister of Defence and defence organisation 1959-64. Mountbatten to Prime Minister, 6 September 
1961.  
12
 MB1/J56, Carriers: vulnerability of, 1961-4. Zuckerman to Mountbatten, 20 September 1961.  
13
 MB1/J56, PSO to Mountbatten, September 1961.  




            
   
 
 
John wrote to Mountbatten; ‘In any study you organise, I hope the Admiralty may be closely 
associated…’.14 
By the autumn of 1961 the demands for rationalisation were again central. The services were 
forced to co-operate on the issue of new carriers and look into the possibility of common 
grounds for training, as well as the operations of organic air power.15 As for the Air Ministry, it 
was already clear that they would oppose the building of new fleet carriers. It was the view of the 
CAS that by the 1970s-80s, for which time the new carriers were intended, future long-range 
strike aircraft would simply render the aircraft carrier obsolete.16 Francis Festing, who was Chief 
of the Imperial General Staff and thereby assessed to be ‘neutral’ to the conflict between the 
Admiralty and the Air Ministry, was asked by the MoD to look into possible rationalisations, and 
was invited to propose a solution to the question of replacement carriers. Festing’s paper ‘Future 
Air Strike Policy in Limited War Outside Europe’17 was the first study looking into the question 
of carriers versus land-based air power. Both the Admiralty and Air Ministry put forward their 
arguments, but Festing did not really put forward clear support to either case. His conclusion was 
that any British ‘…air strike capability outside Europe should be either one hundred per cent 
shore based or one hundred per cent carrier-based’.18  
In December 1961, First Sea Lord Caspar John wrote a memorandum on ‘Aircraft Carrier 
Replacement’ to the Chiefs of Staff Committee. This memorandum briefly discussed the costs, 
size, and requirements for the 1970s and 1980s. But the Navy’s great challenge was obvious; the 
memorandum came simultaneously with two other programmes; the construction of nuclear 
submarines and the escort cruisers19. Caspar John, the First Sea Lord, was aware of the overall 
cost of the naval construction programmes, and the challenges there were to follow. As for 
priority, he argued that the most important step was for the Navy to build a nuclear submarine 
fleet. The importance of the new cruisers was less critical, while the case for replacement carriers 
                                                 
14
 MB1/J56, Caspar John to Mountbatten, 30 November 1961.  
15
 NAUK ADM 205/214, Aircraft carriers: future role: RAF participation in carrier flying, 1959-1961: NAUK AIR 
2/15915, Aircraft operations from carriers, 1961-1965. Actually, the case for joint operations had also been 
discussed in 1959, as a consequence of the RN’s attempt to take over command of the Coastal Command.  
16
 NAUK AIR 20/11506, Future aircraft carriers: joint Admiralty/Air Ministry study, 1961-1962. Letter by Butler 
(P.S. to Chief of the Air Staff), 11 October 1961.  
17
 NAUK AIR 19/997, RN aircraft carrier force: island base strategy, 1961-1965. Containing a copy of the 




 NAUK DEFE 19/20, Enquiry into Naval carrier task forces, 1962-1965. See copies of the Memorandas on ‘Escort 
Cruisers’, and ‘Nuclear Submarines’ of 18 July 1962, as well as the Memoranda on ‘Carriers and national 
Commitments in the 1970s’ of 20 July 1962.  




            
   
 
 
was more of a demand for the future.20 As for the rationale for the replacement carriers, the focus 
on the world-role and limited war, as well as support to the Army ashore, were all central 
arguments from the outset. 
Caspar John ended the carrier replacement memorandum by recommending to the Chief of the 
Defence Staff that he endorsed the continuing requirement for aircraft carriers and start working 
for a replacement for HMS VICTORIOUS. The first should be ordered by 1962/63.21 The Chief 
of Staff, Mountbatten, followed his suggestion and wrote directly to the Prime Minister arguing 
for the carriers, and simultaneously trying to undermine the new alternative of land-based air 
power:  
 
…since the extent to which reliance can be placed in the next twenty years or so on fixed 
bases is at best very uncertain and we may in this period be faced with having no land 
base between the United Kingdom and Australia, there will be need for aircraft carriers to 
provide floating airfields from which British air power can be operated irrespectively of 
whether this power is provided by the Royal Air Force or the Fleet Air Arm.22 
 
The discussion of replacement of the carriers, and finally over the fate of carrier forces for the 
British, had then reached political circles.  
The issue of new carriers soon became part of the general re-examination of British military 
strategy. It was particularly the Treasury23 that was occupied with this crucial link of future 
strategic developments and the need for carriers. The cost of the ‘obligations East of Suez’ for 
the 1970s was an important framework by 196224, and would be even more so in 1966-67. 
During December 1961 and early 1962, the first major studies came about: The Chiefs of Staff, 
with both the Admiralty and Air Ministry, worked with the question of ‘Future Aircraft Carrier 
Policy’. A ‘Joint Admiralty/Air Ministry Carrier Study Group’ was also established.25 As stated 
in a Admiralty note of 1961: ‘It is necessary to start “now” (more or less) if we are to have Fleet 
                                                 
20
 NAUK AIR 8/2354, Island Strategy and the carrier force, 1962-63. Copy of Chiefs of Staff Committee Minute 
COS(62)3rd Meeting, 9 January 1962.  
21
 NAUK DEFE 7/2354. First sea Lord to Chiefs of Staff Committee, 5th December 1961.  
22
 MB1/J61, Carriers: replacement programme and long term defence strategy, 1962-64. Mountbatten to Minister of 
Defence, 20 December 1961.  
23
 HM Treasury: During the 1950s and early 1960s several reviews of Treasury control were undertaken, and there 
were an increase in the authority delegated to departments to spend within predetermined totals. Between 1964 and 
1969, some of the responsibility for economic planning and growth was transferred to the new Department for 
Economic Affairs. http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/about/about_history/about_history_history.cfm Accessed 5 April 
2008.  
24
 NAUK Treasury Office (T) 225/2156, Admiralty: replacement and modernisation of the present generation of 
aircraft carriers: review, 1962-1963. Note by Peck, 16 August 1962.  
25
 NAUK AIR 20/11506. Several documents, notes and correspondence.  




            
   
 
 
Carriers and aircraft in the 1970s…’26 It was by then a common view within the Chiefs of Staff 
Committee that British reliance on the current concept of fixed bases would not be sufficient in 
the future; it was at best ‘uncertain’.27  
The Chiefs of Staff and the Minister of Defence, believed that HMS VICTORIOUS needed to be 
and would be replaced. However, the Minister of Defence was not satisfied with the strategic 
rationale presented by the Admiralty. They fell back on political polemic too easily. For instance, 
in reply to a question about the rationale of carriers the First Sea Lord answered:  
 
The First Sea Lord of the Admiralty expressed surprise that there should still be doubts 
about the future of the aircraft carrier, following the Admiralty presentation in mid-1961 
and the subsequent evolution of a mobile strategy which depended on the carrier.28 
 
The Admiralty had a problem with getting its message out throughout the 1960s. As Admiral 
Henry Leach described it; the Admiralty tended to be arrogant, too self-centred and naive in this 
period.29   
Another parallel and closely linked issue was the proposal for a common, or ‘joint’ vertical-take-
off and landing (VTOL) fighter aircraft for both services. It was by early 1962 a widespread 
political view that one would opt for a new joint VTOL fighter/ground 
attack/strike/reconnaissance aircraft for any new carriers.30 This demand for a joint VTOL 
aircraft between the services of the Armed Forces was maintained by the Minister of Defence, 
despite scepticism from the Air Ministry and Admiralty,31 as well as Chief Scientific Advisor 
Zuckerman.32  
A short de-tour to examine the P.1127 project is required here: The story of practical applied 
vectored thrust fighter aircraft started in 1956 in Britain with studies made by the Bristol 
Siddeley Engines Company, followed up by a co-operation between Bristol Siddeley and 
Hawker Aircraft. This private venture evolved into the design of the P.1127. It was an industry 
driven process, not initiated by the military services. The Royal Air Force first became interested 
                                                 
26
 NAUK ADM 205/214. Note on the ‘Political Considerations affecting the future of the R.N. and R.A.F.’, October 
1961.   
27
 NAUK DEFE 7/2353. Chief of the Defence Staff to the Minister of Defence, 20 December 1961.  
28
 NAUK ADM 205/193, ‘Naval Staff presentations and studies on carriers, escort cruisers and nuclear submarines’, 
1961-63. Record of Meeting, 24 January 1962.  
29
 Interview with Sir Henry Leach, 27 January 2007.  
30
 NAUK DEFE 7/2354. From several Chiefs of Defence Staff meeting reports and correspondence from December 
1961 to February 1962.   
31
 NAUK ADM 1/29108. ‘V.T.O.L Aircraft’, note of MoD meeting, 17 June 1963.  




            
   
 
 
in the project during the summer of 1958. The first draft requirement for a tactical support and 
ground attack fighter aircraft (GOR.345) came about in January 1959, soon followed by a 
contract for the production of two P.1127 aircraft issued by the Ministry of Aviation.33  
The new aircraft was deemed necessary for limited war roles, as well as for CEATO and NATO. 
The Royal Air Force needed the new aircraft to fill a range of roles:34 
 
• Reconnaissance for all tactical purposes 
• The creation and maintenance of a favourable air situation 
• Isolation and interdiction of the tactical area, including destruction of enemy naval forces 
• Support of land forces including, in limited war only, close support with conventional 
weapons in the battle area 
 
Already from the beginning, the Air Ministry tried to propose the new V/STOL fighter as a 
complimentary aircraft to the planned TSR.2. They argued that no existing or projected aircraft 
could fill these major roles satisfactorily, and that it would be too expensive to design one 
aircraft (as the Admiralty was asking for).  
The Royal Navy on the other hand was reluctant to accept the P.1127 aircraft from the 
beginning. The Royal Navy wanted large carriers, and with that, a capable all-round fighter 
aircraft. The sub-sonic P.1127 simply did not fulfil any of their requirements. The Admiralty also 
argued that the Air Ministry had a hidden agenda in respect of this project, namely the TSR.2 
project.35 According to the Admiralty, the Air Ministry simply could not jeopardise the high 
profile project by ordering another aircraft which could fill many of the roles of the TSR.2. It 
was simply therefore that the Air Ministry made the requirement for a sub-sonic ‘cab-rank’ 
aircraft. However, later as the TSR.2 seemed to be in place, the requirement for a supersonic 
fighter could be argued.36  
It is hardly possible to judge these views right or wrong, but by 1961 the Air Ministry decided 
that the sub-sonic P.1127 would not be a satisfactory close support aircraft. During November – 
December 1961, the Defence Committee requested the MoD to come up with a joint 
requirement. The first draft requirement for a joint Royal Navy and Royal Air Force supersonic 
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 SZ/Chief Scientific Advisor/106, Correspondents H 1959-1968, Zuckerman to Healey, 2 July 1965, SZ/Chief 
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35
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36
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V/STOL fighter aircraft (NO.356) came in January 1962.37 The work on the joint requirement 
continued, and led to the P.1154.  
Evidently, such a joint aircraft would not fulfil all the requirements of either service. However, 
there was a strong case for RAF pilots and aircraft operating from carriers as a means of a more 
rational and cost-effective way of operating British aircraft.   
The maritime strategy East of Suez 
The strategic framework underpinning the Admiralty’s arguments for new carriers for the 1970s 
was largely in place by 1962. Two important documents outline their understanding: ‘Carriers 
and National Commitments in the 1970s’, of which a revised final version was presented in 
September 1962, as well as a larger document called the ‘Comprehensive Carrier Paper’ of 
December 1962.38 Here, the Admiralty argued that the challenges of the 1960s were manageable 
by limited modifications to structures and deployments, even though the defence budget was to 
be reduced. The issue was the 1970s. As it was clear that most of the bases would be abandoned, 
carrier task forces would be needed for the British to uphold some flexibility to project power 
East of Suez.  
During the 1950s and early 1960s many bases had been available, and the Army, Air Force, and 
Navy had been well represented in the East of Suez area. Maritime strategies had therefore also 
been joint endeavours. However, economic realities suggested that any duplication of capability 
had to be discarded. For instance, tactical air power should only be used from land-bases or from 
seaborne forces. According to the Royal Navy, it was clear that the progressive diminution of 
bases and increasing challenges to overflying routes would favour a carrier task force concept. A 
mobile maritime strategy, based on a carrier task force, would be an economically feasible 
solution. Substantial savings would be had from the reduction of (land-based) air forces and 
army forces, not least due to their large network of accommodation and support commitments.39  
The fleet carrier and amphibious forces were central to this mobile maritime strategy argued for 
by the Royal Navy. The amphibious forces should consist of a commando ship carrying some 
850 troops, an assault ship carrying some 350-700 troops, as well as tanks and guns, and perhaps 
a landing ship (logistics) able to carry a limited number of troops. Under cover of a carrier task 
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force (including escorts), such an amphibious force would be able to project power against most 
contingencies (except those of a Normandy scale).40  
By 1962, the Admiralty rationale for a mobile maritime strategy, and with this the need for 
carriers, came down to three main arguments:41 
 
• The ability to intervene in land operations outside Europe could be preserved in the 
1970s at a lower cost than at present, if one would eliminate the duplications of the 
existing strategy, which required land-based aircraft as well as carriers.  
• Only a strategy based on the carrier and the amphibious group would offer the certainty 
of being able to force an entry for land forces under effective air cover wherever needed. 
This would at least be doubly true as the tropical bases had been abandoned.  
• In the 1970s, a maritime strategy in the Indian Ocean or the Pacific would have to be 
founded on an Austalasian support area.  
 
According to the Admiralty, simply no combination of forces or weapon-systems could possibly 
assume the many and varied roles performed by carrier task forces, be it in support of land 
operations or for sea control and the protection of shipping.  
The case for carriers 
The main Admiralty argument for carriers was that such forces were needed to effectively 
deploy tactical air power around the world in the 1970s. With carriers the UK would have a force 
operating in the politically free arena of the seas. The Admiralty argued that the principal 
specific commitments, on which the requirement for aircraft carriers rested, were the 
safeguarding of shipping world-wide, and the provision of air strikes and support for national, as 
well as allied purposes. In many situations, the Admiralty argued, this could not be achieved 
from shore bases. Mobile and flexible tactical air power, by carriers, could be delivered in 
whatever part of the world the UK policies required. From these prospects, the Admiralty argued 
the cost effectiveness of carriers.42 The Admiralty also got full support from the Chief Scientific 
Advisor Zuckerman, as he wrote to Minister of Defence Watkinson, arguing that mobile forces 
clearly would be the best way of maintaining military power, especially since the overseas bases 
were ‘dwindling away’.43  
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The principles for deployment of the carriers East of Suez were based on a ‘double stance’ 
concept of two task forces after a decision by the Minister of Defence in February 1963. One 
carrier was intended to be stationed in the Middle East or Indian Ocean, while the other should 
normally operate in the Far East. The carriers should normally be no more than seven days 
steaming from the troublespots at the time.44 Until 1963, there had been one Fleet Carrier 
operating East of Suez. This one had had a balanced complement of strike-fighter and anti-
submarine aircraft, while the two carriers operating in the Western NATO theatre had been 
focused on anti-submarine warfare.45 The anti-submarine capability thus decreased with the 
‘double stance’ East of Suez.  
 
Chapter 1-B: The Royal Air Force ‘Island Strategy’  
The original concept of safe transport routes 
The background for what later was to be known as the ‘Island Strategy’ may be traced back to 
the question regarding safe and available air-transport routes to and from the Far East in the 
aftermath of the Suez Crisis. Prior to this, important links to the many outposts had been possible 
with relatively short range aircraft using only RAF staging posts. Following the Suez Crisis, as 
well as the overthrow of the pro British regime in Iraq – the problem of what would be known as 
the ‘Arab Air Barrier’ became acute.46 As the Arab countries denied the British over-flight rights 
for military aircraft, the routes had to be directed around great parts of Africa. 
As a consequence of this, the decision was made to develop a new airfield at Gan.47 
Coincidentally, the US approached the British with the proposal that they should develop the 
airstrip on Ascension Island for the case of their rocket activity at Cape Canaveral. The British, 
with the advice of the Air Ministry, agreed to this, with the understanding that they should have 
full staging rights.48 (A decision which would later prove very important during the Falklands 
War). For these initial years, it was all about routes for Transport Command to support all British 
interests in the Far East. Even the Royal Navy was much in debt to these services. These were 
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the ideas of Air-Marshal Hudleston, the man who came up with and fought for the concept 
during his post as the Vice Chief of the Air Staff from 1957 till 1962.49 He did not intend the 
concept to be used as a counter to increased naval activity or future plans and strategies for the 
region.50  
The Island Strategy as a alternative to carriers 
The well known term ‘the Island Strategy51’, came out of the Air Ministry in 1962. But by then, 
Hudleston was about to leave the Air Ministry – and the ‘extended ideas’ which would develop 
during the Autumn of 1962 were far beyond what originally was intended with the concept of 
staging islands for politically safe air-transport links.  
The first records of the Island Strategy becoming a direct alternative to the carrier task force 
concept date from January 1962.52 The concept was then used in conjunction with criticism of 
the Navy’s carrier replacement programme by the Air Ministry in a brief for the Defence 
Committee. The general perception within political circles and the MoD by December 1961-
January 1962 was in favour of a carrier replacement for HMS VICTORIOUS, however, the Air 
Ministry was awaiting an opportunity to halt the project. As a staff recommendation to the Chief 
of the Air Staff before the coming Chiefs of Staff meeting stated:  
 
I would not recommend you to oppose this paper strongly, but much depends on the 
climate of opinion within your Committee. Your most effective intervention would 
probably be an indirect one in terms of ‘island strategy’ should the opportunity arise.53 
    
The question of replacement carriers was of course an important one for the Chiefs of Staff in 
1961-62. From the beginning the Air Ministry was sceptical about the enormous investment 
which this obviously would include. It was a general view within the RAF and Air Ministry that 
carriers were not a cost-effective use of air power resources. The main arguments against carriers 
were summarised thus by the Air Ministry; the increasing vulnerability of carriers to submarines, 
surface and air attacks, the limited number of the carriers’ offensive aircraft, the inherent cost 
and difficulty of sustained carrier-borne air operations, and finally the disproportionate effort 
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required to land a very small force bearing in mind that this was a requirement seldom if ever 
likely to arrive.54 The economy of the defence sector was tight already, and everyone knew that a 
carrier programme would have grave negative implications for the other services. As Michael 
Quinlan noted in an interview: ‘Since a carrier programme included both money and air power – 
the Air Staff had to have a view!’55  
By late summer 1962, the RAF’s alternative of the ‘Island Strategy’ was raised in various 
meetings, and gradually became known to the Ministry of Defence. Also the Colonial Office 
became involved in the evaluation and survey of islands about this time.56 A more official 
approach would come as a consequence of an Admiralty paper entitled ‘The case for carriers’ in 
August 1962. The Air Ministry found it needed to respond with a reply to this paper, outlining 
the implications of meeting the commitments by the use of land-based aircraft and island bases 
instead of carriers. The Secretary of State for Air, Hugh Fraser, first sent a note of his views on 
the aircraft carriers on 4 October 1962. Peter Thorneycroft, the Minster of Defence, then wrote a 
memorandum on 9 October 1962, after the new solution had been verbally discussed as an 
alternative to fleet carriers:57 ‘I have in recent weeks heard numerous references to what appears 
to be generally known as “The Island Strategy”’. He continued: ‘I would like to know more 
about it’. He then asked to have a paper on the concept within a week, and also an outline of a 
two-service meeting and discussion on the subject to follow in due course. This memorandum by 
Thorneycroft was often referred to as the starting-point of inter-service rivalry. The requested 
follow-up note on the ‘Island Strategy’ came from the Air Ministry to the Minister of Defence by 
18 October 1962. This was the first specific, thorough document on the RAF proposed concept 
of staging and mounting bases for the sake of fighting limited wars. After his review of the 
paper, the Minister of Defence decided by late October 1962 that the ‘Island Strategy’, which 
possibly could fill the roles more ‘effectively and economically’, should be included as part of 
the Scientific Panel’s enquiry.58 Still, the ‘Island Strategy’ paper was not released to the study-
group until January 1963.59 With this, we see how the Island Strategy became politically 
accepted as an alternative to the aircraft carriers – and led to the great inter-service rivalry of 
1963.  
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In short, the thoughts of the Air Ministry matured to become a strategy. There needed to be four 
bases in the Indian Ocean: Aldabra, Masirah, Gan and Cocos. Mobile Army troops, as well as 
reinforcements for island protection with Type 34 radars and Bloodhound II SAM systems (as 
well as others as the situation demanded) which were to be flown to these islands  from the 
British Isles. Some of the islands were to be used as staging positions, and those closest to a 
conflict would act as mounting bases. From the mounting bases the troops would be lifted in by 
tactical transport aircraft to establish airheads. The air support for these operations would come 
from strike (TSR.2) and air-to-air combat aircraft (P.1154) stationed at some of the listed islands 
– up to 1000 miles away at most. Normally the range would be much less. The Air Ministry 
prepared a map showing the coverage of the aircraft planned. This map was used and referred to 
extensively in the discussions during the winter of 1963.  
 
 
Figure 1: Island Strategy Map, 1962. 60 
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OR.351 radius of action (assault) 1000 NM. (The operating range 
with full load for an ‘invited’ operation i.e. with airfield facilities 
and fuel available at forward end is 3000 NM. Using the airfields 
shown this covered all of Africa South and South East Asia.  
 
T.S.R.2 combat radius 1.250 NM. (Could be extended by in-flight 
refuelling).  
 
‘Island Stance’ airfields (Singapore was shown for possible use ‘on 
invitation’ by Malaysia; Cocos was required if the UK had a base in 
Australia).  
 
‘Island Stance’ airfields with stockpiles available for operations.  
 
The stockpiling of equipment and use of facilities at Manila would 
be by arrangement and was alternative to the provision of similar 
facilities, under similar arrangement, in Thailand.  
Figure 2: Island Strategy Map, 1962. Symbol explanation.61 
 
An operation such as the Island Strategy could according to the Air Ministry be maintained 
independently by the Air Force for up to 28 days.62 By then seaborne reinforcements would 
become increasingly necessary. Tanks and other heavy vehicles would not be available to the 
ground forces until a beachhead could be established and supplies from the sea brought in. In 
some later discussions, the Air Ministry made a note of the fact that this was to be done by 
transport ship, and not by carriers. This was beyond the capacities of carriers they argued. This 
was also agreed on by the Admiralty.   
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As the Island Strategy evolved into two different concepts; first the quest for safe transport 
routes and later the extended concept of staging and mounting bases for offensive operations, 
some complications arose. The new Chief of Transport Command, Hudleston, who in fact was 
the original ‘father’ of the concepts, appeared in the media promoting the ‘secret’ concept. He 
had publicly discussed the use of a series of bases around the African continent with a group of 
journalists who had flown with the RAF to the Far East. The essence of the concept he envisaged 
appeared in The Guardian on 4 November 1963, and caused an uproar within the Ministry of 
Defence. The Minister of Defence, Peter Thorneycroft, called the Chief of the Air Staff for a 
meeting and required an explanation of their reasons for bringing this out to the public.63 The Air 
Ministry’s explanation was that Hudleston was concerned solely with the problems of 
communication; ‘…it was in no way an exposition of the “Island Stance” strategy, of which the 
cardinal feature was the use of islands as mounting bases’.64  
‘Air Cover for the Army in Limited War’  
As the general concept of an Island Strategy had been established, more detailed studies were 
conducted to examine to what degree the concept could conduct air-land warfare and give 
effective support to the Army.65  
The greatest challenge to the concept of the Island Strategy centred on how and how effectively 
the RAF could support the Army from bases hundreds of miles away. The Army was dependent 
on air support for ‘close air support’, defensive ‘air cover’ and offensive ‘air strikes’ against 
enemy forces. Strikes against permanent enemy installations and pre-planned targets would be 
easily conducted by the RAF bombers. This would be handled by TSR.2 strike aircraft and V-
bombers directly from the mounting bases. In solid RAF tradition, they argued: ‘It would clearly 
be in our interest to make the fullest possible use of pre-emptive air strike to neutralize the 
enemy air forces.’66  
The Air Ministry argued the capabilities of the future projects of the RAF to fill the above 
mentioned tasks with a force of two squadrons of P.1154s, two squadrons of TSR.2, one 
squadron of Victor tanker aircraft, as well as OR.351 medium tactical transport aircraft. Both the 
P.1154 and OR.351 were projected as V/STOL aircraft. Before continuing the debate on 
                                                 
63
 NAUK DEFE 25/40, Island strategy, 1962-1965. Thorneycroft to the Chief of Air Staff, 4 November 1963. Also 
see NAUK DEFE 7/1782 and several newspaper cut outs and correspondence in NAUK AIR 8/2354.  
64
 NAUK AIR 8/2354. Advise from the P.S. to Chief of the Air Staff, 6 November 1963.  
65
 The Air Ministry simultaneously delivered critical studies of the carrier options prospects of delivering the same 
capabilities. See e.g. NAUK AIR 19/977 for a Air Ministry paper on: ‘Availability of Carrier Aircraft over an 
Assault area’. 
66
 NAUK AIR 19/997. Air Ministry note: Air Cover for the Army in Limited War, of 15 February 1963.  




            
   
 
 
conceptual alternatives, it is helpful to briefly examine these two V/STOL projects for fighter 
and transport aircraft, which clearly must be understood in relation to the ‘Island Strategy’.  
The P.1154 
The Royal Air Force GOR.345 requirement, practically the P.1127, was overtaken by the 
political demand for a new joint aircraft by early 1962.  
The joint RAF and RN P.1154 aircraft was designed and equipped according to the No.356 
requirements. This described a modern aircraft for strike support to ground troops, as well as 
high performance air defence and interceptor capabilities. It was to be operated from both land 
bases and carriers. The broad performance of the aircraft was 225 NM. radius for low-low strike 
missions and 390 NM. for a mixed profile strike radius. The aircraft needed to be super-sonic, 
and V/STOL capable. It was not a full vertical take off requirement (as this reduced the  
performance), but what was referred to as a ‘Rolling VTO’.67 
The Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy tried to work out a common requirement after pressure 
from the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee (DOPC), but did not succeed. By the autumn 
of 1962, the requirements for two different versions were proposed by the services: The first was 
a V/STOL strike/reconnaissance aircraft to be developed for the Royal Air Force. This aircraft 
was called the P.1154a, and was intended to be operational by 1968. The Royal Navy version, 
the P.1154b, was to be a more advanced all-weather version. This aircraft could be operational 
by 1970, in time for the new carriers. However, due to political pressure, the debate over whether 
it was possible to produce an agreed joint aircraft continued throughout 1963. The 
recommendation by the services by late 1963 concluded that the P.1154a should be produced for 
the Royal Air Force as a replacement for the Hunter by 1969, while the P.1154b should be 
cancelled and replaced by an order of American Phantoms.68  
This recommendation was accepted by the DOPC, and announced in the Defence White Paper of 
February 1964.69  
The No.356 requirement was re-worked to fit the Royal Air Force demands instead of being a 
joint project. The No.356 (issue 2) was accepted by the Ministry of Aviation by May 1964. 
However, the P.1154 for the Air Force was soon cancelled by the new Government that took 
office in October 1964. The Defence White Paper of 1965 announced that the Royal Air Force 
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was to go back to the previous P.1127 design, now made into the Kestrel evaluation aircraft.70 
This was a far cheaper and less technologically demanding project than the P.1154.   
 
Figure 3: P.115471 
 
The Beverly transport aircraft replacement had first been approved in 1957. It had then been 
planned as a short take-off and landing aircraft (STOL).72 The project did not move along 
quickly, like many others in the years following the Sandys Defence Review of 1957. However, 
by 1961 the project was picked up again. In addition to the previous requirements, the RAF and 
the Army now started arguing for a vertical take-off and landing capability for the new medium 
transport aircraft. It was by then known as the ‘Hastings/Beverly Replacement’, and both the 
designations STOL and V/STOL were used in project studies. The Royal Air Force argued that if 
the Army needed to be inserted into an area at short notice and close to a concrete theatre, they 
should not be dictated by the availability of ‘suitable’ bases. As the VTOL technology was much 
discussed in this period, visionary thoughts of new possibilities came about. It was the RAF and 
Army’s view that a capability to operate from an unobstructed area of 1,500ft. long should be an 
operational quality. They believed this was a practical and feasible requirement.73  
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It was in this context that the Air Ministry came up with the argument that future operations 
could be mounted from bases involving forward carriage over a distances of 1,000 NM. or more, 
to likely combat areas. The technical prospects of VTOL technology must here be seen in 
relation to the previous discussed ideas of an ‘Island Strategy’. Strategic aircraft would bring in 
the troops and equipment to the staging bases – but a VTOL medium transport was needed for 
bringing them into the combat theatre. The prospective aircraft needed to be dimensioned for 
tactical transport and support of both own RAF and Army combat forces. The OR.351 needed to 
carry heavy transport vehicles and equipment, as well as ground equipment for the forward air 
forces, and not at least RAF surface-to-air missiles, helicopters, air-radars and communication 
systems for establishing effective forward bases. It was a substantial requirement of V/STOL 
technology.  
Four design proposals were submitted. Two by the British Aircraft Corporation, one by Hawker 
Siddley Group and one by Shorts:74 The BAC.222 turbo-prop, derived from the American C.130 
Hercules, did not meet the original STOL requirements, and was immediately eliminated as an 
alternative. The BAC.208 and the Hawker Siddley A.W.681 were turbo-jets, and could be 
adapted to a full VTOL design. They both proposed a design with four Bristol BS.53 engines, the 
same as in the P.1127 VTOL aircraft. They both proposed cruising speeds of more than 400 
knots. The fourth aircraft, the Shorts SC.5/21B, was a turbo-prop based on the Short Belfast. All 
the prospective aircraft were estimated to come to a cost of about £85-100 million75 for 30 
aircraft.76  
As for the Air Ministry evaluation of the alternatives, they found no great differences as to range, 
but still argued that the jet alternatives were faster and could therefore deliver more over a given 
period. And of course, the Air Ministry envisaged a VTOL: ‘Bearing in mind that the aircraft we 
choose will be with us until at least 1980, I consider that we should be ill-advised to bring into 
service an aircraft which was not potentially capable of V.T.O.L.’77 As for the choice between 
the two jet-designs, the BAC.208 and the A.W.681, the Air Ministry saw few differences as of 
operational function, and thus initially recommended that industrial implications should be taken 
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by the Ministry of Aviation. Later, by the autumn of 1962, the Royal Air Force officially 
supported the A.W.681 as their preferred option. The Air Ministry argued it would need 62 
aircraft delivered by 1968/73. The estimated gross cost was £140-160 million.78 
The greatest question subject to debate became the actual need for VTOL technology for the 
transport fleet. As for the Royal Air Force, clearly this had a rationale to be found with the 
concept of the ‘Island Strategy’. There were essentially four main roles argued for the new 
tactical transport, where the second made specific reference to the Island Strategy:79 
 
• Intra-theatre carriage of passengers and freight 
• Airborne and air-landed assault 
• Supply dropping, including medium and heavy platforms 
• Aeromedical Evacuation 
 
The Admiralty was opposed to the OR.351, especially after it was officially discussed in 
conjunction with the ‘Island Strategy’ concept during the summer of 1962.80 Clearly, the Chief 
of the Air Staff’s statement that the OR.351 and the ‘Island Strategy’ would make naval forces 
redundant, made an impact.81 As for the Chief of Staff, Mountbatten saw that before the OR.351 
could rank for consideration in the defence costing, Ministers would require background directly 
linked to the likely strategy to be pursued in the 1970s. As the link was obvious, the question of 
the OR.351 therefore had to be officially considered in conjunction with the ‘Island Strategy’ 
studies, as well as the NATO requirements for the smaller tactical VTOL transport aircraft 
(NBMR.4). Generally, Lord Mountbatten was critical of the OR.351, even though he saw the 
need for replacement transport aircraft.82  
The visionary thoughts and proposals did not manage to convince sceptics. In late 1962, the 
Chief Scientific Advisor, Zuckerman, visited Washington to discuss the needs for new transport 
aircraft.83 The Americans had already taken into service the C.130 Hercules. As this aircraft did 
not meet the STOL requirements of the British, as well as the fact that the Americans were also 
interested in the prospects of STOL and VTOL aviation, the discussions sought to come up with 
a common project. However, in the end no agreement came about. Three alternatives for the 
British were left; develop and produce an aircraft to satisfy the OR.351 requirements, put the 
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project on hold and buy some interim quantity of C.130s to satisfy immediate requirements, or to 
continue the effort to establish a joint UK/US long term V/STOL medium transport aircraft.84 
It gradually became a conviction that the costs and risks were unmanageable for independently 
producing such a visionary aircraft; buying American C.130 aircraft steadily became the most 
discussed option. These discussions were all brought to the attention of the Prime Minister in this 
final stage. Prime Minister Macmillan saw the urgent need for new transport aircraft, but 
underlined the need to reduce the costs by working out a joint Anglo-American scheme.85  
During the winter of 1962-63 many ‘preliminary decisions’ were discussed and made: Studies of 
C.130 were undergone in a hurry, and the possibility of changing the requirements for fitting this 
option were discussed.86 However, the V/STOL aircraft remained as an option.87 Despite the 
C.130 being the most discussed option in this period, it was actually ‘decided’ at a Chequers 
meeting in early February 1963 that the new transport aircraft would be based on the OR.351 
requirements.88 Following, on 15 February 1963 Thorneycroft wrote to Mr McNamara 
announcing that the British would not buy the C.130 aircraft.89 
However, it was becoming clear that even though this was the option preferred by Thorneycroft 
and the Air Ministry, the political focus on costs kept pulling towards the American Hercules 
C.130 option. As the prospects of getting VTOL aircraft diminished, the Air Ministry 
desperately sought alternative solutions; perhaps a modified Belfast, or a mix of C.130’s and 
some new British VTOL designs?  
In the end, after much indecision, the safe option of the Hercules C.130 was chosen over the 
visionary thoughts of a medium size VTOL transport aircraft.  
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Figure 4: OR.351, AW 681.90 
 
The coverage  
Normally, airfields would be available for the forces. In the worst case, if any airfields were not 
be available – the operations would be possible via the V/STOL aircraft. One squadron of 
P.1154s and a simple radar system would go in with the first troops and thus be stationed close to 
the ground-troops. Still, the bulk of air support would be provided from the mounting bases.  
From the mounting bases, a good coverage could be maintained from as far as 1000 NM. For air 
cover missions, a P.1154 fighter with two Red Top missiles, two 300-gallon external fuel and a 
refuel of 7500 lbs. from the Victor tankers; could maintain 2 hours and 35 minutes on-station. 
The total sortie time would be approximately 6 hours and 45 minutes. One Victor tanker could 
support six P.1154. For a 1000 NM. operational radius and a twelve hour continuous coverage 
by six fighter aircraft, a total of five formations of six fighters and one Victor tanker would be 
required. If the task was close air support, the primary aircraft would be the TSR.2 (and V-
bombers), but also the P.1154 would be able to carry 2000 lbs. of strike weapons (bombs or 




            
   
 
 
A.S.30 air-ground missiles). The rationale for and mix of air cover and ground support aircraft 
would be up for the commander to decide as of the demands of each operation.  
Again, as the Air Ministry stressed, this was a worst case scenario. Most conflict areas were 
much closer to the mounting bases and even better coverage would be possible. With this, a clear 
alternative to the expensive carrier task force concept had emerged and made its position among 
both the politicians and the public.  
The RAF was also searching for a role 
As the Polaris submarines were to take over the deterrent from the V-bombers, and the deterrent 
was deemed to be the main home-defence capability – the prospects for the traditional RAF air 
defence forces also became somewhat uncertain. The cut in aircraft inventory which had started 
with the Sandys Defence Review of 1957, still continued in 1960.  Fighter Command was 
steadily being reduced from 400 to 200 aircraft. The Minister of Defence stated that they had to 
‘…look carefully at the future of air defence when there are no fixed deterrent bases to protect’91. 
As cuts were demanded, the Air Staff had proposed to cut expenses by reducing the homeland 
forces by one squadron of aircraft, as well as the Bloodhound III project of long-range missiles. 
However, these suggested changes were deemed insufficient. As the Minister of Defence 
responded to the Air Staff suggestion: ‘…these alterations do not really seem to reflect the big 
change in the nature of the threat’. The Minister continued: ‘With the introduction of missiles, 
manned aircraft are going out for certain purposes’, and concluded that; ‘The shape of the RAF 
may have to change in the light of strategic developments’.92 Chief of the Air Staff, Pike, tried 
unsuccessfully to withdraw these statements from the records.93  
However, we clearly see that the RAF was under great pressure at the beginning of the 1960s. 
Both the RN and the RAF needed to fight for their relevance in a time of great changes. By 1960, 
there were still great cuts to forces in Britain and to forces attached to NATO – on behalf of a 
relative increase in focus towards East of Suez.  
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Chapter 1-C: The 1962-63 Enquiry  
The ‘seaborne/airborne mobile strategy’ was conceived in 1961 by Minister of Defence 
Watkinson, and supported by the Chief of Staff, Mountbatten. To be able to get this concept 
established in this time of inter-service rivalry, they needed, according to Mountbatten, to get a 
‘soldier’ (Army) to lead a study which would conclude on what they already agreed. 
Mountbatten told Watkinson he had already talked to Francis Festing from the Army, and 
recommended him for the job. He also suggested that Watkinson should get Macmillan to initiate 
the study, thereby giving it more legitimacy.94 Festing was chosen to lead the studies on the 
issue, and delivered his papers on the ‘Rationalisation of British tactical air power’ and ‘Future 
Air Strike Policy in limited War Outside Europe’ in December 1961. However, Mountbatten was 
extremely disappointed with the outcome. He felt that it had become so political that it did not 
discuss the real issues. Mountbatten summarised the outcome of the study retrospectively:  
 
…by that time the feeling between the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy over the 
question of the future of the Fleet Air Arm had become so bitter that the Committee were 
anxious not to exacerbate the situation in their report.95 
 
The main ideas emerging from these studies were the questions of joint aircraft programmes and 
joint operation of carrier aviation. These thoughts became important frameworks for the military 
strategic debate of the early 1960s, not least with the politicians.   
As the Island Strategy option had become a direct alternative to the Admiralty’s replacement 
programme of carriers, the inter-service rivalry inevitably intensified. Mountbatten, as the Chief 
of Staff, was constantly under pressure. As the former leader of the Navy he clearly wanted to 
support the Navy. He had, during his post as First Sea Lord, largely been the architect behind the 
Royal Navy’s turn to the East of Suez in the late 1950s. On the other hand he had to step forward 
as the common leader for all the services. From his personal papers, we clearly see how he 
constantly tried to balance these roles. Often with good fortune, he helped the Navy (mainly 
unofficially), but also did important work to establish a common and stronger central control. 
Some of his unofficial politics may be extracted from a letter from Caspar John to Mountbatten 
at the height of the 1963 inter-service battle. Mountbatten, as the diplomat and Chief of Staff, 
tried to end the battles between the Air Ministry under Thomas Pike and the Admiralty under 
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Caspar John in January 1963. However, Caspar John was clearly angry with Mountbatten for this 
turn:  
 
But, with respect, what you seem to have forgotten is our personal conversation a month 
or two ago, when I asked whether you felt I was right not to compromise with Tom. Your 
answer was to the effect “Don’t compromise – fight him to the death”. I have acted 
accordingly – hence the log jam.’ … ‘May I also, with respect, remind you that it is you – 
not me – who has personally stimulated Tom to return to the charge with his Island 
Strategy and anti-carrier papers – adding fuel to already robust flames.96  
 
As the carrier replacement programme was brought out from naval circles and over to the 
Ministry of Defence and the Treasury, it was naturally linked to the greater questions of defence 
policy. Then there was the alternative strategic concept raised by the Air Ministry, the Island 
Strategy. To study these alternatives, an independent study-group under the Chief Scientific 
Advisor, Zuckerman, was put together by September 1962 for the ‘Enquiry into Naval Forces 
and Anti-Submarine Warfare’.97 The study-group consisted of Sir Solly Zuckerman as Chairman, 
as well as a group of independent university academics: Dr J.C. Kendrew as Deputy Chairman, 
Professor H. Bondi, Sir E. Bullard, Sir W. Cook, Dr. M.N. Hill and Professor R.V. Jones. The 
group was actually put together by the Admiralty, as the study was initially concerned with naval 
support for Army operations in limited wars and anti-submarine warfare.98 But as the group was 
set up, the task was shifted by the MoD, due to the newly raised prospects of the Island Strategy, 
to also examine the Carrier Task Force concept versus the potential of the Island Strategy.  
There were also several other studies conducted in parallel, but most of them were single service 
studies arguing the ‘extreme’ solutions, e.g. ‘Carriers and National Commitments in the 1970s’ 
written by the Admiralty, and ‘Air Cover for the Army’ by the Air Ministry. The services were 
also invited to write papers on the other service’s ideas, e.g. the Air Ministry’s paper ‘Naval 
Task Forces’99, and the Admiralty’s paper ‘The Island Strategy’. Obviously, these would be 
rather critical – which of course was also the rationale for the MoD to give them these tasks. 
There were also some studies which were intended to be joint efforts. But, even though these 
                                                                                                                                                             
95
 SZ/GEN/72, Mountbatten.  
96
 MB1/J172, First Sea Lord: correspondence mainly with Admiral Sir Caspar John and Admiral Sir David Luce, 
1960-63. Caspar John to Mountbatten, 16 January 1963.  
97
 NAUK AIR 20/11424. Copy of report by the study-group of 22 April 1963. Note: The study was also called by 
several other, but still related names, e.g. the ‘Enquiry into naval forces and carrier task forces’, or ‘’Naval Task 
Forces and Islands’. Towards the end it was often, and more correctly, called the ‘Enquiry into Naval Forces’ – and 
in the end ‘Enquiry into Carrier Task Forces’.  
98
 NAUK DEFE 19/20. Note from Zuckerman to the Minister of Defence, 29 October 1962. From this origin of the 
group structure, the study-study-group was criticised of being ‘all naval’ from the Air Ministry from the beginning. 




            
   
 
 
‘joint studies’ normally had a lead service, that lead service would only approach the other 
service for the most intricate and least important technical questions. In reality, these studies 
became nothing more than single service ‘extremes’ as well. The following sub-chapter follows 
the structure of the Chief Scientific Advisor’s ‘Enquiry into Naval Forces and Anti-Submarine 
Warfare’ study, with supplementary arguments and discussion from the other parallel and linked 
studies.  
As the interim report of the study from the Chief Scientific Advisor’s group was presented in 
February 1963, both the Air Ministry and Admiralty put forward their criticisms – and not least 
started a great inter-service debate. But first of all, Chief of the Air Staff Pike argued that the two 
cases, the Island Strategy and the Carrier Task Forces, should not simply be viewed as 
alternatives. They should be viewed as complementary. 100 Not least did all forces – naval 
included – rely upon the availability of air transport from the UK. The Air Staff argued that if 
there were a question to be asked, it was whether carriers were needed in addition to the staging 
islands, which in any case was necessary.  
Threats and scenarios  
The first controversial issue Zuckerman’s study-group looked into, was in what cases would 
intervention by military forces be necessary? They found the ‘intervention by invitation’ by 
threatened regimes or for internal security purposes the most likely scenarios arising. With these 
types of scenarios,  airheads would be available and the threat would most likely be low. Thus, 
the ‘Island Strategy’, as the much cheaper, would be a viable strategic concept. But certainly this 
could be managed without fleet carriers and the full network of bases envisaged. The Army and 
RAF Transport Command would de facto play the most significant roles.  
In case of scenarios of ‘threats of moderate opposition’, the establishing of airheads would most 
likely be difficult. In these scenarios, the carrier concept clearly was the preferred choice. The 
study-group found these scenarios to be less likely, but argued that the UK should be prepared to 
carry out such tasks. This was a complicated and central question, and the study-group of 
scientists pointed out that it was relevant to ask how frequently this country would conduct 
armed interventions overseas in the 1970s? First Lord Carrington commented to the Minister of 
Defence on this matter and concluded that:  
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It seems to me that if we want to conduct such an operation once in the decade and 
cannot undertake it, or fail in undertaking it, our position in the world may be undermined 
as a result. Conversely, and I would suggest even more important, if we are known to be 
capable of such an operation we may never be called on to undertake it, but our position 
about the world remains secure. I believe it is the deterrent value of this intervention 
capability that is of the greatest importance.101  
 
In case of situations of ‘strong opposition’, the study-group doubted both the effectiveness of the 
Island Strategy and the carrier option. Even a two-carrier task force, also known as the ‘double-
stance strategy’, would, due to the great vulnerability of carriers, not be able to fight such a war 
without the participation of US forces.  
Availability of carriers 
Initially, the study-group supported the Navy’s arguments for a carrier force of four fleet 
carriers. A fleet of four was needed to keep a ‘double stance’ East of Suez, as one would always 
be in for maintenance and another needed for the North Atlantic and home waters. The study-
group thus recommended four carriers, (if carriers would constitute the strategic choice over 
land-based air power) and actually went as far as stating that if so; ‘anything less would be a 
compromise’ and not cost-effective. The Chief Scientific Advisor was very clear that a 
compromise solution would be a useless one. (By the summer of 1963 this was changed to three 
carriers by the MoD, a number which has remained unchanged.)  
Concerning the question of the availability of carriers, the Air Ministry argued that a carrier 
force could only sustain operations for a short period. This was easily countered by the 
Admiralty, which stated that a carrier task force would be able to sustain operations for 2-3 
months without returning to an advance base. Maximum activity could be upheld for 3-4 days 
without pause. As a direct counter-argument against the Island Strategy, they stated: ‘Many of 
the replenishment problems applying to a carrier would apply equally, and often with greater 
force, to an airhead ashore in the forward area, and also to a mounting base’.102 
Not all arguments were relevant. Among others, the Air Ministry made a point of the fact that 
carriers needed overhauling. The Admiralty ironically replied that: ‘No mobile vehicles, be it 
tank, aircraft or ship can spend all its life operational onstation: all need to be refitted or 
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overhauled periodically, and the carrier is no exception to this rule. Even men require 
roulment’.103 
Vulnerability of carrier forces 
All operations of war entail some risk and all bases are to some extent vulnerable; but an 
aircraft carrier is very far from being unacceptably so. In a properly constituted force it is 
hard to pinpoint, hard to hit, and even if hit, extremely hard to disable.104  
Caspar John, December 1962 
 
The vulnerability of the carriers has since the beginning of carrier aviation been a main argument 
against these costly ships and aircraft. The case of carriers’ vulnerability was now put on the 
agenda. Zuckerman wrote to the Minister of Defence in January 1962; ‘The bigger the carrier, 
the more it can do and the easier it is to operate; but the more there is at risk’.105  
The Air Ministry argued that if the carriers were to be stationed close to the coast of the conflict 
area, this would require more forces just to protect the carriers from the threat from fighter, strike 
and bomber aircraft, as well as from enemy ships and mining operations. This critique of the 
Admiralty is only partly relevant, since most low-level conflicts and crises would be against 
nations without any significant air power strike capability or larger naval ship which could lead 
to a need for ‘carrier protection by other carriers’ as the Air Ministry argued. Still, the Admiralty 
was put under pressure over the question, and was in time given the task of writing a specific 
paper on this. The paper ‘Vulnerability of the Aircraft Carrier in a Task Force’ was delivered 
from the Admiralty by mid January 1963106. However, the Admiralty had already a year earlier 
made and unofficially distributed copies of a similar paper to among others Chief Scientific 
Advisor Zuckerman.107 The official Admiralty paper of 1963 on the question of ‘vulnerability’ 
was also distributed as an enclosure to other broader ranging documents in 1963, e.g. by Admiral 
David Luce.  
The Admiralty paper sought to explain that a carrier both contributed to the defence of the task 
group and simultaneously derived its protection from it. Normally, a carrier was regarded as the 
most valuable ship of a force, and consequently the carrier was positioned and manoeuvred so 
that it was safeguarded by the other ships. Therefore, the vulnerability of a carrier had to take 
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into account the total defence capability of a task force. Normally this would comprise one 
cruiser or destroyer and up to six frigates, including air defence pickets. Further, a task force 
might be formed rapidly as a concentrated or as a disperse force to meet the nature of the threat. 
For an enemy to attack a carrier, he would first have to locate the task force, and then locate the 
carrier within this force. This would be a challenging task for a naval surface force, especially 
finding the carrier within the protective force. It was argued that a submarine force normally 
made their way inside the force and could often take out the carriers. The Admiralty disregarded 
this argument, as it thought that the new technology of noise makers would compel the 
submarines to use active means of detection, such as radar and active sonar. It must be noted that 
such technology has never been proven to be very effective. According to the Admiralty, the 
submarine threat would be taken care of by the Type 184 long range hull mounted sonar (25,000 
yards detection range) and the new Type 195 dunking sonars of the helicopters. These would 
also be equipped with Mk.44, later Mk.46 torpedoes. From 1970, the units would also be 
equipped with nuclear depth charges for ASW. Most of these argued capabilities never came 
about as realities. However, it was still clear that a carrier task force would be very vulnerable to 
submarine attack. This issue came up later as a thorough independent study ‘Anti-submarine 
Defence of a Carrier Task Group’ conducted by the Chief Scientific Advisor’s Naval Panel.108 It 
was a broad-ranging study, stating that a carrier group would be vulnerable to a submarine threat. 
As for the air raid threat – this was a case to discuss. In its arguments, the Admiralty noted the 
strong progress in ECM technology – and concluded that: ‘Against a force employing echo 
enhancers, decoys and noise jammers, identification range would be much reduced, and might 
well be restricted to visual identification’. This was tried during several specific trials in NATO, 
but subsequently disregarded as normal tactics.109 NATO, including Royal Navy, found the 
realities quite different. Modern aircraft with ESM equipment would, by ESM triangulation, 
seldom have difficulties locating an aircraft carrier within a task force. Normally, a carrier would 
be equipped with the best air warning radars, and seldom operated as ‘silent’ ships. But, as the 
Admiralty noted, opposition they would meet in the limited wars and conflicts in the East of 
Suez region would not normally have such capabilities. As they in an apolitical way expressed it: 
‘In the context of limited war against second class powers with virtually no experience of 
maritime air operations…’.110 This must still be regarded as a somewhat arrogant argument of 
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little value for a future concept that should cover all limited and total wars. In any case, the 
Admiralty argued that such a carrier force would in most cases, against enemies of limited 
capabilities, be able to destroy enemy aircraft, surface forces and submarines, as well as 
supporting facilities, before they could pose a threat to the carrier.  
As for the air defence capacities of the carrier task forces, the Admiralty was very enthusiastic 
and optimistic. The much disputed 200 miles range of the new radars for the carriers was perhaps 
realistic against large bomber and strike aircraft at height, but not a practical reality against the 1 
sq. metre targets proposed in the studies. The normal detection ranges of the organic AEW 
aircraft were less than 100 miles, while the Admiralty in their arguments spoke often of more 
than 150 miles from sea level – and ever ‘much greater ranges’ when flying at altitude. With 
these systems, the 25 miles range Sea Slug and short range point defence Sea Cat missiles, air 
defence would be resolved. In addition, the P.1154 would be able to take out Mach 2.5 enemy 
aircraft up to 65.000 feet, and the OR.346 targets up to 3.0 Mach and 80.000 feet. As we see 
here, the Admiralty was ‘stretching the realities’ in their optimistic belief in future technology, or 
just arguing for the purpose of being politically attractive. It must be noted that this was the habit 
of both services in their struggle to gain influence.  
The scientific expert group, led by Chief Scientific Advisor Zuckerman, which had been set up 
by the Minister of Defence in October 1962, delivered its final results by April 1963. The group 
was firmly in favour of a carrier task force, given the assumption that the British wanted to 
uphold a capacity for future independent military intervention in the East of Suez region.111  
 
Chapter 1-D: The capabilities in question 
In the early 1960s, the debate on land-based air power and carrier task forces dealt mainly with 
the future needs, be it land-based or carrier-based forces. This was also the case with 
Zuckermans study group. In addition, the focus was primarily on the capabilities of air defence, 
anti-surface and amphibious warfare. This short sub-chapter evaluates the status of these three 
capabilities at the time.  
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The Air Defence capabilities 
British air defence ships did not have any long-range missile systems, and were consequently 
used in a warning and intercept role. These ships had practical radar ranges up to 170 miles when 
detecting large aircraft flying in formations.112 A British (or NATO) naval force would typically 
use such Air Defence ships as ‘radar pickets’.113 They were placed some 100-200 NM. from the 
force, in the threat-direction. These ships were essential for giving early warning of long-range 
Soviet strike aircraft armed with missiles of more than 100 NM range.  
The best and principal organic air surveillance radar was the Type 984. This 3D radar was 
mounted on HMS VICTORIOUS and HMS HERMES by 1960. It was also later fitted to HMS 
EAGLE. Due to its size, it was not possible to fit it on the Air Defence ships. Even though this 
was one of the best radars used by western naval forces in the 1960s, it had a great shortcoming. 
It was not designed to handle aircraft with jammers, which became more and more common.114  
A global problem for all ship (and land) based surveillance radar systems is the obvious 
limitation of line of sight due to the earth’s curvature. This crucial gap was to be filled by the 
AEW aircraft of the first generations. About their capability, these early AEW aircraft had belly-
mounted radars and did not have the capability of modern AEW aircraft to simultaneously search 
all heights for targets. This was the reality for the UK, as well as the US and Soviet forces until 
the E3 Sentry and the Soviet Mainstay came about in the 1970s.  
In 1962, a large air defence exercise was conducted in the Mediterranean for the purpose of 
evaluating the effectiveness of the total capacity.115 This ‘Exercise Poker Hand’ included the 
Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean and the US Sixth Fleet. The ships included the carriers 
FORRESTAL and HERMES, and a number of escorts. Aircraft such as the Vixen, Phantom and 
Scimitars took part as attackers. The disposition (tactic) of the forces was standard for the time: 
The carriers were 50 miles apart at right angles to the AAW axis, two escorts supporting each 
carrier. Three radar pickets and three AEW barriers were placed in front. This disposition was 
expected to give sufficient warning, but reports proved they had real problems maintaining a 
good overview in this area which was heavily coloured by commercial traffic. They also 
examined tactics where the carriers and most escorts were silent, but about two out of three 
enemy attackers reached bombing position. The tactics proved unsuitable against strike aircraft 
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armed with missiles. Following this, large naval NATO forces have since tried to extend their 
early warning coverage by actively using all sensors.  
As for the airborne early-warning aircraft, the Fairey Gannet AEW.3 had replaced the Skyraider 
AEW.1 in active service by November of 1960. The Fairey Gannet, initially designed as an 
organic ASW aircraft, was converted to have an AEW role and equipped with the APS-20 radar 
from the Skyriders. The APS-20 radar was slightly improved by 1967-68 to reduce clutter.116 
The radar had some 100 NM detection range on large targets.117 On the Gannet, it was mounted 
in a radome underneath the centre of the fuselage. The Gannets were old aircraft, but were kept 
for the organic AEW role until the HMS ARK ROYAL was paid off in the late 1970s.  
Air Control Warfare is first of all crucially dependent on effective air surveillance. This was a 
hard lesson for the British forces to learn during the Falklands War. But, having this in mind, it is 
further necessary to discuss and describe both organic and land-based fighter aircraft. In the 
British case, it was clear that also shore-based fighter aircraft of this era had a role in air defence 
of shipping.118  
The Hawker Sea Hawk was designed at the end of the Second World War, but an operational 
design was not available for the Korean War. The aircraft was finally operational by 1953, with 
never ending modifications until its early retirement after the Anglo-French Suez operations in 
November 1957. The aircraft had been the backbone of the FAA for most of the 1950s, but was 
just too underpowered to keep up with more modern jet-designs in dogfights. The British were 
continuously chasing the developments of the USA and the Soviet Union for aircraft design in 
this era. The De Havilland Sea Venom was designed for fighter and escort roles; and had night- 
and all-weather capability. They had canons in the nose and some later versions were capable of 
carrying the Firestreak air-air missile. This early British heat-seeking missile moved air combat 
into a new era. The Firestreak had an effective range of 4 miles, but were solely for rear 
hemisphere attack. The missile was still so successful that for the first 100 launches, the 
engineers learned practically nothing new about any potential weaknesses of the new weapon.119 
The Sea Venom could also carry a small number of bombs and rockets. The aircraft first flew 
trials from HMS ILLUSTRIOUS in July 1951 and the first front line aircraft flew in 1953 – 
followed by the first operational squadron, the 809s, by the next year. The Sea Venom replaced 
the Sea Hornet in the night fighter role, and saw extensive combat missions in the Suez operation 
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of November 1956. The Sea Venoms had to take much of the air cover and escort roles of the 
RAF, due to the long transit they had from Cyprus and Malta. The Sea Venoms operated from 
the HM Ships EAGLE, ALBION and BULWARK during this conflict. The Sea Venoms, some 
finally with the modern Firestreak, did their first line duty from 1954 to 1960, by when all were 
replaced by the Sea Vixen.    
The navalised De Havilland Sea Vixen first flew in 1957 and was fully operational by 1959.120 It 
was a promising air-to-air combat aircraft for the FAA. It was some ten years behind the US 
equivalent F3D Skynight, but able to match most enemies. The Sea Vixen FAW.Mk.1 was the 
first FAA fighter not equipped with guns. It was to rely fully on the new AI18 radar system and 
air-air missiles. This was a successful, modern, multi-role aircraft for the FAA until 1972. By 
1963 an improved Sea Vixen FAW.2 variant had become operational. It had improved ECM 
capabilities, as well as the capability to carry the Red Top missile. The Red Top missile was 
initially an upgraded Firestreak (originally called the Firestreak Mk IV). It had improved range, 
warheads and a limited all-aspect infrared seeker head to intercept the target. The Red Top was, 
in addition to the Sea Vixen, deployed on the RAF Lightning until her retirement in 1988.121 The 
Sea Vixen, though subsonic, was the main FAA organic fighter for air combat throughout most 
of the 1960s. The aircraft made its mark during the Kuwait crisis of 1961. The aircraft onboard 
the carrier HMS CENTAUR also made a tremendous effort in January 1964, supporting air 
cover for the marines’ landing troops in Tanzania, as well as the RAF transports flying in. The 
final operational tasks of the Sea Vixen were to oversee the withdrawal of British forces from 
Aden in 1967, operating in co-operation with the Buccaneers. The Sea Vixen was retired from 
first line service in 1972 with the HMS EAGLE, and replaced by the McDonnell Douglas 
Phantom.  
In the case of the RAF, the Air Ministry fought to acquire a fighter interceptor capable of taking 
on the increasing number of modern Soviet bombers. Two separate designs, one day- and one 
night-fighter were envisaged. The day-fighter’s requirements led to the beautiful Hawker Hunter. 
It became operational just prior to the Suez crisis of 1956. The aircraft were stationed at Cyprus 
to fly escort for the RAF bombers. Due to the long transit they did not really play any significant 
role, and the organic fighters of the FAA became important additions for the escort and air 
combat roles. The range was one flaw in the conventional gun-armed Hunter; another became 
obvious when operating with other NATO countries: the American F-100 Super Sabre easily 
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outperformed it by the late 1950s. The design of the Hunter was not supersonic – and it soon had 
to give way as an air-air fighter by 1960.122 As for the night and all-weather requirements of the 
RAF, the Gloster Javelin came into service in the 1950s. It was produced in numerous versions, 
but was not truly an operational asset until the early 1960s, and then soon retired from Coastal 
Command by 1964. The Javelin was the RAF’s delta-wing fighter, and the first missile armed 
interceptor. It had good air radar for its time, and was put in a pure intercept role to guard Britain 
against the Soviet bombers.  
The cry for a supersonic fighter to replace the Hunters and the Javelins came from the beginning 
of their operational service. The project of the English Electric Lightning123 emerged early in the 
1950s. The Lightning was operational by 1960 and was the first and only designed and built 
supersonic interceptor of the RAF. The aircraft gradually replaced the Hunters and the Javelins 
for the air combat role. The Lightning was equipped with two Firestreak infrared homing 
missiles and guns. Though supersonic, and ranked as one of the greater British fighter designs, 
this aircraft had significant flaws. In an air combat role, the Lightning had a disadvantage with 
the inlet-design and the nose of the aircraft, resulting in poor radar performance.124 This was a 
great disadvantage for advanced air-air combat, but the aircraft was intended to receive radar-
guidance by a ground station to intercept the Soviet long-range bomber and strike aircraft fleet. 
For this role the GCI sighted the bombers and scrambled the Lightning from alert. The Lightning 
used most of its fuel to climb to 35,000 feet, accelerate to 1,5M, then to be directed for a one-
pass stern intercept to engage with the Firestreak missile (or the Red Top from F3 batch).125 The 
Lightning then only had enough fuel to return to base.  
In the time period 1957-62, Air-Air Refuelling (AAR) became an accepted and important part of 
air control warfare, and the British built their tanker force from converted V-bombers.126 This 
was a reality that had great importance for maritime air power in general, but also for the 
relationship between the FAA carriers and the land-based forces. The RAF could now offer, or at 
least argued for, a largely extended range for its aircraft, e.g. a full coverage of the North Sea by 
land-based air power. This capability increase is important regarding the prospects of land based 
air power. In Britain, the first standard AAR aircraft was the Vickers Valiant. These were only 
operational until 1964, by which time they were exposed to fatigue damage, and replaced by six 
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Victor B(K)1As by the following year. 24 Victor B1s were converted to tankers from 1966 
onwards. These had an operational range of 2500 miles and were capable of night operations. 
With these aircraft and their technical capabilities, land-based air control capabilities have to be 
included in discussions on maritime air power. Ground-controlled intercepts, AEW support and 
refuelling made them capable of taking part in conflicts at sea to a far greater extent than 
previously. The Lightning made an important interceptor capability for the maritime theatre 
surrounding the British Isles.  
As regard the British naval surface-to-air systems of the 1950s and 1960s, these were designed 
as point defence systems.  In the 1950s, the gun had the main role in this defence; later the 
Seacat short-range missile replaced most of the traditional anti-aircraft guns. The Seacat system 
entered service on HMS Devonshire in 1962. The missile had a maximum range of 4.75km and 
was steered by radio-command guidance and the target could be tracked visually or by radar. 
The Seacat system provided a simple but effective close-range air defence system, and was 
gradually fitted to almost all British and some foreign warships. Air defences for British ships 
became more effective by the 1970s. The medium-range Seadart was introduced for testing in 
the late 1960s and proved effective. In addition, rocket launched chaffs became operational for 
confusing incoming radar-guided missiles.  
The capabilities of the British early warning systems to detect and give early warning on strike 
aircraft with long-range missiles were good. This was true for both the ground stations, the naval 
‘picket ship’ concept, as well as the naval organic AEW aircraft. On the other hand, the British 
FAA fighter aircraft and the land-based fighters were not nearly capable of securing the 
Norwegian Sea from Soviet air strikes on the British surface forces, nor of stopping the Soviet 
air armada of strike aircraft aiming for the British Isles. As Gunstan and Donald stated: ‘In the 
early 1960s the FAA had no fighter of a kind that might be expected to win in close combat, for 
example against a Mirage, F-5 or Mig-21’.127 In addition the numbers, especially in case of the 
RAF, were far too limited.  
The total maritime air defence concept was examined by a study of the Admiralty in 1960.128 
They looked at the proposed ‘second phase’, following the initial nuclear strikes. This was the 
proposed scenario of maritime warfare. The Admiralty expected that a large number of the long-
range bombers would be destroyed in the initial strategic exchange. Consequently, they 
examined their forces up against an attacking force of 50 Mach 2 bombers. These remaining 
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Soviet maritime air strike forces would not be able to halt all communication to the British Isles. 
However, the challenge was to get the expected sinking rate down to a ‘tolerable number’, 
assessed to be e.g. 400 ships a year. Convoys of 300 – 600 ships were considered, but this would 
again give a too great a target for the air strike forces with long-range nuclear missiles. As for the 
argued and recommended tactics for effective air defence, an attack on the bases (in good RAF 
tradition) was considered most effective. Still, this was not likely to be effective since the Soviet 
forces were so spread out. The second alternative was to provide air defence barriers of carriers, 
missile ships and land-based aircraft in the gap north of Scotland. As for the carriers and missile 
ships, these would be intolerably vulnerable to the great submarine threat. The solution had to be 
large convoys escorted by large and balanced forces, but the outer ‘radar pickets’ for early 
warning would still be very vulnerable to submarine attacks. The British surface-to-air missile 
systems were assessed as not adequate, and one carrier was proposed for a 100-ship convoy and 
two carriers were required for up to 600-ship convoys.129  
In lieu of the threat posed by the Soviet air strike forces, and the performance and numbers of 
British air-air combat aircraft - it is hardly possible to say that British air defence aircraft were 
adequate to protect British territory. The British aircraft could barely compete with the powerful 
land-based strike aircraft of the Soviet Navy. As for the maritime communication lines, it was 
assessed that the British forces in co-operation with NATO could possibly defend one 300-600-
ship convoy at a time.  
The Anti-Surface Warfare capabilities 
Surface Warfare is very much concerned with sensors and weapon systems. A large number of 
aircraft, or aircraft with great performance does not necessarily give operational quality. The air-
to-surface missiles used by the British strike aircraft were modern in design and operational 
capability. The most widely used short-range system; the American Bullpup air-to-surface 
missile was introduced in 1959. The missile was a short-range weapon with range of 10 NM and 
it was radio-guided. The missile was also produced to be equipped with a tactical nuclear 
warhead. The FAA operated the missile on the Sea Vixen by the mid 1960s, as well as the 
Scimitars and Buccaneers. The equivalent French AS-30 air-to-surface missile was later 
introduced to some British aircraft. During the 1960s a programme for a medium-range missile 
went on as a joint programme of the Admiralty, Air Ministry and the Ministry of Aviation.130 
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The naval side held up a requirement to hit a KYNDA-class ship, or any equivalent air-to-
surface guided-missile ship, and a 20-mile requirement was demanded. The missile became the 
Martel with a 60-mile range, but it was not operational until the early 1970s. Blue Steel was the 
first operational British stand-off missile, though it was mainly intended for land-attack. It was 
operational from 1961 until 1969, when the Polaris took over the deterrent role. The missile was 
made for the V-force, Vulcan B2 and Victor B2. Blue Steel had a 1MT warhead131 and a range 
of 100 miles in order for the attack aircraft to launch with less chance of interception. Later in 
the 1960s updates slightly extended its range and low-level flight performance.  
For the aircraft, this era of jet propulsion and integration of computer technology was truly 
revolutionary. New aircraft designs came along before many production lines were completed. 
The US and the Soviet Union led this rapid evolution, and the British fought to keep up with a 
national capability to produce modern designs.  
The 1950s and early 1960s saw numerous designs, some successful – but many faulty. The 
turboprop Westland Wyvern torpedo bomber and strike aircraft was operational from 1953, via 
the Suez crisis, until its early retirement by 1958. One aircraft intended to become the multi-role 
fighter of the FAA was the Supermarine Scimitar, operationally introduced by 1958. In the 
ASuW role it could carry the Bullpup air-to-surface missile. Some 70 aircraft were delivered to 
the Royal Navy from 1958. The last 24 ordered were never produced due to its unsuccessful 
history.132 It was an early generation jet aircraft, haunted by technical flaws. It was well known 
for standing on the deck – leaking fuel in numerous buckets under its fuselage. For the ASuW 
role, the famous Buccaneers soon replaced it.  
The Blackburn Buccaneer is probably one of the most successful British aircraft. The aircraft 
were purpose-built for the ASuW and land-attack strike roles, and the core feature was long 
range at high speed – low level. The experiences of FAA in Korea led to the requirement for a 
specialised low-level attack aircraft, but it has also been said that this aircraft was a purpose-built 
‘SVERDLOV Killer’. The first development batch of 20 Buccaneers was ordered in 1955. By 
1958 the first prototype flew, followed by the first deck landings on HMS VICTORIOUS the 
year after. The aircraft were operational with the 700Z out of RNAS Lossiemouth from March 
1961. The improved Buccaneer Mk.2 went on to successful trials on HMS VICTORIOUS in 
1966. The aircraft were operational until late 1978. The Buccaneers were capable of carrying 
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nuclear bombs internally, as well as carrying anti-surface missiles; first the Bullpup and later the 
Martel missiles.  
For two decades, from the early 1950s, the Canberra filled the roles of reconnaissance and strike 
against enemy forces, mainly in the land-theatre – but also in the maritime theatre. In the mid 
1960s, several air-sea exercises saw the use of the Canberra in low-level attacks on naval 
forces.133 The aircraft proved remarkably versatile. From 1965 onward it carried the French Nord 
AS-30 missile in addition to the rocket projectiles.134  Strikes by light bombers against shipping 
were according to the naval doctrine clearly a role for land-based aircraft.135 
The V-force also had a strike role against enemy offensive forces in the 1960s. Armed with 
nuclear weapons, even a naval moving target could be effectively hit. This maritime strike role 
was officially noted in the 1966-defence review.136 Also the naval doctrine noted that kiloton 
nuclear bombs could be used for both land and ship targets.137  
The Skyraider AEW.1 with its APS-20 radar was also a significant asset for ASuW. The aircraft 
was labelled AEW, but was significant also in ASuW with its surface reconnaissance and 
targeting capabilities. The radar was down-looking, designed to cover the blind zones of the 
surface ship radars. Developed to give warning on low-level strike aircraft, it was well suited for 
detecting surface targets as well. The Skyraider on area surveillance usually had both the role of 
detecting aircraft and surface forces simultaneously.  
The new helicopters of the Royal Navy also had a role for reconnaissance and strike. The Navy 
was introduced to the tactical helicopter in 1952,138 by which time the US supported some 
Whirlwinds. They were mainly used for ASW, but were still utility helicopters also used for 
surface reconnaissance - and thereby part of the surface warfare capability. (The Whirlwinds are 
further described in a later chapter on British ASW forces). The more advanced Wessex had a 
crew of three and a whole range of weapons compared to the Whirlwind. For surface warfare 
purposes it could carry machine guns, rockets, as well as missiles. Initially it was equipped with 
the primitive Nord SS.11 wire-guided missile139 and later the more capable short-range AS12 
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guided missile. The Wessex was initially produced as a HAS.1140 utility helicopter, of which 129 
were delivered.141 The Commando Assault role was taken over by the specialised HU5142 by 
1966, while an improved HAS.3 was operational by 1967 for ASW and surface warfare. This 
HAS.3 introduced radar onboard naval helicopters, and was consequently assessed to be a truly 
new resource for surface warfare. The sad fact was that the HAS.3 had grown too heavy, and 
even with new and more effective engines, it was beset by technical difficulties. The Wessex 
HAS.3 was the first complete maritime tactical helicopter, but problems such as its short 
endurance pressed for a new helicopter. The Wessex was replaced by the much more capable 
Sea King airframe by 1969-1970.143  
The Westland Wasp was the third British maritime helicopter of this era. The Wasp was the first 
British helicopter designed to operate from ships other than carriers.144 Of these surface ships, 
the HMS LEANDER was the first to operate a flight of Wasp. 98 helicopters were delivered to 
the FAA from 1963 onward. This was a light general-purpose frigate helicopter. For the ASuW 
role against Fast Patrol Boats it was capable of carrying AS-12 wire-guided missiles from the 
late 1960s.145   
The large number of Shackletons gave considerable surveillance and reconnaissance capability, a 
necessity for effective anti-surface warfare. Also the strike aircraft were capable of offensive 
operations. The forces still lacked the long-range weapon systems against maritime threats, such 
as that of the Soviet Union. This technical limitation of the British forces would probably lead 
them into a defensive position in any battle for sea control or denial in the northern Norwegian 
Sea. From 1957 the RAF was allowed to carry US nuclear weapons (of which 60 weapons were 
kept in US custody at RAF bases)146, and the use of such weapons were defined in the doctrines 
as a means of destroying naval targets. Still, these weapons were clearly meant for strategic 
nuclear deterrence, the prime focus of British forces after Sandys in 1957 – and it is doubtful if 
they ever would have been used for maritime warfare.  
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For operations in the littorals and for small-scale conflicts, the ASuW aircraft and conventional 
weapon systems were excellent. Not least helicopters easily available for the surface forces 
became important for these types of operations.  
The Amphibious Warfare capabilities 
Force projection by maritime air power can be divided into two categories. Firstly, strike by 
delivering weapons against maritime targets at shore and attack on naval vessels at port – and 
secondly, force projection by landing forces ashore.  
The latter, amphibious warfare, has a solid position in British military thinking. This much was 
clear in this period as several carriers were more or less permanently used as assault ships after 
the introduction of the helicopter in the late 1950s. The two best known, the HMS BULWARK 
and HMS ALBION made great efforts in Kuwait in 1961, Brunei in 1962, as well as in Borneo 
from the early 1960s until 1966 with their commando troops and helicopters.  The operation 
against Kuwait’s new airfield in 1961 is a good example of force projection by maritime air 
power. The Whirlwind HAS.7s of 848 Squadron rushed in the No.42 Royal Marine Commando 
from BULWARK. The Marines then secured the airfield for the RAF Hunters to move in for 
deployment.147  The operation in Brunei came after the Sultan asked for help against guerrilla 
attacks from Indonesian territory. HMS ALBION was heading for Singapore with the No.40 
Royal Marine Commando at the time, and was immediately re-routed to assist by landing its 
forces ashore.148  
As for delivering weapons on maritime facilities and attacking ships at port, in an operational 
sense, this is very much the same as conducting ASuW. The targets are mainly the same mobile 
forces and threats as in all normal operations in the littorals. Still, this is a diffuse and hazy area 
between maritime air power and air power theory and concepts in general.  
In the case of the FAA, their Hawker Sea Hawks made a great contribution as an air-ground 
attacker against the Egyptian shores in the 1956 conflict. They were operated from HMS 
EAGLE, ALBION and BULWARK. Even so, the Sea Hawk was obsolete by modern standards 
of aircraft design and was soon retired. The FAA’s next strike aircraft for force projection was 
the Scimitar. This technically unsuccessful149 multi-role aircraft had its only operational role in 
ASuW and strike on land targets. Both the Sea Vixen and the Scimitar were announced to be 
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equipped with tactical nuclear weapon for the force projection strike role. However, no such 
weapons were ever issued to the Squadrons.150  
Accepting this as a grey area, it is also clear that the ordinary RAF bombers and strike aircraft 
played an important role. The V-bombers became a true resource for maritime war, especially 
after they had lost their nuclear deterrent role with the cancellation of the Skybolt in 1962, and 
the introduction of the Polaris. The Buccaneer was the principal ASuW and land-attack strike 
aircraft of the FAA. By 1966 it had relieved other aircraft of this role.151 The Canberra strike 
aircraft was further an important asset of maritime air power in this regard. These aircraft, the V-
bombers, the Buccaneers, and Canberras have been well covered in the previous sub-chapter on 
surface warfare.   
Force projection by amphibious warfare is one of the more advanced forms of warfare. An 
amphibious operation is fully dependant on the other core capabilities of information 
exploitation, surface and subsurface warfare, and not least air defence – both prior to and during 
the operations. As for the amphibious landing specifically, maritime air power became an 
important factor after the introduction of the organic helicopters for landing troops, as well as 
evacuation. The assault role of the Whirlwind and the Wessex proved its existence from the 
beginning. The Whirlwind HAR versions for troop support and utility successfully conducted the 
first helicopter assault landings during the Suez crisis of 1956. The 845 Squadron operating from 
HMS OCEAN landed men from the 45 Commando Royal Marines.152 This was such a success 
that the concept was persuasive, and from 1960 onwards Whirlwinds equipped specialist 
Commando Assault squadrons on the converted carriers HMS BULWARK and HMS ALBION. 
As for the Wessex helicopters, the first batch of HAS.1 was truly multi-role, and was used for 
the assault role in the Far East during the confrontations with Indonesia in the early 1960s. From 
1966 onwards, a specialised assault version, the Wessex HU5, was taken into service for this 
role.  
Chapter conclusion  
As regard the conceptual question on land-based air power versus carrier aviation, the debate of 
1961-63 is perhaps the most interesting of all such debates. The Royal Navy successfully linked 
the strategic rationale for carrier task forces to the East of Suez roles, which in the early 1960s 
was still undisputed. Even though garrisons were shut down and former colonies were given 
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independence – the British still wanted influence, both politically and economically in its former 
empire.  
Summarised, the Admiralty’s rationale for a mobile maritime strategy, and with this the need for 
fleet carriers, came down to three main arguments: First; the ability to intervene in land 
operations outside Europe could be preserved in the 1970s at a lower cost than at present, if one 
would eliminate duplications of the existing strategies, which required land-based aircraft as well 
as carriers. Secondly; only a strategy based on the carrier and the amphibious group would offer 
the certainty of being able to force an entry for land forces under effective air cover wherever 
needed. This would at least be doubly true as the tropical bases had been abandoned. Thirdly; in 
the 1970s, a maritime strategy in the Indian Ocean or the Pacific would have to be founded on an 
Austral-Asian support area. Arguably, with carriers, the UK would have a force operating in the 
politically free arena of the seas, and safeguard shipping world-wide.  
The Royal Air Force, who practically had always been against costly carrier aviation, were 
deemed to go against this due to the fact that such a programme would clearly have grave 
implications for their position and future investments. The Royal Air Force ‘Island Strategy’ 
concept for use of land-based air power for fighting limited wars and protecting British maritime 
trade became a direct and competing alternative to the Royal Navy’s carrier task force concept. 
The Air Ministry argued the increasing vulnerability of carriers to submarines, surface and air 
attacks, the small size of the carriers’ offensive aircraft compliment, and the inherent cost and 
difficulty of sustained carrier-borne air operations. Finally, the disproportionate effort required to 
land a very small force was a disadvantage of a carrier force, bearing in mind that this was a 
requirement seldom, if ever likely, to be asked for. The concrete ‘Island Strategy’ concept 
proposed in this period is comprehensive, visionary, and arguably still a potential concept for 
independent land-based air power for maritime warfare. Since the earliest days of aviation, air 
power advocates have argued such ideas – but they have not been presented and argued in such a 
structured and compelling manner. However, the visions of the ‘Island Strategy’ rested upon a 
probably over-optimistic belief in future aircraft and weapons technologies. This optimism was 
in fact quite widespread. It was a time of ‘revolution in military affairs’ argued in most countries, 
not least the United States and the Soviet Union.  
The 1960-63 debate ended in July 1963. The Royal Navy won their case for carrier task forces 
versus the Royal Air Force’s ‘Island Strategy’ alternative. The building of new fleet carriers was 
then decided by the Cabinet. The debate on land-based air power versus carrier aviation was 
linked to the technical developments of the time: First of all, the promises of very capable and 




            
   
 
 
long-range air-air refuelling for land-based aircraft, but also the generally poor capabilities of the 
Royal Navy as regard missiles against both aircraft and surface vessels. By tradition, the Royal 
Navy had become, and stayed focused on, fixed-wing aircraft for such roles. Additionally, the 
development of amphibious forces, not least proved by the Suez Crisis, influenced the general 
positive perception on the flexibility of naval carrier-borne forces. As there clearly was a 
professional difference of opinion between the ‘expert advisors’ from the military services, a 
neutral study-group was created in 1962 under leadership of the Chief Scientific Advisor, Solly 
Zuckerman. Largely, Zuckerman’s group argued in favour of the proven concept of carrier task 
forces, despite the fact that the ‘Island Strategy’ was perceived as a far cheaper alternative. The 
scientific advisors simply did not believe in the realism of the Royal Air Force’s visionary 
alternative. This inter-service victory for the Royal Navy may first of all be explained by the fact 
that they successfully managed to link the carrier replacement programme to the greater question 
of foreign and defence policy. Additionally, the decision was probably influenced by important 
players: First Sea Lord Caspar John emerged as an active and strong leader, arguing passionately 
and well for carrier aviation. Lord Mountbatten, as a former First Sea Lord and a true believer in 
carrier aviation and the East of Suez focus, had great influence with all the Ministers of Defence, 
and also had a close relationship with Zuckerman. They clearly shared much time and ideas. 










            
   
 
 
Chapter 2: The debate on Carriers and the Island Strategy 
 
Our present aircraft carriers will last until the 1970s. But if we are to on deploying air 
power around the world after this, I believe we must replace them: not to substitute for 
fixed land bases – for there are certain tasks which land-based aircraft will always do 
better – but to combine with them, as we did in Kuwait. But ships of this size and 
complexity, as the noble Lord said, take about eight years to design and build. So, if we 
are not to renounce here and now our ability to deploy air power by sea in the 1970s, we 
must start preparing to replace our carriers at once. This is what we are now doing by 
getting ahead with the first phase of design; this must in any case precede any question of 
ordering. 1  
Lord Carrington, 11 June 1962 
 
There were now two alternatives proposed to fill the needs of the British as they withdrew from 
their former colonies and garrisons. This chapter explains the political debate that arose 
following the two alternatives and the ‘neutral’ study made by the Chief Scientific Advisor.  
The first part of this chapter deals with the steps towards the costly carrier replacement 
programme. The second and third parts focus on the criticism raised between the services. The 
fourth part discusses the debate which followed from the Chief Scientific Advisor’s study. As 
there was no clear-cut conclusion to this debate, the fifth part discusses the many ‘alternative 
navies’ proposed. However, in the end, the carrier replacement programme was politically 
decided upon in July 1963. The last part of the chapter reviews and discusses this decision.  
 
Chapter 2-A: Scepticism from the Treasury 
As a carrier replacement programme clearly would put a heavy burden upon the defence 
expenditure for the next decades, the Treasury became a central actor against the carrier 
advocates. In addition to the Admiralty, these included the network around Mountbatten. 
Mountbatten had much correspondence with both Thorneycroft and Watkinson, and they clearly 
had good relations and shared common ideas. Watkinson asked Mountbatten for advice on the 
most central issues on several occasions, e.g. numbers of carriers for the future fleet, the 
seaborne/airborne mobile forces and a deployment pattern shifting to the East of Suez.2 
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Thorneycroft was in the beginning sceptical of the carrier programme due to the costs involved. 
However, he clearly supported the carrier option by the spring of 1963. Mountbatten also had a 
very close relationship to Zuckerman throughout the 1960s. 
By early 1963, the year of the greatest debates on the issue, general scepticism over the need for 
large fleet carriers was obvious.3 The cost estimations varied, depending on the politics behind 
the numbers. The initial estimates came to a total of £ 600-800 Million4 (for four carriers), 
depending on complements. The estimates were later argued, in some internal Treasury notes, to 
be closer to £1000 Million5, and even more, perhaps up to £1300 Million6 over a ten year 
period.7 However, the first thorough joint Treasury/ MoD/ Admiralty estimation of the capital 
costs of the ideal carrier replacement programme in 1963 came to £620 Million8, spread over 14 
years. This was a comprehensive figure which included ships, aircraft, shore and afloat support. 
The Admiralty criticised the fact that the Air Ministry’s Island Strategy had not been put under 
any such examination of costs from a joint group. The cost, which was estimated to about one-
sixth of that of the carrier option, was merely an Air Ministry rough estimate.9 The Admiralty 
argued that the true cost of the Island Strategy was underestimated. The Admiralty drew parallels 
to the costs of the Aden airbase of £75M, and questioned if more such expensive bases would be 
required, and if this needed to be the cost of an island base. This was rejected by the Air 
Ministry, where they argued that the Aden base was in a special position, and that these £75M 
included a regional headquarters, permanent deployment of aircraft and personnel – including 
family quarters, mess, schools, and hospitals. The Air Ministry stated that only one such base 
was needed10. Full of confidence, Chief of the Air Staff Pike welcomed the Ministry of Defence 
or any other enquiry group to do such a cost-study.11 To take the discussion to the case of costs 
was probably a bad decision by the Admiralty – as the carrier replacement programme was 
clearly the far more expensive of the two strategies.  
Within the Treasury, most of the Admiralty’s arguments were questioned, or even disregarded as 
fallacious. They were simply against carriers due to their costs, and consequently found 
arguments and criticism to fit their case. But, even though this was the case as far as most of the 
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civil servants of the Treasury were concerned, the Chancellor of the Exchequer12 was not so 
outspoken in his politics. Traditionally, the Treasury had been against (any) such great 
procurement programmes. What was somewhat special was that the current Chancellor at the 
time, Maudling (1962-64), had aspirations for the Conservative leadership, and did not want any 
enemies at this stage. Because of this, he personally was not in strong or open opposition to 
decisive work on new carriers in his period as the leader of the Treasury. Direct and outspoken 
criticism of carriers would put him in an awkward situation. 13   
However, the Treasury and Board of Trade were clearly against the carriers. The main lines of 
arguments put forward by January 1963 were:14 
 
• The whole Admiralty concept was really a legacy of the 19th (or at best early 20th) 
century.  
• In time of peace (in the 1970s) Britain did certainly not need to plan – any more than 
other Western European country – to have to protect their maritime trading interests by 
an exceedingly expensive naval armoury. The ‘freedom of the seas’ would not, by the 
1970s, be a special British interest to which they should devote large resources.  
• It was further argued that a tiny fleet of carriers would be no good in any greater war, and 
in case of conflicts the Commando ships, Surface-to-Air Missile ships, and long range air 
power would provide a ‘formidable armoury’.  
 
As a consequence of the great complaints about costs, the Admiralty came up with a ‘scaled-
down programme of carrier replacement and aircraft purchase’ by February 1963. The basic 
proposed changes from the Admiralty included an abandonment of the Buccaneer replacement 
(OR.346), a commitment to build smaller carriers, to adjust the establishment accordingly, as 
well as an attempt to postpone the carrier programme for a few years.15 These adjustments were 
expected to decrease the cost of the project by some £200-225 Million.16 The new carrier was by 
the summer of 1963 designed to carry 30 strike/fighter aircraft, 4 AEW aircraft, 5 large ASW 
helicopters, and 2 SAR helicopters.  
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Even though the Admiralty had lowered the cost proposals quite radically, Treasury calculations 
and internal debates still argued that greater reductions to the planned programmes (carriers, 
TSR.217, and OR.351 (medium VTOL transport aircraft)) were necessary – if the defence 
expenditure was to be kept within 7 per cent of GNP.18  
 
Chapter 2-B: The Air Ministry critique of the Carrier Task Force 
concept 
Both the Air Ministry and the Admiralty brought criticism to the study conducted by the Chief 
Scientific Advisor in the winter of 1963. Both services tried to undermine the strongpoint of the 
other and argued their superiority and ability for fulfilling the required tasks. There were still 
some common grounds between the two concepts, which would not create too much debate. 
These included the debated questions of tanks, supplies, airheads, and not at least the speed of 
reaction. Regarding tanks, the Army stated that these were absolute requirements, and the size 
had to be a minimum of 35 tons. As for this requirement, non projected aircraft could support it. 
They had to be brought in by support ships, and thus also the Island Strategy was dependent on a 
level of ‘sea-tail’. On the other hand, to be able to bring these inland, bigger aircraft were 
needed. But then, on the other side, neither the existing or planned carriers could carry these 
tanks either. By these proposed Army requirements, none of the services could really play this 
card. As for the questions of supplies and airhead, there were not many differences between the 
concepts other than argued by the services themselves. On the question of speed of reaction, the 
Air Ministry solution was favoured, with an argued 4 day warning period, while the Navy could 
well need an additional day. But again, there were no big differences between the concepts.  
The Air Ministry’s main critique centred on the ‘necessities of carriers’. The main reason was 
economy and thus the cost-efficiency of carriers. However, as the Island Strategy had been 
generally accepted as the less expensive, this issue was therefore not an argument often used in 
detailed debates. This upper-card was more used by the Air Ministry and those in favour of the 
land-based air power option as a concluding remark after other discussions, as well as for public 
debates. The critique most used by the Air Ministry of the Carrier Task Force concept and Chief 
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Scientific Advisor’s study centred on a disregard of ‘carrier essentiality’, the issue of ‘reaction 
speed’, the true effect of ‘naval diplomacy’, and finally the greater ‘military practicability’ of 
carriers.19  
The Air Staff argued that the conclusion of ‘carrier essentiality’ in the Chief Scientific Advisor 
studies was mainly made up of some ‘arbitrary escalation of ideas’. The Air Staff attacked the 
document’s question; ‘Would the Army be prepared to fight with air cover provided and 
controlled from a base 1,000 miles away?’20 This assumption that the RAF air cover would 
always be 1000 miles away was fallacious. This would hardly be the case according to the Air 
Staff, where they referred to the maps of air cover presented by the Air Ministry on 14 
November 1962. Regarding carrier essentiality, the Air Staff pointed to the fact that the carrier 
task force could not realistically hope to be positioned closer than 2-300 NM to the shores of the 
conflict area due to threats that could be posed by countries ‘of moderate opposition’. The Air 
Staff made reference to the fact that the Admiralty themselves stated this in previous 
documents.21  
As for the question of the ‘reaction speed’ of the RAF and RN air power concepts, the Chief 
Scientific Advisor study found that there would be no big difference in the alternatives. The Air 
Ministry agreed with this, but questioned whether the carrier strategy would be able to deliver 
heavy equipment and tanks. This was clearly miscalculated according to the Air Staff. Either 
these heavy forces needed to be stockpiled in the region, or brought over from the British Isles. 
In the first instance, other ships needed to transport these – and the two RAF and RN strategies 
would make no difference. In the second case, air mobility would clearly be the more effective 
way of bringing in heavy equipment.  In any case, military personnel and equipment had to be 
brought into the region from the British Isles. With this in mind, the Air Staff argued that it was 
ridiculous to build some of the bases for Island Stance only as ‘staging-positions’ for transport 
aircraft, and not do the little extra for making the entire Island Strategy a reality with both 
‘staging-positions’, as well as ‘mounting-bases’ for offensive operations. This latter was a 
reasonable argument – many of the bases were needed in any case.  
Another Air Staff criticism of the Carrier Task Force strategy was the use of this force for 
military presence or ‘naval diplomacy’. Such employment of naval forces was argued as a risky 
use of resources, as the threat posed by mines and other forces could actually sink the British 
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forces before an operation. The larger the carrier, and thus fewer carriers – the larger the 
strategic catch would be for an enemy. Still, this criticism from the Air Staff does not hold 
ground for discarding this role of naval forces entirely. The need for presence is a classic naval 
and defence policy objective. It must be remembered that military forces – with their presence as 
a tool of naval diplomacy – in most cases actually do stop possible conflicts from coming to 
military confrontation.  
Finally, after debating the general questions, the discussions came to detailed examinations of 
the ‘military practicability’ of the two alternatives. The Air Ministry argued especially against 
the air defence, ASW, and air strike capabilities of the Carrier Task Force concept.  
The first Air Ministry’s criticism of the military practicability of carriers centred on the air 
defence capabilities. The Air Ministry fully rejected the carriers’ ability to provide air cover for 
other forces on land. The argument was that most carrier aviation simply had to concentrate on 
self-protection of the carrier and thus was not cost-effective. The Air Ministry soon left the line 
of constructive criticism and went on arguing their own better capabilities. The land-based 
aircraft were much better, of course. But even the early warning capabilities could be better 
solved by mobile forces. The Air Ministry argued that such a mobile system was easily set up; an 
early warning radar of the UPS-1 Type could be landed or dropped with the first troops, giving 
air traffic warnings up to 150 NM.22 This system could be operated within one hour. As for 
communication, this could be done in the same time and place. Shortly after, the more capable 
TPS-34 radar could be brought in and could be operational within 10-15 hours. This radar would 
give an effective range of 250 NM for early warning and fighter control.  
As for the ASW capacities, the Air Ministry argued for the excellence of air power over surface 
forces on several occasions, as they had since the Second World War. It was clear; the speed and 
passive sonar ranges of modern submarines required aircraft to hunt them. Among others, the Air 
Ministry referred to joint reports from the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet and Coastal 
Command of 1957 and 1962, in which were found the same conclusions.23 The Air Ministry also 
noted that the Admiralty had never refuted these conclusions. ASW was simply best served by 
aircraft. Another issue was the capacities of the missile firing submarines, a further new threat 
that pointed in the direction of land-based aircraft for the role, which would be able to cover 
large areas outside the range of the surface forces.24  
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Concerning force projection by air strike capabilities, the Air Ministry and Chief of the Air Staff 
Pike argued that the new planned aircraft, the TSR.2 and the P.1154 with its V/STOL capability, 
would give flexible and ‘at hand’ capabilities – even some 1000 NM from the mounting base. 
This range capability, as well as the fact that they could station and maintain a patrol of up to 6 
P.1154 V/STOLs over the area at any time, made a strong argument. Still, the fighter and ground 
attack operations described in the concept were designed only for the initial hours of an attack. 
About one half of a squadron of the V/STOL aircraft, as well as the necessary radar system, 
would be moved in with transport aircraft. Chief of the Air Staff Pike argued that this was well 
within the capabilities of Transport Command.25 Another option was that TSR.2 reconnaissance 
aircraft could find alternative landing sites for the V/STOL fighter support closer to the action 
area. The Air Ministry particularly attacked the carriers’ inability to conduct or support 
intervention operations far inland. Even if the Royal Navy could deliver forces to the coast, they 
still had the logistical challenge of bringing them inland. The Admiralty did not find much 
substance in this criticism, as they said they had never claimed that carrier forces were required 
for such purposes.26  
This ‘Carrier versus Island Strategy’ debate peaked between January and May of 1963. The 
carrier option was assessed as the more flexible, viable, and realistic option. Still, the Air 
Ministry and Chief of the Air Staff Pike never gave up, and continued the strategy of counter-
arguing all the strong-points of the carrier solution: ‘The Air Ministry concept demonstrates true 
flexibility, with forces sitting tight at home, ready to hand, and uncommitted until the last 
moment before the decision is taken to intervene’.27  
‘The case against carriers’  
The Air Ministry, at the hand of Michael Quinlan, kept trace of all the arguments they came 
across in a ‘black paper’ document called ‘the case against carriers’. Through the years of the 
carrier replacement programme, from 1962 until 1965, 18 versions of this document were 
produced.28 The set of arguments from this document were constantly used and slightly adjusted 
to the situation currently discussed. As of July 1963, they attacked the Royal Navy carrier 
programme on three main points:29 
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• The very heavy expenditure would produce only a very modest ‘punch’. The carrier task 
force envisaged would at best be able to operate some 50 aircraft onstation. With the 
costs envisaged, this could not possibly be a cost-effective use of air power.  
• The operational use of carriers was subject to grave limitations: Carriers move slowly, 
they would be vulnerable, they could not bring force to bear far inland, they could not 
operate under any major land-based air threat, their deployment would be hampered by 
politico/geographical barriers, they would need base facilities, their operational 
endurance would be limited, their use would be more subject to weather limitations than 
that of land airfields, and last but not least – carrier operations would require special 
aircraft features which would affect performance.  
• The roles advanced for carriers were all related at best to vague and unlikely 
contingencies. The Admiralty argued that the carriers were needed for three main roles: 
Deterrence against limited aggression, sea control for naval forces and merchant 
shipping, and to support land and air forces at shore. As for ‘deterrence to aggression’, 
the Air Ministry argued that any educated trouble-maker would be able to exploit the 
operational limitations of a small carrier task force. As for ‘sea control’, the Air Ministry 
argued that during the 50 or so conflicts the British had taken part in since 1945 – none of 
them had required carriers for any sea control role. As for support of land-operations, the 
Air Ministry argued that this only would be relevant for an amphibious landing on a 
coast. The effectiveness of a carrier supported landing would also assume that the carrier 
would be there in time, that there were little air opposition, and that the entry point would 
be within reach of the land-based transport aircraft in order to get forces in.  
 
The black paper ‘the case against carriers’ summarised the general perception about carriers that 
had evolved within the Air Ministry. With the political ambition to get defence expenditure 
down to 7% GNP, it was clear to anyone that the Armed Forces could not possibly afford the 
new carriers without significant reductions in other parts of the forces. The Navy had got the 
Polaris, and a level of escorts would in any case be needed for protection of the carriers – so it 
would be the other services that would take the bill. The strategy the Air Ministry followed was a 
‘value for money’ discussion. The Air Ministry truly believed that carriers were not a cost-
effective use of air power, or the scarce resources available to the defence sector. The concluding 
remarks of the ‘the case against carriers’ black paper of July 1963 stated that:  
 
We can have no military influence in areas where there are no land bases available to us. 
In such circumstances carriers are just expensive white elephants. If we leave overseas 
bases we shall become a purely European power; carriers will not restore the situation.30 
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Chapter 2-C: The Admiralty critique of the Island Strategy 
To the Admiralty, it was clear that the RAF Island Strategy was fully dependant on a sufficient 
number of bases. The Admiralty was very sceptical about the realities of building and 
maintaining such a network. The last two decades had clearly show the political difficulties of 
upholding political ties to many of the former colonies, and thus the former bases which had 
been so important. The first question raised by the Admiralty was whether the UK wanted to be 
dependent on such a network of bases. They argued that the implications would often be more 
commitments in relation to the host nations and conflicts in the regions. If the British were to 
lose control of one or a few bases, this would leave British power in ruins across a large area. In 
a wider perspective, the main argument of the Admiralty was the greater flexibility of the carrier 
force, a strategy they argued would make the UK largely independent of bases and thus political 
commitments. The Admiralty wrote a paper entitled ‘The Island Strategy’ in January 1963, 
which brought forward a broad set of critical comments.31 The criticism centred on the ‘strategic 
reality’ and ‘political feasibility’ of the Island Strategy, as well as some technical/tactical 
questions on the military practicability of the concept of using solely land-based air power.  
As for the ‘strategic reality’ of the Island Strategy, the Admiralty argued that the concept was 
inherently inflexible. The strategy assumed that the conflicts would follow the patterns of the 
ongoing conflicts. As the challenges would most likely be different in the future, the islands and 
their bases could not be moved around. This critique was far-reaching, as the Island Strategy 
clearly was based on a wide spread network of bases. Even if the conflicts most likely would be 
different in future, as argued by the Admiralty, Africa, the Middle East and the Far East would 
still be the same. On the other hand, the Falkland Islands, which would be at stake two decades 
later, were not fully covered by the ‘Island Strategy’ bases. The carrier task force clearly proved 
the most flexible in this case.  
The concept was further dependent not just on the islands in the Indian Ocean, but also bases 
with maintenance, operation facilities, and equipment around the African continent. This was 
due to the previously mentioned ‘Arab Air Barrier’, where overflying rights were not given. The 
Admiralty had special concerns over Masirah, Aldabra and Thailand. This critique of 
‘feasibility’ was of little importance – as the costs of running these bases were covered by the 
Air Ministry’s greater concept of the ‘Island Strategy’.  
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As for the ‘military practicability’ of relying on a concept of land-based air power, the Admiralty 
started out with the statement: ‘The concept of going into battle by air at ranges up to 1000 miles 
is untried’. That was a reasonable and justified criticism. Air power theorists from the early days 
(and up to the present) have repeatedly presented visions for ‘independent air power’ – which 
have proved impractical. It was, and still is, difficult to argue against this sound scepticism.  
First regarding force projection: As argued by the Admiralty, the most critical phase of an 
intervention plan was the approach and touch-down at the point of entry, because of the light 
armour and arms any air-inserted spearhead troops would have in hand. In the early phase they 
would sit helplessly, even before the most modest opposition. The Admiralty stressed that in this 
phase: ‘…undisputed command of the air is essential, yet it can not be secured unless the 
transport force is protected by fighters and ground attack aircraft.’32 Even if a long range 
interdiction plan was conducted to take out any enemy forces prior to a landing, this would 
probably not be successful according to the Admiralty. This last argument would prove to be 
important. Firstly, attacking a nation before a conflict broke out was politically controversial. 
This argument was also raised within the Chief Scientific Advisor’s study-group, and especially 
stressed by Bondi.33 He was quite clear in his speech that the ‘political dangers’ of the concept 
‘effectively ruled it out’. As for the military practicability of pre-war interdict operations, the 
criticism was less justified. Such interdictions for taking out aircraft, commando posts, and early 
warning systems have become ‘normal operations’ in the conflicts of the past 20 years.  
The greatest criticism from the Admiralty was to be directed towards the combat radius of the air 
forces. They stressed the 1000 miles argument. As the Admiralty stated: ‘…fighters and ground 
attack aircraft could not be flown to the battle zone in a state of combat readiness – nor could the 
radar environment be established’. Both the Kuwait and Aden operations gave recent examples 
of the practical difficulty of establishing such facilities. These criticisms were justified, even 
though the prospects of new and much greater capabilities of air-air refuelling by older, 
converted, V-bomber aircraft were promising. As a comment upon the critique of the Admiralty, 
far from all of the conflict areas would be 1000 NM away from the mounting bases – this was 
the maximum described by the Air Ministry. In most cases, the distance would be far less. This 
counter-argument by the Air Ministry was justified.  
Other, lesser criticisms from the Admiralty included: The questions of logistics, the vulnerability 
of island bases in case of nuclear war, reaction speed, protection of shipping and acclimatisation. 
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All these criticisms were raised more as loose arguments without much discussion, and 
consequently had less substance. A final criticism, which seems justified, was the Island Strategy 
concept’s lack of military presence.34 Military presence as a means of diplomacy has been and 
always will be important.  
Many of the arguments of the Air Ministry’s solution could have better been made from the 
Admiralty if it had been seen in the context of real experiences such as the Kuwaiti Crisis of 
1961. The practicality of relying on land-based air power had been put to the test, but proved 
much more difficult than argued in the Island Strategy concept. But then again, one must 
remember that the argued Island Strategy concept was not in place. The crisis may still be used 
to exemplify many of the challenges that would meet such a land-based air power concept, even 
though it would be better prepared in the future.  
Since the Iraqi Revolution in 1958, Great Britain’s oil-interests in Kuwait were at stake.35 An 
Iraqi attempt to seize control over Kuwait was expected, and the British constructed the 
‘Operation Vantage’ plan for reinforcement of Kuwait.36 Immediately after Kuwait was given 
full sovereignty on 19 June 1961, the Iraqi ruler looked to Kuwait. The British forces in the 
region were put on alert, awaiting any requests of assistance from the Sheikh of Kuwait. The 
invitation came, and the intervention was ordered by 30 June. According to the ‘Operation 
Vantage’ plan, Transport Command was to fly in great numbers of Army troops by strategic and 
tactical airlifts. However, the Army troops planned to be flown in from the UK, Africa and 
Cyprus were stopped by the ‘Arab Air Barrier’, as Turkey and Sudan denied over-flight rights to 
the British for the initial part of the crisis. They later relaxed the restrictions.37 Still, even if the 
transport system for reinforcements was not as effective as hoped, several thousand troops were 
flown in within a week. RAF fighters in the region were to provide supporting air cover and air 
strikes. As the crisis started, the RAF had two Hunter squadrons in Bahrain. These provided 
limited air cover over Kuwait. As for the planned early warning and control radar and 
communication systems of the RAF, these did not become operational until more than two weeks 
after the crisis started. It was in fact the carrier HMS BULWARK with its air radar, the 42 
Commandos, and the 848 helicopter squadron which became the saviour of the initial phase of 
the operation. The ship was luckily in the area for hot-water trials at the time. There were also 
several support ships close by. Soon HMS VICTORIOUS, with its new and much improved air 
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early warning radar, came into the area.38 The politically successful British intervention in 
Kuwait in 1961 was thus not without problems. First of all, the logistical system was initially so 
dislocated that it would have made a quick intervention impossible by RAF forces alone. The 
fortunate close position of naval forces, even strengthened by a planned handover of ships at 
station which made the force stronger than normal – made much of the contribution.39 This 
operation demonstrated the importance and potential of naval forces. These experiences were 
used to some extent by the Admiralty in the debates that followed, regarding the need for 
carriers, but it would most certainly have helped their case if they had used them more in their 
studies and arguments.  
 
Chapter 2-D: The debate following the 1962-63 Chief Scientific 
Advisor’s Enquiry  
The first complete preliminary report of the Chief Scientific Advisor Study-Group on the 
‘Enquiry into Carrier Task Forces’ of 7 February 1963 was circulated to all involved institutions 
and actors. The final report was delivered 22 April 1963. In the final report, the study-group still 
found it difficult to give any concrete recommendations, as the technical and military tactical 
questions and the comparison of the two concepts were so thoroughly inter-connected with 
political and financial questions. For instance, if the politicians assessed that the probability of 
military intervention in the 1970s was low; they could well opt for the cheaper strategy. Since 
the choice between the alternatives would have far reaching consequences beyond those of a 
military tactical sort, they had to involve political judgement. Even though no clear cut 
recommendation was presented, the panel’s discussion of pro and cons largely supported the 
naval concept.  
The enquiry first discussed the most likely cases of intervention the British could face in the 
1970s. The most likely case of intervention would come after an invitation by a regime 
threatened by a neighbouring country or facing internal security problems. In such a case, either 
carriers or the full network of island bases would be necessary. The enquiry concluded that such 
interventions would ‘require the maintenance of the present planned Air Force strength of 
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transport and fighter/ground attack aircraft.’40 As the degree of opposition rose, the enquiry 
argued that the RAF would find it difficult to establish the airheads. In that case, the carrier 
option would most likely be the more effective and enduring. Despite this far less likely case, the 
study-group argued that the Government should be prepared to carry out such an operation.  
As for the military technical and tactical evaluations, the study-group concluded that the 
advantages of the Admiralty’s solution had better prospects for effective air cover, a quicker 
landing of tanks (smaller ones however than the Army required) and heavy equipment in 
conflicts of ‘moderate opposition’. In addition, naval presence as a means of military diplomacy, 
geographical flexibility, and the ability to put an operation into reverse were assessed important. 
The study-group argued that ‘naval diplomacy’, operations such as sailing off the coast of a 
conflict area or while a political climate was about to ‘hot up’, might well prevent hostilities 
from breaking out. This argument was generally accepted, and was not much debated. It was the 
statement and conclusion regarding ‘air cover’ which most provoked the Air Ministry. The Chief 
Scientific Advisory Study-Group argued that the immediate provision of air cover, including 
adequate radar cover, was of paramount importance in the case of an opposed assault. None of 
the services disagreed over the importance of ‘air cover’, but the study-group’s acceptance of the 
naval case for carrier task forces for provision of more effective air cover, despite the 
shortcomings of carrier aviation, was fallacious according to the Air Ministry.41 Still, the enquiry 
supported the naval case:  
 
Whatever can in theory be achieved by an air striking force operating at long range, we 
think there is no question but that a carrier-borne force, albeit a smaller one, at 100-200 
miles range will be more effective in the opening stages of an assault landing.42  
 
This question, despite the enquiry’s conclusion, led to several rounds of discussion over the next 
few years.  
As for the greater system of ‘mobility’ for the British Army, the Chief Scientific Advisory panel, 
the Admiralty, and the Air Ministry all agreed upon the necessity of transporting the bulk of the 
Army troops by air, but that the heavy equipment had to go by sea. Thus, both concepts were 
dependant on a ‘sea-tail’ for the main force and heavy supplies. But the consequence of this was 
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more controversial and complicated: Zuckerman actually supported both concepts by concluding 
of this ‘sea-tail’: ‘…be it noted by ships other than carriers’. 43 Zuckerman argued that not even 
the projected carriers were large enough to carry all Army equipment, tanks especially. 
Regarding the Island Strategy, he also noted positively that in any case the islands would be 
needed as staging points for all services, if not as mounting bases for offensive air operations.  
But there were pitfalls and disadvantages in the Admiralty’s solution which were also noted by 
the Chief Scientific Advisor’s study-group. The study-group argued that a carrier force had to be 
of four ships – as a minimum. One may think that this support from the Chief Scientific Advisor 
would strengthen the Admiralty’s case, but this argument of four – or none, did not suit the later 
discussion of a ‘double’ or ‘single stance strategy’, nor the cancellation that later came about. In 
addition, the Chief Scientific Advisor’s report read:  
 
Carriers are not required for operations in which U.K. forces intervene by invitation; nor 
is it likely that carrier task forces would be used against heavy opposition in view of the 
risks which the whole operations would run.44  
 
The preliminary report supported the carrier concept only if there would be a minimum of four 
carriers, and found that they were the ‘right solution’ only when used against enemies of 
moderate opposition. They would later change these arguments. The greatest criticism of the 
carrier option by the Chief Scientific Advisor’s study-group was the vulnerability of a carrier 
force and its cost. A determined force of submarines or aircraft, or an opponent using mines, 
would pose a great threat to a carrier force. Much of its own force would be needed just for self-
protection.  
The Chief Scientific Advisor and his group were generally sceptical of the Island Strategy 
concept, which was dependent on four bases in the Indian Ocean; Aldabra, Masirah, Gan and 
Cocos.45 The issue of bases in the East of Suez region was very much the background of the 
entire re-structuring of British forces in the region. Building up – and running new bases were 
thus controversial in themselves. Of the bases envisaged; Aldabra did not have any facilities, and 
the others had only limited air facilities. Consequently, the Air Ministry solution would also 
require heavy investments and some running-costs. The study-group was also sceptical of the Air 
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Ministry concept’s ability to exercise close control of fighters and close air support aircraft in the 
initial hours of an assault. This could not be done effectively until the mobile ground radar 
systems were brought in. Even as the prospective P.1154s were to have air intercept (AI) radars, 
the enquiry report concluded that the ‘effectiveness of standing fighter patrol without direction 
and control would be less than that of a patrol of equivalent strength operating under radar 
control as envisaged in the Naval Solution…’.46 All the same pitfalls of the air control 
capabilities of the Island Strategy, with air power applied from 1000 NM away, would also be 
the case for tactical air strike operations.47 And of course, the study-group also questioned the 
political (and military) feasibility of relying on destruction of the enemy on the ground before the 
operations. 
The War Office sat on the fence during most of the inter-service debate. They were included in 
the mobile concepts of both the Air Ministry and Admiralty. The War Office was mainly taken 
into the debate for discussion regarding the logistical capacities required, especially concerning 
tanks. The Army argued that tanks were essential elements if the British were to advance against 
opposition, and the question of minimum weight was studied. The Army concluded that tanks 
weighing less than 35 tons were not acceptable. This not only challenged the Air Ministry, but 
the Admiralty as well. No aircraft available or planned for the RAF would be able to support 
this, but neither could the prospective carriers. The Chief Scientific Advisor’s study-group 
concluded that sooner or later sea-borne supplies, beyond what the carriers could bring, had to be 
brought in.48 They also found that a point of entry far from the coast was out of the question. The 
Air Ministry solution would always require a ‘sea tail’, which of course had to be protected by 
escorting forces. But then again, the Chief Scientific Advisor followed this up by stating that 
such an escorting force would not necessarily need carriers: Land-based air power and naval 
surface forces could fill these requirements. Even though the Chief Scientific Advisor’s study-
group was sceptical of the Island Strategy concept, they still argued for the fact that bases and 
staging posts were required in any case. The bases currently available should therefore be 
retained as long as possible.  
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Throughout the studies and debate, Zuckerman’s study-group did not support any compromise 
solution. It had to be one thing or the other. The interim report concluded that the Government 
had two choices:49 
 
• To use the forces and bases which they currently had, together with existing equipment, 
and to use them for as long as they could, cutting the political commitments accordingly 
and recognising that in the future the loss of bases would limit more and more the 
political interventions they could make.  
• Or build and man, at admittedly a very high cost, an effective carrier task force so as to 
retain political and military flexibility.  
 
As an interesting last note on the report, though unimportant at the time: The most visionary 
conclusion of the study-group argued that the Government, for financial reasons, would possibly 
decide against maintaining an intervention capability in the 1970s. A solution was simply to opt 
to continue the policy East of Suez for as long as possible using the carriers and bases in service 
– and progressively cut the political commitments accordingly. With these concluding remarks 
from the study-group one may foresee the end of the story… 
Alternatives to the classical carrier 
As we have seen, the Minister of Defence commissioned several studies to examine the case for 
new carriers, the costs involved, and the military strategy options during 1963. Many questions 
were raised, many of which were quite radical. From the beginning, the Navy also had to look 
into possible ways of protecting ships at sea and of supporting assault operations by other means 
than traditional (large) carriers.  The first study was to examine the question ‘The Navy without 
Aircraft Carriers’.50 A central question was whether and how the Navy could fulfil their world-
wide roles without the traditional carriers. Attached to this study was the shorter study of an ‘All-
Missile Navy’. Next, the Admiralty had to study the concept of ‘Off-shore support ships’.51 This 
latter study was to examine the possibility of operating normally land-based aircraft from 
‘floating airfields’. These ships could either be converted from ordinary large merchant ships or 
purpose built. This was a study ordered by the Chiefs of Staff, and it was intended to involve all 
three services.   
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The Navy without Aircraft Carriers 
As for the main and first study, ‘The Navy without Aircraft Carriers’, this was fully undertaken 
by the Admiralty, with several drafts going out to the Air Ministry and Minister of Defence 
offices. The aim of the study was to examine the measures necessary to make the Navy viable 
and able to perform its world-wide role without ‘carriers as we know them’. Commando carriers, 
as well as the proposed ‘off-shore support ships’, were planned. The first part of the study dealt 
with the necessity of fixed-wing aircraft for the maritime roles. The second part focused on the 
issue of whether land-based aircraft could take on all these maritime roles. In case the research 
found that some aircraft had still to be sea-based; could these aircraft be operated from vessels 
other than ‘carriers as we know them’? 
The arguments may be summarised thus; the Navy stated that ‘these far-reaching’ assumptions 
which formed the foundation for the studies in the first place were fallacious. The Admiralty 
stated that it was beyond doubt that ‘seaborne fixed-wing remain indispensable for 
reconnaissance and surveillance, “probing” air and surface contacts, and the destruction of 
shadowers and jammers’.52 The reality of the potential of any British surface-to-surface missile 
systems was clear:53  
 
Neither can the Navy’s requirements for fighter aircraft be reduced, nor for surface strike 
against ships eliminated, because we do not have the capability of developing shipborne 
long range S.A.G.W and S.S.G.W which could compete with the Russian L.R.G.W 
capability, present and future.  
 
If one went forward with this alternative, it would require increased helicopter capacity for other 
parts of the Navy, fully capable command and control facilities built in other ships, as well as 
other means of carrying troops. In addition, it would require a great number of new weapon 
programmes to make the Navy into a still powerful force. And even so, one would lose the 
ability to influence events on land with such a naval force. Still further, it would require a much 
greater air force, to substitute for carriers.  
In its recommendations, the Navy did not leave the alternatives much up to chance, and made no 
attempt at hiding their political position. ‘It is concluded that for the operation of seaborne fixed-
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wing aircraft even in the indispensable minimum of roles, aircraft carriers as we know them are 
essential’.54  
Off-shore support ships 
The second study, which was to examine the controversial question of ‘Off-shore support ships’, 
was ordered in February 1963. The Chiefs of Staff had asked for an evaluation of ships other 
than classical carriers, which could still operate ‘normally land-based aircraft’ and provide air 
support for Army intervention.55 This request and the document that followed should be 
understood in conjunction with the on-going discussion of new carriers versus the Island 
Strategy. The ‘Off-shore support ships’ report was delivered by 9 May 1963.56 The first official 
record discussing the issue was a meeting between the Minister of Defence and the Chiefs of 
Staff held on 6 February 1963. The broad requirements were put forward by the Chiefs of Staff 
to the Admiralty study by 26 February. The general feeling of the Minister was that the long 
standing requirement of independently being able to put ashore a Brigade group plus a Parachute 
Battalion, as means of incursion and deterrence, had to be abandoned. If the UK were to uphold 
this capacity, it would probably require some cheaper solutions. The Minister ‘was therefore 
seeking a way in which it could be carried out at less cost and with less vulnerability than in the 
aircraft carrier strategy but with more flexibility than in the Island Strategy’.57 He asked for a 
study of a concept where the RN and RAF supported the Army from ‘floating bases’ of cheap 
converted merchant ships, or if necessary new support ships after merchant building standards. 
This would possibly give the capacity to support amphibious operations and other helicopter 
operations at far less cost than the naval carrier standards.  
Even during the initial meeting, the First Sea Lord replied that such a ship would have a very 
restricted role compared to that of a fleet carrier. Escort groups and guided missile ships, 
including a programme of new surface-surface missiles would also still be required.58 This was a 
view supported by the Minister. He still saw the need to examine cheaper solutions, and the 
concept had to be studied. In addition to the ‘floating bases’, they also briefly discussed what 
would be the smallest possible carrier that could operate the projected P.1154 aircraft. The Navy 
found that a ship for this purpose could be as small as 15,000 tons. The concept was abandoned 
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shortly afterwards, as ‘such a ship showed that it could not be efficiently or even safely 
operated…’.59 (An interesting conclusion, in the light of the coming 16,000 ton INVINCIBLE-
class, in service just a decade later).  
The ‘floating bases’ concept asked for by the Minister was later refined in a broad requirement 
put forward by the Joint Planning Staff. Such a ship was required to support:60 
 
• The landing of one parachute battalion group or Royal Marine commando group or both 
to seize an airfield and cover such engineering tasks as are required to rehabilitate or 
improve it.  
• The arrival; sea-lifted battalion group by battalion group, or of an air transport infantry 
brigade group including some part of the non-organic units. 
• The completion of the build-up of the forces and of non-organic units.  
• Offensive and defensive actions on land would take place throughout the period of build-
up which might last up to ten days.  
• The development of further operations.  
 
The naval study-group concluded in the end that this was an undesirable concept. And if it had 
been advisable, such ships had to be newly constructed ships of about 20,000 to 22,000 tons, 
with a minimum of landing and take-off facilities. The cost would be about £20 Million per ship, 
and three ships would be needed if it were to make some contribution.61 The Admiralty was 
greatly concerned with this concept, as the ships would be extremely vulnerable. In addition, 
they argued that operating and maintaining aircraft from ships was a very complex duty – which 
in reality required all the facilities present in complete carriers.  
All the studies were delivered from the Admiralty to the Minister of Defence by May 1963. The 
Minister stated that he and his staff would reflect upon them, and convey the views and 
scepticism of the Admiralty to the Prime Minister. It never came to any realisation of such ships, 
or the ‘Afloat/Ashore concept’ which followed. Naval scepticism is very pictorial, with 
nicknames used in their in-house studies and correspondence about the concept-ships; the ‘Pike 
ships’, the ‘Thorneycrafts’, or simply the ‘Garages’. The Chief Scientific Advisor was also 
reluctant from the start. As he wrote in February 1963; ‘We have also briefly considered the 
                                                                                                                                                             
58
 Ibid.  
59
 NAUK DEFE 7/2354. Note from Carrington to Minister of Defence, 9 May 1963. See also NAUK ADM 1/29108.  
60
 NAUK AIR 20/11423. Report by the Joint Planning Staff, 21 February 1963.   
61
 NAUK DEFE 7/2354. ‘Off-shore support ships’ study report, summer 1963. For chronology and details on the 
debate and design of the ships; see the NAUK AIR 20/11423, NAUK AIR 20/11424, and NAUK AIR 20/11425, 
Future aircraft carriers and the island strategy: Admiralty/Air Ministry studies. 




            
   
 
 
possibility of simplified carriers acting simply as floating airstrips, but have concluded that they 
would not meet the operational requirements’.62 The attitude of the Admiralty did not change.  
A Navy without carriers; an ‘All-Missile Navy’ 
When the Admiralty delivered the final reports of the studies to the Minister by May 1963, they 
also enclosed a new and general overarching paper named ‘Aircraft Carrier Replacement’.63 In 
this new paper, they attempted to sum up the greater issue of carrier replacement.  
 
We approached the two studies which you commissioned with completely open minds 
and I think we have done them very thoroughly. We were fully prepared to make 
proposals for refashioning the Navy very radically, for example by going over to an “all-
missile” force without carriers as we know them had this seemed the right course. But as 
you will see, our conclusion was that – even leaving aside any question of costs – it 
would not be possible to have a next-generation Navy capable of fulfilling the roles 
postulated for it.64  
 
In any case, an all-missile navy could not be built until the late 1970s, as the challenges of 
making such weapon systems were great. In addition, the Admiralty argued that the cost of 
building up such a navy would be just as expensive as building and running the currently 
planned structure.65 However, later estimates showed that it would be about half the cost of a 
carrier programme, about £600 million for a ‘All-Missile Navy’ compared to roughly £ 1,300 
million for a carrier navy.66  
As a final comment from the Admiralty, First Lord Carrington made a straightforward 
conclusion in a personal letter to the Minister of Defence after the final reports had been 
circulated:  
 
I may summarise… Even if an “all-missile Navy” were a feasible aim in the time scale 
under consideration, which it is not, seaborne fixed-wing aircraft would remain 
indispensable for tactical reconnaissance, surveillance, “probing” air and surface 
contacts, and the destruction of shadowers and stand-off jammer aircraft. The seaborne 
aircraft must be operated, maintained, rearmed and refuelled in ships. For this is in fact 
no practical alternative to a parent ship with a flat top, a catapult, deck of certain strength, 
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and minimum radar facilities. And whatever new name might be found, this would be an 
aircraft carrier.67  
 
Even though the Admiralty studies clearly tried to push off the alternative ideas proposed, the 
Chiefs of Staff found that the case for dual-purpose commando ships was poorly covered. The 
Admiralty never gave the alternatives a chance and their arguments were poorly founded. Thus, 
the concepts would not be disregarded for the future – and the issue of smaller and combined 
role ships for launching aircraft would emerge again.  
 
Chapter 2-E: Approval of the Carrier 
The debate summarised  
The debate of 1963 thoroughly examined the pros and cons both of carrier aviation and land-
based air power. All the arguments about maritime air power were brought to the table. This was 
an inter-service rivalry where the Air Ministry tried to torpedo the Admiralty’s carrier 
replacement programme. It was clear that the building of new fleet carriers would have grave 
implications for the economy of the other two services. The two strategies proposed were both 
intended as solutions to the UK’s demand for continued military presence and influence East of 
Suez in and after the 1970s. The case for carriers was generally supported by Mountbatten and 
Zuckerman throughout this period. As for the Ministers of Defence, Watkinson had been 
supportive, but Thorneycroft, who took office in July 1962, was initially greatly concerned over 
the costs involved. However, after a year in office, he had become a supporter in the Admiralty’s 
fight for the carrier.  
The Admiralty promoted carriers for both transport of troops and reinforcements, as well as air 
strikes and air cover. As they saw it, the RAF should play a supporting role to the Royal Navy by 
ensuring a modest transport of troops and equipment from the British Isles. The Air Ministry 
first came up with the Island Strategy for politically safe transport-routes, as a response to the 
‘Arab Air Barrier’. Later, by the autumn of 1962, the wider Island Strategy concept became a 
complete, but far cheaper, alternative to carrier forces. A multitude of missions from strikes, and 
air control, to the insertion of troops, was to be done via ‘staging’ and ‘mounting bases’, as well 
as airheads close to the conflict areas. This was deemed possible due to air-to-air refuelling and 
V/STOL fighter/strike and medium transport aircraft.  
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Even though the Island Strategy concept was not initially intended as an alternative to carriers, it 
became so by 1962. The economic situation was clear to anybody – if new carriers were to be 
acquired, other forces had to take enormous cuts. The Air Ministry clearly felt that they had 
taken their share of cancelled programmes over the last 3-4 years following the Sandys Defence 
Review in 1957. During Thorneycroft’s first months in office, he was generally supportive of the 
economically more feasible ‘Island strategy’; however, by the winter of 1963 he became less so. 
When the question of the financial cost of the Island Strategy came up for debate in March 1963, 
Thorneycroft declined to spend time on it. He had lost faith in the Air Ministry’s alternative.  
Finally a decision  
The views of the Minister of Defence and the Chancellor of the Exchequer were to be presented 
to the Defence Committee in late July 1963. The CVA-0168 project and the general need for an 
aircraft carrier fleet for the 1970s was by then fully supported by the Ministry of Defence:  
 
It was, however, a necessary decision if the navy was to be able to deal with other 
countries (for example Indonesia) whose ships might be armed with surface-to-surface 
missiles. The decision had been taken in the past that the navy should not be so armed but 
rely on fixed-wing aircraft to deal with such opposition, and for this purpose carriers were 
necessary. There was no means of avoiding a decision on carriers unless the Government 
was to change its policy and abandon its east of Suez role, and Defence Committee had 
already decided that no such change should be made.69 
 
During July 1963, all the institutions and actors tried to lobby their case. There was much 
correspondence, not least directly to and from the Prime Minister.  
The Air Ministry and the Treasury were particularly concerned over the fact that the expensive 
carrier programme had never truly been put under any cost-effective study.70 The Treasury was 
sceptical because of the great burden it would put on the defence budget, as well as on public 
expenditure in general:  
 
I do not consider that the case has yet been established for embarking on the construction 
of new aircraft carriers with its major long term implications for defence expenditure and 
public expenditure in general, and I invite the Cabinet to agree.71  
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This statement was part of a draft presentation the Chancellor prepared for the final meeting. 
After a meeting with the Prime Minister, Macmillan, the Chancellor was told not to present it to 
the Cabinet.72 The Prime Minister himself put the Treasury off, as he did not want any political 
disturbance from this issue in what was generally a troublesome time for the party. The 
controversial issue of carriers was for political reasons pushed forward. 
The Ministry of Defence and the Admiralty had argued convincingly that new carriers were 
needed. Modernisation and a refit programme for the old carriers were also discarded, as this 
would be enormously expensive and probably keep each carrier in dock for up to two years. A 
modernisation option would in any case only give an older carrier a few extra years. In July 
1963, Peter Thorneycroft, then Minister of Defence, spoke to the House and confirmed that new 
carriers would be built. He also stated that three carriers should make up the future carrier force 
for the Royal Navy:  
 
The Government have had the question of aircraft carriers under consideration with a 
view to determining the requirement for the 1970’s. After full consideration it has been 
decided that the carrier force likely to be required during that period is three carriers.73  
 
It was hard to judge the defence challenges of the future (1970-80). However, a minimum of 
three carriers was deemed necessary if Britain and the Royal Navy were to keep any global role. 
With less than three carriers, the Navy would be reduced to an anti-submarine navy. With a 
global role in mind; two carriers were intended for deployments East of Suez, while one would 
be in home waters for maintenance and training.74    
The Cabinet supported the stand of the Minister of Defence, and the first new carrier was agreed 
upon by 30 July 1963.75 The question of a second new carrier was planned to be discussed in 
about two years’ time. Having scaled down their ambitions, from four to three fleet carriers and 
by spacing out the replacement programme, the Admiralty had won support for their arguments.  
The Chief of the Air Staff would still not support the political decision of building three new 
fleet carriers for the future challenges of the 1980s. The developments of shore-based aircraft 
were just too promising. The general financial problems were not solved. Both the carrier, the 
TSR.2 and the Army’s Chieftain tanks were approved. It was quite clear that the economy would 
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still be pressed in the future. This fact had been made clear by the Treasury. If the decision on 
the building of the carriers would stand – it was obviously clear that the numbers of aircraft and 
tanks would suffer. It was impossible to cut an expensive carrier in two…76  
Chapter conclusion  
Due to the differences of opinion over the military strategic alternatives from the Royal Navy 
and the Royal Air Force, which had evolved into an extreme inter-service rivalry, Chief 
Scientific Advisor Zuckerman’s neutral study achieved great political influence. From the 
beginning of the debate, Zuckerman had proved to be a strong believer in carrier aviation. This, 
added to the well known fact that he was closely related to the Chief of the Defence Staff Lord 
Mountbatten, largely ruined the Royal Air Force’s trust in the ‘neutral study’.  
This chapter has reviewed and discussed the criticism to the study that was raised from the 
services, and the continuing inter-service rivalry. However, these two alternatives, proposed to 
fill the needs of the British as they withdrew from their former colonies and important garrisons, 
hardly reached the political decision makers. The top leadership did not want a great public 
debate in a generally troublesome period for the Conservative Party, and as the time for concrete 
investments lay far ahead the easiest solution was to stay with the proven policy and forces. The 
story of 1960-63 is important for the conceptual debate on land-based air power versus carrier 
aviation, but this chapter has shown that the inter-service rivalry, as well as Air Ministry and 
Admiralty strategic thinking and policy, had little bearing on the political decision that came in 
July 1963 in favour of the carrier option.  
The way ahead  
New carriers had been agreed upon by the Cabinet, but challenges for the Royal Navy would not 
ease for long. The greatest political issue at stake – the continuation of Britain’s global role, 
which had also become essential in the carrier debate, became more and more important. The 
Admiralty soon came to conflict – again – with the Treasury over the need for new aircraft 
carriers. The disagreement surfaced after the Treasury halted the funding for the time-pressing 
research and development phase. This was what the naval MoD officers and servants feared to 
be an indirect move away from a ‘new design carrier’, to once again take the discussion on a refit 
carrier.77 Several issues contributed to the halt of the new carrier; the question of cancellation of 
the surface-to-surface nuclear Blue Water missile, the question of deferring a decision on 
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OR.351 VTOL transport aircraft, the discussions on finance of the nuclear programme, and not 
least the new policy review of ‘strategy in the long term’. Clearly, the whole burden of the 
world-wide role was immense, and had to be reviewed.78 The Treasury in particular pressed for a 
greater review in this period.79 Despite the Cabinet decision of 30 July on the carriers, no 
agreement on funding had come by late summer. The fight kept on. In an internal MoD note 
from September 1963, the Treasury – Admiralty conflict was discussed:  
 
It is clear that this can now be settled only at Ministerial level, and I understand that since 
Mr. Armstrong wrote his minute of 27th September the First Sea Lord has had a talk with 
the Minster. The Minister has made up his mind to appeal to the Prime Minister on the 
ground that what the Admiralty proposes is clearly in accordance with the conclusions of 
the Cabinet, and that what the Treasury are trying to do is equally inconsistent with those 
conclusions.80 
 
Thorneycroft now partly took the Treasury’s side in the debate. He admitted that a late refit of 
HMS EAGLE and HMS HERMES would make them last until 1980. Consequently, only one 
new carrier was needed and consequently the CVA-02 was put aside. The CVA-01 was then 
designed to be about 50,000 tons, costing around £60 million.81 According to Thorneycroft, the 
aircraft intended for the carriers of the 1970s would be a joint RAF and RN multi-role aircraft 
based on the Hawker P.1154. This vision of a British joint aircraft was even supported by the 
opposition parties.82 The link between the carrier issue and agreement for a joint aircraft for the 
RAF and RN was important at this critical stage in late 1963.83 In this sense; the RAF helped the 
Navy’s case for carriers with this aircraft, which was chiefly designed for and proposed by the 
RAF.  
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Chapter 3: A new framework – a new debate on maritime air power 
 
May I say, first, how glad we are on this side of the House that the Government 
have accepted the arguments which we have so often put forward against building 
an aircraft carrier of the size of the ‘FORRESTAL’ class.1 
Denis Healey, 1963 
 
After the decision to opt for carrier task forces in the summer of 1963, the debate and rivalry 
calmed down for a while. Even though there were some disagreements between the Admiralty, 
supported by the MoD, and the Treasury over funding for the design and research work. This 
chapter first briefly discusses the shift of government in October 1964, after which the Ministries 
needed to be settled. Thereafter, examines the greater strategic developments; the Soviet Navy 
was rising and the challenges in the East of Suez region did not diminish. Simultaneously as the 
strategic framework was becoming more complicated – the debate on land-based air power and 
carrier aviation, now focusing on the CVA-01 programme, re-emerged. This happened within the 
framework of the new defence review under Denis Healey started by early 1965.  
 
Chapter 3-A: From Conservatives to Labour, October 1964 
The Conservative Party was the dominating political party in the 20th century. They had the 
leadership for most of the century, as well as a majority in the Commons and House of Lords.  
For the first period of my research, the Conservatives held power under Prime Ministers 
Macmillan (1957-1963), and Douglas-Home (1963-64). Traditional Conservative politics has 
had a cautious attitude towards change, a distrust of ‘big governments’ and emphasis upon law 
and order, patriotism, and preference for freedom and private enterprise. In the late 1950s, the 
Conservatives had come to accept the ‘welfare state’ and a need for more governmental 
intervention and direction.2 However, in early 1960s the Conservatives had problems in meeting 
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the steadily increasing demands from the public for an increased standard of living. As the 
economy performed less satisfactorily, at least compared to other nations the British identified 
themselves with, the support for this increased welfare state proved difficult.3 The international 
trend of nationalism and the establishment of the European Economic Community market 
(EEC), or Common market as it often was called, challenged Conservative foreign policy. The 
Conservative Party led the country during and after the Suez Crisis of 1956, and initiated the 
decolonisation era. Under the Conservative Party, the British applied for EEC membership in 
1963. The British also applied in 1967 under Wilson. Both these were vetoed by the French 
General and President De Gaulle. In this period, Conservative politics was challenged and the 
party became divided over the developments. In several fields, the Conservatives had closed the 
gap on traditional Labour policies.  
The new Labour Government under Prime Minister Harold Wilson, which came to power in 
October 1964, had the aim of modernising the economy. The concern for the overall economic 
position of Britain with other nations stayed central in politics. The Labour Government of 1964 
aimed at a 4 per cent annual growth, increased focus on social reforms, and increased spending 
on public services.4 This classic socialistic policy had implications for the ‘competing’ demands 
of the defence sector for funding. The question relating to defence and foreign policy had always 
internally torn the Labour Party, and when Harold Wilson got to power in 1964 he had to bridge 
the differences within his party.  
The Labour Party’s ethos was one of social reform, economic redistribution, and support of the 
trade unions. Until the First World War, the party had not been interested in the questions of 
defence and foreign security policy. Following the war, the party became committed to 
disarmament and strongly supported the building of League of Nations. The party was not 
pacifist per se, but there were elements of this in the 1920-30s. However, this changed with the 
Spanish Civil War. The pacifist elements of the party then re-considered, and most of the party 
found that war could be justified. The same attitude prevailed after the Second World War. The 
party stayed focused on international institutions, the United Nations, and a commitment to 
international law. The party has also traditionally been sceptical of power politics, secret 
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diplomacy, and had a tradition of anti-colonialism. Finally, the party has strongly argued for 
diplomacy over military force.5  
Despite these general lines of Labour policy thinking regarding defence and foreign policy, the 
Wilson Government did not initially propose great changes to the policy of the previous 
government. The new Secretary of State for Defence, Denis Healey, was largely a right-wing 
labour politician. He had great influence within the party, and had been one of the leading 
experts within the party in this field from the mid-1950s.  
The late 1950s until early 1970s was a period of broad agreement between the parties. There 
were of course, in time, differences between parties, as well as within parties.6 However, by and 
large, the period has by most been described as an ‘era of consensus politics’. Population and 
politicians focused on peace, prosperity, and welfare.7 Public expenditure had especially, but 
gradually, taken a greater portion of the GDP, and that fact resulted in increasingly hard-pressed 
defence budgets.  
 
Chapter 3-B: NATO strategy 
The road towards ‘flexible response’ in NATO strategy  
From the start in 1949, NATO was founded on a strategic concept based on the maintenance of 
large conventional forces easily available along its central borders. In order to achieve this, 
NATO agreed in Lisbon in 1952 to build up almost 100 divisions to confront the stronger Soviet 
conventional position at the Central Front. It soon became clear that the European countries 
neither had the political will or the economic strength to achieve this goal. During the initial 
years of NATO, great advances were achieved regarding nuclear weapons. The US had used 
theirs first in Japan, while Soviets detonated their first atomic bomb, RDS-1, on 29 August 
1949.8 The Soviet Union did not have their first mass-produced bomb delivered to the Long 
Range Aviation until 1953. Development of this immense technology was rapid. By 1954 the 
Soviets had used the technology to develop the first tactical nuclear bombs; soon thereafter the 
same warheads were used in long-range missiles, and by 1955 the first nuclear warhead was 
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successfully tested with the T-5 torpedo for the Navy.9 For their Air Force, even air defence 
systems became available with tactical nuclear warheads.   
The US detonated their first hydrogen bomb or thermonuclear bomb in 1952 – followed by the 
first Soviet thermonuclear test in 1953. The Soviet Union had their first mass produced 
thermonuclear bomb operational from 1955, and a full variety of bombs was available by the late 
1950s. In late 1953 the US unilaterally began to deploy nuclear weapons on the European 
continent, which gave the US a first strike capability over the Soviet Union until the late 1950s. 
The Soviet long-range aviation of the time was not capable of large attacks against the US – but 
the launch of Sputnik on 4 October 1957 changed the balance.  
As a consequence of these important developments, the US officially stated a new strategic 
posture based on ‘Massive Retaliation’ in 1954. The concept of Massive Retaliation implied that 
the conventional forces were used in a ‘trip-wire’ role, where the smallest aggression by Soviet 
military forces would open an Armageddon on Soviet territories. The Soviet Union, and later the 
Warsaw Pact10, had to mobilise fully to defeat the conventional forces. This would give the US, 
or NATO, the opportunity to attack strategically with nuclear weapons. NATO immediately 
started considering the new strategy. It was very tempting, primarily because the immensely high 
level of conventional forces the previous NATO strategy required had been both economically 
and politically unfeasible. NATO officially adopted its strategy of Massive Retaliation by the 
end of 1956 with MC 14/2. The main reason for the US taking the lead towards a new strategy 
for the use of nuclear weapons was that the credibility of the strategy was challenged. Soviet 
developments in rocket and nuclear technology were rapid, and the first strategic nuclear SS-
3/R-5M missile was fully and successfully tested on 21 June 1956.11 By modern definitions, the 
missile would be considered ‘intermediate-range’ with its 1200km range. Then all Soviet 
resources were put into making an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of hitting the 
US. The newly established Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN) accepted the first ICBM, the R-7 
(SS-6) missile, on 17 December 1959.12 New and improved missiles, as well as silos were 
developed during the first half of the 1960s.  
The consequence of these developments for the maritime theatre and especially for the Soviet 
Northern Fleet was immense. It made the large fleet of long-range and high performance 
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strategic bombers superfluous in its original role. This in turn had a great impact when large 
numbers of these aircraft were transferred to the Soviet naval air arm for strike purposes against 
NATO naval forces and naval infrastructure in and around the Norwegian Sea.  
As for British strategic thinking, most strategic thinkers of the 1950s and early 1960s; e.g. Chief 
Scientific Advisor Zuckerman, Chief of the Defence Staff Mountbatten as well as the main part 
of the RAF, expressed clear belief in strategic nuclear forces. Zuckerman and Mountbatten, who 
would be central in the carrier and maritime strategy discussions from the late 1950s until the 
mid-1960s, also strongly believed in the ‘mutual destruction’ strategy.13 There was no need for 
maritime forces in such a reality, and from this, maritime forces were to find their rationale East 
of Suez.  
US pressure for a more flexible strategy 
The new US strategic posture was very controversial, and provoked a debate on nuclear policy. 
The early critics of the strategy of Massive Retaliation soon gained support because of the Soviet 
developments in nuclear and rocket technology. In the US, the critics of the Eisenhower 
administration introduced the term ‘Missile gap’. It was claimed that the US had fallen behind 
the Soviet Union in the production of nuclear missiles, especially in case of ICBMs. Regarding 
both the USA and the Soviet Union, few questioned the assumption that a future war between the 
superpowers would quickly escalate into a nuclear war. Sokolovskiy, Marshal of the Rocket 
Forces and one of the most prominent and well known Soviet military thinkers of the early 
1960s, stated; ‘If nuclear weapons are not destroyed and if the aggressors unleash a world war, 
there is no doubt that both sides will use these weapons’.14 Further, Sokolovskiy said that nuclear 
weapons could be used in a modern war to solve strategic, operational, and tactical tasks from a 
military point of view. The Soviet missile threat was clear; however, it was greatly exaggerated 
in this early period. The period around 1960 saw many verbal confrontations between the Soviets 
and the West. The official speeches and articles of the Soviet leadership, together with the semi-
official writings of authors such as Sokolovskiy, prove this. The Soviets tended especially to 
underline their success in missile technology, probably as a means of fighting Washington’s 
overall lead in technology.15  
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The earlier nuclear weapons strategy had become dangerous and was now viewed as an 
‘inflexible tripwire’. For military development the Massive Retaliation era was an important 
period of growth for dealing with the menace of new technologies, but it was now time for new 
forward and flexible strategies. The discussions started in the early 1960s in the US as earlier 
feelings of invulnerability were effectively broken down by the leap forward of Soviet rocket 
technology. In addition, the Berlin Crisis of late 1960 to early 1961 led Kennedy and his new 
administration to start focusing on limited war and accidental nuclear exchanges.16 The result of 
this was an important secret policy directive known as National Security Action Memorandum 
(NSAM) 40, which focused on contingencies ‘short of nuclear or massive non-nuclear attack’ 
and laid out US policy towards NATO.17    
A grand strategy of ‘flexible response’ had become US policy under Kennedy from the early 
1960s, but NATO would not officially adopt the new strategy until as late as 1967 with MC 14/3. 
Still, the basic principles of a flexible response posture within NATO came gradually during the 
1960s. The discussion was raised at a NATO Ministers meeting in Oslo in May 1961.18 The 
request of a new direction for NATO defence policy was raised more explicitly by the US 
Government in a speech to the NATO Council by the US Secretary of Defence McNamara in 
December 1961.19  
In the 1962-63 timeframe, US officials worked intensively for NATO to implement this new 
forward and flexible strategic posture. At the NATO Council meeting of Ministers in May 1962, 
chaired by Secretary General Stikker; Dean Rusk, the US Secretary of State, and McNamara 
took the lead in this discussion. Dean Rusk raised two fundamental questions:20 First, how 
should the Alliance’s role in nuclear deterrent be increased? Second, what should be the balance 
of nuclear and non-nuclear forces in NATO’s deterrent system? The American wish to build a 
multilateral MRBM force was a strong and integrated part of this proposal. This agenda was 
obvious at the time, and in response Dean Rusk underlined at the meeting; ‘…in order to avoid 
giving any impression that the United States was imposing a plan on its allies, he urged all 
members to co-operate fully as colleagues in the discussion’.21  
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McNamara explained the background for the US shift in defence policy. It was based on studies 
of future nuclear exchange scenarios which showed the enormous losses which clearly would fall 
on both sides. In light of these findings, the US developed their plans in order to permit a variety 
of strategic choices and instituted programmes which would ‘enable the Alliance to engage in a 
controlled and flexible nuclear response in the event that deterrent should fail’.22  
The British response to the American proposal of a more flexible strategy was divided. Harold 
Watkinson, the UK Minister of Defence, stated during the same NATO meeting that in general 
his government supported the views the Americans proposed on nuclear strategy, especially in 
case of the second-strike capability of the Polaris system. At the same time, Watkinson pointed 
out that over-reliance on conventional weapons might be interpreted by the Soviet Union as a 
sign of unwillingness on the part of the West to use nuclear weapons. Nevertheless he agreed 
that the balance between conventional and nuclear weapons as proposed by Rusk and McNamara 
was substantially correct.23 
Watkinson and the British Government, on balance, supported the plan for conventional forces. 
This was based on the fact that British forces:  
 
…faced the Russians not only on the European central front, but also around the 
perimeter of the Communist world. Britain accepted its responsibilities in the Middle and 
Far East as well as in Europe where it would try to play its full part.24  
 
Again, the British found arguments which would justify their prioritisation of conventional 
forces for the East of Suez challenges.  
As for the US led NATO project of a MRBM force, the British were generally reluctant. 
Mountbatten stated during an informal session of the NATO Military Committee of Chiefs of 
Staff on 11 Dec 1962: ‘The British have never contested that there is an obvious and military 
case for modernising some of the present delivery systems, but we have always had some 
reservations about embarking on a MRBM programme on the scale now proposed’.25 Later, 
according to Mountbatten, British military budgets in Europe were already fully committed in 
keeping the existing forces adequately equipped. According to General Maxwell Taylor, the 
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MRBM programme would amount to one or two billions of dollars.26  A couple of years later, as 
the question of multilateral forces was about to be abandoned, Mountbatten wrote to General Sir 
Michael West with the British Defence Staff in Washington: ‘I am personally convinced that the 
multi-lateral force is the greatest piece of military nonsense I have come across’. He continued: 
‘I remain the implacable opponent to this and am glad to know that if Mr. Wilson does win the 
Election he has pledged himself to get us out of this nonsense’.27 Also, Zuckerman had had the 
same views and worked against this maritime ‘multilateral force’. In the words of Zuckerman 
this was a seaborne force which could simply not operate as an effective tactical force, as it had; 
‘…target acquisition inadequate; rate of response too slow; inaccurate delivery; vast 
“overhitting” – Polaris missiles are pretargetal weapons’.28 Such forces could only be useful as 
strategic weapon systems. The sole reason for such a multilateral force was to satisfy German 
nuclear aspirations, to which the British again were opposed.  
The desire to create a credible non-nuclear option and strategy to reduce the reliance on an 
immediate resort to nuclear war, when faced with a Communist use of limited force, was strong. 
However, as the Americans took the lead for changing the overall strategic concept of NATO, 
some nations had grave concerns of their true agenda and the possible consequences.  
The first concern which occupied many of the European continental nations was whether the 
overall deterrent would thus be improved? The next concern was whether such a strategy would 
make Europe the nuclear battlefield, or on the other hand; would the US really be willing to use 
nuclear weapons to defend Europe – as this in turn would lead to a Soviet nuclear attack on the 
American continent. On these questions, the French Government stood up as the greatest 
opponent to the American’s new proposals for a strategical shift for NATO by 1962-63.  
The American lead for a flexible strategy was captured in two controversial NATO Military 
Committee documents: The MC 100 was approved by early 1963.29 It led to the controversial 
MC 100/1 ‘Appreciation of military situation as it affects NATO up to 1970’. The MC 100/1 
proposals for a shift in strategy were based on three particular concerns:30 First, ‘the growth of an 
increasingly invulnerable Soviet nuclear capability’. Second, ‘the certainty of enormous 
devastation in case of all-out nuclear exchange’. As a consequence of the two first, the third 
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concern raised was; ‘the lesser credibility, under certain circumstances, of deterrence based on 
the threat of all-out nuclear war’.  The MC 100/1 followed up this threat evaluation by calling for 
a three stage principle defence. First, ‘NATO’s manifest determination to defend its purposes 
against all forms of aggression’. Second, ‘the recognisable capability of the Alliance to respond 
effectively with the appropriate degree of force, regardless of the level of aggression’. Third, ‘a 
flexibility which will prevent the potential aggressor from predicting with confidence NATO’s 
specific response to aggression, and which will lead him to conclude that the maximum degree 
of risk would be involved’. What was additionally new was the focus on ‘circumstances less than 
large scale strategic nuclear attack’. In such circumstances, the MC 100/1 argued for a response 
with ‘appropriate conventional land, sea and air operations, augmented as necessary with tactical 
nuclear weapons’.31 The use of conventional forces, including tactical nuclear weapons, had two 
objectives: Either to halt the aggression and restore the integrity of NATO, and to clarify 
whether the aggression was major or limited.  
The British viewed the MC 100/1 document as ‘…an able and skilfully-worded paper, which 
reaches a compromise between conflicting national views…’.32 The document met the European 
pressure for an early resort to strategic nuclear strikes in the event of major aggression, and at the 
same time met the US wish for a possibility of an appropriate strategic nuclear response. It also 
rejected the ‘trip-wire’ concept. The British evaluation of MC-100/1 was in total positive; ‘…one 
of the most important documents that has come before the Military Committee for a very long 
time’.33 The document, with minor adjustments, reflected the UK’s national views according to 
Mountbatten:34 
 
• In its appraisal of the requirements of a strategy founded on deterrence to war in all its 
forms. 
• In the emphasis placed on the growing Soviet threat to NATO maritime strategy. 
• On the principles of maritime strategy.  
• In its treatment of the NATO response to limited aggression. 
  
In his presentation during the 30th Session of the Military Committee in Chiefs of Staff Session, 
Mountbatten was very clear on the use of tactical weapons and his emphasis on this first point: ‘I 
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believe we need such weapons to permit us merely to initiate but not to prolong a tactical nuclear 
response…’ He then concluded on the issue of NATO’s greater strategy: ‘We should therefore 
give priority to the things we require to deter war rather than those required to carry out 
prolonged and sustained operations if we cannot all afford both’.35 This was a clear statement by 
Mountbatten, and indicative of his perceptions of strategy throughout the 1960s. Mountbatten 
simply found little reason for conventional forces for the security of the British Isles and home-
waters. He, like most of the top military British establishment, focused on the deterrence role for 
the home region. Parts of the Royal Navy were, on the contrary, far more sceptical about the 
concept of Massive Retaliation, as well as the sole focus on nuclear deterrence. There were in 
fact great disagreements about strategy within the Royal Navy. The most known and persistent 
critic was Rear Admiral Buzzard, the Director of Naval Intelligence. He argued for a prime role 
for the Royal Navy prior to, and not after, a nuclear exchange (which was the main and official 
focus by the early 1960s).36 
The MC 100/1 document with its new strategic posture only came to a ‘final draft’ on 11 
September 1963 – and was never accepted. With this, the discussion on NATO strategy was 
more or less put aside for a couple of years.  
British home-waters and NATO’s northern flank  
As for the military strategic importance of the northern flank of NATO entering the 1960s, the 
Atlantic Policy Advisory Group37 argued there were three main rationales describing the 
strategic purpose of Scandinavia:38  
 
• The barrier which it presented to Soviet access to temperate waters; 
• The bases which it afforded for counter-offensive (including anti-submarine) operations; 
• Its favourable location for the detection and warning of impending attack.  
 
The maritime strategic goals were set, but the NATO Annual Reviews (the Triennial Review 
after 1960) which examined how NATO countries fulfilled their obligations of force 
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commitments towards the NATO military authorities’ final proposed programmes were not 
promising to read. For instance; the Military Decision on MC 39/14, an analysis of the military 
implications of the 1962 Triennial Review, showed that ‘the military posture of the Alliance in 
general will remain inadequate to ensure fulfilment of the major NATO Commanders’ 
missions’.39  The evaluation made by Allied Command Atlantic underlined that the shortfalls of 
aircraft carriers, maritime patrol aircraft, and escorts for ASW seriously limited SACLANT’s 
capability of carrying out his missions.40  
During the 30th Session of the Military Committee in Chiefs of Staff session, SACLANT41 
Admiral Smith underlined the challenges the increased Soviet maritime focus represented. ‘Their 
fishing fleets, their merchant fleets, and their offensive fleets, particularly the submarines, have 
enormously increased. They now constitute a very serious threat and challenge to our control of 
the seas, the control of this maritime alliance at sea. And we disregard this threat at our peril’.42 
SACLANT said he understood the land and air focus of NATO following the Second World 
War, but now was the time to focus on the naval forces. CINCHAN43, Admiral Woods, 
supported entirely what was stated by SACLANT. But in the end, despite SACLANT’s and 
CINCHAN’s pressure, the maritime threat evaluations and suggestions for getting NATO 
maritime capabilities on the agenda with the central leadership of NATO did not lead to any 
action taken. The discussion of the revised strategic concept of a more ‘flexible nature’ was still 
viewed mainly through the perspective of a tactical combat doctrine for land battles. As stated in 
a memorandum for the Secretary General in October 1963: ‘The NATO Military Authorities 
consider that existing publications and procedures concerning maritime tactical doctrine are 
adequate for the development and evolution of [NATO Basic Military Requirements] 
NBMRs.‘44   
NATO strategy in limbo, and the British still occupied ‘East of Suez’ 
The American led attempt to change NATO strategy during the 1962-63, which has been 
previously discussed, did not materialise. The MC 100/1 document only came to a draft issue on 
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11 September 1963. French led European scepticism grew out of a fear that the Americans 
would never sacrifice American cities for European cities. The assassination of Kennedy was an 
additional factor ending American pressure for a more flexible strategy in 1963. He had been a 
driving force behind the new proposed position. The next government of Lyndon B. Johnson and 
his administration soon became preoccupied in South-east Asia.45  
An additional important concern for NATO in the maritime theatre was the withdrawal of French 
forces from SACLANT by June 1963. The decision can not directly be explained by the general 
conflict over NATO’s 1962-63 debate on deterrence and conventional strategy – but was 
probably influenced by it. The French maritime position was in fact more ‘independent’ in its 
focus from the late 1950s. The French Navy grew from a coastal defence navy to become a 
modern navy of ocean-going cruisers, carriers (CLEMENCEAU and FOCH), and submarines. 
The aim of independence also made rationale for a nuclear deterrence fleet. The first out of six 
French SSBN were operational by 1971.46 In parallel to this French naval build-up, De Gaulle 
started to withdraw French participation in NATO naval commands as early as 1959.47 
From late 1963 to 1966 very little was done to alter NATO strategy. Especially for 1964, hardly 
any interesting documents are to be found on this issue in the NATO archives. The focus 
following the crash of the 1962-63 attempts to change the strategic posture was of a more 
practical nature discussing force goals, for old and currently approved strategic guidance, for the 
major NATO Commanders. The reason was diplomatically stated in a progress report of the 
Defence Planning Committee of November 1964 stating: ‘Owing to difficulties encountered in 
the Military Committee in agreeing on the outlines of a new strategic appraisal …’.48 In the 
following year, 1965, the same debate went on; it centred upon the forces required to cover the 
various contingencies which might arise within NATO.49 Some aspects of strategy were 
developed, for instance, the creation of the Allied Mobile Force (AMF). Within this frame, two 
closely related issues were discussed; the economically driven tactical-technological idea of 
‘dual-purpose forces’ and one main strategic level discussion about how to deter local and 
limited attack. It is important to notice the general perspective on the East-West relationship by 
1964-65; that ‘the present situation in Europe was a stable one, even though the chief problems 
of post-war Europe remained unsolved, and therefore no new measures should be adopted which 
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might be interpreted as stemming either from weakness or from a provocative policy’.50 NATO 
was trying to keep ambitions ‘realistic and feasible’. It was underlined in NATO meetings that 
force goals which plainly could not be met – should not be approved.51   
Even though, at the top political level, NATO stood still in 1964-65, recovering from the crash of 
1962-63, and generally holding a view of a ‘stable Europe’ – SACLANT became increasingly 
aware of the Soviet naval build-up. The issue had been raised several times from the early 1960s 
– but SACLANT’s attempt to get the maritime issue more into focus at NATO top level did not 
materialise.  
In 1965 SACLANT produced two important studies dealing with the growing Soviet naval 
threat, particularly the Soviet Northern Fleet. The two documents were the ‘Contingency Study 
for Northern Norway’ and ‘Study on NATO Maritime Strategy of 1965’.52  These studies on 
maritime strategy and threat evaluation from 1965 did not have any immediate effect, but were 
followed up and continued to be referred to during the 1967 discussions of a new and more 
flexible NATO maritime strategy based on two concepts; namely standing naval forces and 
maritime contingency forces.53 However, these SACLANT studies did not have any immediate 
effect in 1965-66, during which time the carrier programme reached its peak in British politics.  
It is also important to notice that the general opinion in Europe and Britain was that ‘Europe was 
a stable area’. Concerning strategic thinking, it was very much ‘status quo’, with discussions on 
force goals and national contributions as of the old strategic posture. NATO was in limbo, and 
the British were fully focused on their ‘East of Suez’ challenges and shrinking defence budgets.  
Secretary of State for Defence, Denis Healey, asked for several studies during the autumn of 
1965, as part of the last phase of the Defence Review to be presented in January/February 1966. 
As for British strategic interests, they too were solely focused on the ‘East of Suez’ challenges. 
The nuclear deterrent force had great support across the military services as well as among the 
politicians. The debate which found place within NATO, and predominately within SACLANT, 
had surprisingly little input from and to the British defence debate.  
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The study ‘Defence Review – Possible Contingencies East of Suez in the 1970s’ discussed the 
challenges of both independent operations and operations in co-operation with allies.54  
As for the Arabian Peninsula, the British would not be able, or willing, to intervene in any 
conflict, unless a United Nations operation came into effect. In the case of the Persian Gulf, it 
was the same. The British would generally only participate in United Nations operations, with 
the exception of unilateral support to some Gulf states, Bahrain included. In the case of China; 
the country was assessed to be unwilling to either get into a conflict with the West (especially the 
USA) or commence any aggression in the Australasia area. 
The most likely trouble spots in which the British could be involved included East Africa, 
Malaysia, and Australasia. In the case of East Africa, the region was especially susceptible to 
communist penetration. If a conflict occurred, the British would probably be involved in the 
evacuation of British nationals. The British also accepted their ‘moral obligation’ of support to 
any Commonwealth countries. Malaysia was also still under pressure, and could face a new 
conflict with Indonesia. In this case the British were prepared to support Malaysia, hopefully in 
conjunction with Australia, New Zealand, and possibly the USA. Indonesia could also threaten 
parts of the Australian mainland and New Guinea, in which case the British would probably also 
intervene.  
 
Chapter 3-C: A Carrier programme without a foothold 
The building of the first carrier had been decided upon by the Cabinet in July 1963. However, 
the Treasury kept fighting the decision during the autumn of 1963. This was still an issue 
between the Admiralty and Treasury, mainly concerning the payment of design, research, and 
development costs.55 The problems between the Treasury and the Admiralty, which was fully 
backed by the Minister of Defence, Thorneycroft, reached the Prime Minister.56 As a 
consequence, the Admiralty and Treasury were forced, by the Prime Minister personally, to 
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reach an agreement.57 Within a week, the Treasury agreed to pay gradually some £ 600,000 over 
the next year for the contracts needed by the Royal Navy.58  
However, much had changed in the British political landscape by 1964-65, as had the external 
factors influencing defence policy – therefore a thorough re-evaluation of both the procurement 
programmes as well as the greater thoughts of foreign and defence policy emerged again. As for 
internal factors, the new powerful joint Ministry of Defence of 1 April 1964, laid the foundation 
for a more direct control of the military by the politicians. The post also changed its official 
name, from Minister of Defence to gain status as Secretary of State for Defence. Denis Healey, 
who came to the post in the autumn of 1964, after the change of government, took a firm grip on 
all defence policy matters. He had long expressed his scepticism over large fleet carriers. E.g. in 
1963, Healey expressed this concern about the building of unsuitably large carriers:  
 
May I say, first, how glad we are on this side of the House that the Government have 
accepted the arguments which we have so often put forward against building an aircraft 
carrier of the size of the ‘FORRESTAL’ class.59  
 
As for external factors, the expansion of the Soviet naval and merchant fleet greatly influenced 
the strategies of the other maritime nations and NATO at all levels. SACLANT was gravely 
concerned over Soviet maritime expansions. The British were not a driving force in this case, but 
they generally supported SACLANT. However, the consequences of the shift in NATO 
strategies, the gradual rise of a ‘flexible response’, and the focus on the flanks would greatly 
influence the British by the late 1960s.  
During the new Labour Government under Harold Wilson, with Denis Healey as Secretary of 
State for Defence, and James Callaghan as the Chancellor of the Exchequer, defence policy 
began to stabilise. The case for carriers, with the great costs involved, became the centre of 
attention again. Even though the first carrier had been approved by the Cabinet in July 1963, 
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there was still time to look at alternatives. The Treasury in particular kept up their objections 
throughout 1963 and 1964, often directly to the Prime Minister.60  
Carriers, and the value for money  
The period between late 1963 and late 1964 had been remarkably quiet with regard to the out-
spoken rivalry between the services. There had been less pressure from the political level, as the 
new leaders had to find their place and make their political strategies. However, the cost-
effectiveness of carriers and a question of ‘rationalisation of air power’ resurfaced again. 
In early January 1965, the Ministry of Defence announced a study which was to examine ‘the 
most efficient and economical organisation for the control and employment of air power in 
support of national defence policy’.61 
The committee consisted of Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Caspar 
John, and Air Chief Marshal Sir Denis Barnett. Field Marshal Templer, who retired as Chief of 
the Imperial General Staff in 1958 was viewed as a neutral leader, and therefore chosen to lead 
the committee. The study became known as the ‘Templer Study’, but its official name was ‘The 
Rationalisation of Air Power’. The Air Ministry considered the study very important.62 However, 
its conclusions did not propose many changes to existing structures. The boundaries of 
responsibility for air power, which had evolved over the years, were assessed to be functional for 
the services at present and in the foreseeable future. The study concluded that there should be no 
change in the basic responsibilities of the services, except that they were advised to further 
examine potential common training and logistical support to improve interoperability.63 
However, due to few new arguments or little influence, ‘The Rationalisation of Air Power’ study 
and the debate that had been led by General Templer, started a new round of inter-service rivalry 
that lasted from January 1965 to February 1966. The background was a deep and sincere 
difference of professional opinion between the Admiralty and the carrier supporters on the one 
side, and the Air Ministry and the anti-carrier supporters, especially from the Treasury, on the 
other. The prime question at stake throughout 1965 was whether strike carriers gave value for 
money as a military strategic option to the British challenges at present, and particularly for the 
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coming 1970s. This was the underlying issue of all the concrete studies produced in 1965, and 
was one of the most central issues of the Defence Review which ended in early 1966. The 
Treasury was sceptical to whether this immensely expensive programme (£1300m. plus over the 
next ten years) could be affordably fitted within any defence budgets.64 During 1965, Healey 
continued asking for several studies to examine the many questions raised. 
The Navy fighting back; the arguments for carriers 
From all the studies I have seen it seems clear to me that in relation to the tasks likely to 
face us in the 1970s the greatest usefulness of the carrier force lies not in the traditional 
strike role but more in what might be called the support role – headquarter and control 
facilities – defence of shipping – close Army support in the more limited type of 
operations.65  
Richard Amyatt Hull, October 1965. 
 
Late in December 1964, the Royal Navy presented a thorough document about the need for 
carriers. The background for the document was a questionnaire put forward by the Paymaster-
General, Mr. George Wigg, to the Secretary of State for Defence. The document contained three 
sections; discussing the roles and operations of aircraft carriers, experience in the use of carriers, 
and a discussion on the costs of carrier forces.66   
The document started out with the ‘East of Suez’ argument: As long as the Government’s grand 
strategy required the deployment of military forces overseas, it was crucially important to 
exercise maritime control – whenever and wherever needed. To be able to do this, the carrier was 
a central resource. The carrier was argued to be important for three reasons: To control the 
military situation at sea, to provide the air support required for intervention operations, and to 
deter limited aggression.  
The first requirement of being able to ‘control the military situation at sea’, this included strikes, 
air defence, surveillance and anti-submarine warfare. The strike capacity included both the 
capacity to strike enemy navies and shipping, as well as (together with the RAF) to strike 
towards land objectives. The air defence capacity included both air surveillance, with the organic 
AEW aircraft, as well as air defence fighter aircraft. A naval task force, or maritime shipping 
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convoy, was crucially dependent upon easily available air defence forces for self protection and 
for intercepting shadowing air forces. A carrier air defence force would give local air superiority 
of about a 250NM radius. As for surveillance, the organic AEW aircraft was crucially important. 
The Royal Navy argued that without such a capacity, the ‘Fleet could not operate’. Also for anti-
submarine warfare, the carrier was deemed necessary for the protection of a maritime force. The 
British carriers could carry up to 8 Wessex ASW helicopters with dipper sonars; a force that the 
Royal Navy argued had proved itself to be one of the most effective ASW of the time.  
To provide the air support required for intervention operations. This strategic aim included 
military action to support British treaty obligations, or to ensure the continued internal and 
external security of those countries which relied upon the British, or to answer a call from a 
nation in distress. However, the intervention capacity of the Royal Navy did not envisage a large 
scale operation such as the Second World War. Such a demanding task would have to be done in 
conjunction with allies. The scope of their capacity had been demonstrated during the Kuwaiti 
intervention two years previously. The Royal Navy was also working out contingency plans for 
the support of an intervention in Zanzibar. As the Royal Navy argued, the capacity had been 
required in Indonesia, Korea, Kuwait, Cuba, and Borneo. For the near future of the 1970s, new 
places that could well require support from carrier forces would include; the new African states, 
Mauritius, Fiji, British Guinea, British Honduras, or the Falkland Islands. According to the 
Royal Navy, intervention operations there would be outside the range of shore-based fighters and 
ground attack aircraft, or readily available bases would not be available for the outset of a 
conflict. Local air superiority and air-land support of the forces on the ground have to be 
available locally – and in many instances the carrier task force was the only option. Additionally, 
a carrier might be the only available asset to provide a local command post, as it had for instance 
in January 1964 when Tanganyika appealed for support.  
To deter limited aggression. The document started out with the classic naval argument that 
carriers, the Royal Navy in this case, could serve as a deterrent against attempts to interfere with 
British interests overseas. The mobility of the carrier with a striking power would enable the 
British to exert influence without a provocative presence.  
The experience from carrier operations after the end of the Second World War was extensive, 
and made a formidable basis for discussing the need for carrier task forces. There had been many 
minor operations supported by naval carrier forces; e.g. naval aircraft had taken part in 
operations in Brunei and Malaya, as well as Tanganyika. As for major operations, British carriers 
had taken part in Korea, Suez, Jordan/Lebanon, and Kuwait.  




            
   
 
 
In the Korean War, HMS TRIUMPH took part in the first naval air strikes of the war on 3 July 
1950. At least one British carrier was constantly on station for the next two and a half years off 
the Korean coast. They conducted offensive interdict operations. (The American and Russian 
aircraft were far superior in air-air combat). During the Suez conflict in the autumn of 1956, 
British carrier forces participated with HMS EAGLE, HMS BULWARK, and HMS ALBION. 
The three carriers were important during the first five days for offensive strikes against airfields 
and aircraft, as well as against the Egyptian Navy. Organic fighter aircraft also gave air cover for 
the parachute forces. In addition, the helicopter and amphibious forces experienced a renaissance 
during this short conflict.  The next example of British carriers at war was the Jordan/Lebanon 
conflict of 1958. HMS EAGLE was important for providing air cover for the entire air-lift route 
from Cyprus to Jordan. The organic fighter aircraft were also important for providing security for 
British Army troops in Jordan, should the Jordanian armoured forces turn against them. The last 
example of important carrier operations (prior to the debates of 1964-66) was the Kuwaiti 
intervention of 1961. HMS BULWARK, carrying the 42 Royal Marine Commando troops and 
the only available asset for command role of the forces, was the back-bone of the British forces 
during the initial phase of the intervention. Later, surprisingly late, both RAF aircraft and support 
forces were flown in and the fleet carrier HMS VICTORIOUS took the lead role. However, the 
Kuwaiti conflict clearly showed the usefulness of carriers, as this was an anticipated conflict that 
was supposed to be primarily undertaken by the RAF with Operation Vantage.  
The Aircraft Carrier presentation of 21 December 1964 and the document that followed, are hard 
to assess. There are no clear traces of it being discussed or absorbed into any official documents 
during this turbulent period. 1965 saw numerous studies being prepared; many of these followed 
the line of thought and many of the same arguments and calculations as those presented by 
December 1964. The document probably did not have any great influence, but it shows the 
Navy’s understanding of the need for carriers.  
Alternatives to the CVA-01 
During 1965, numerous studies were ordered, or conducted independently, arguing the case of 
one force, against that of the other service.  
For instance, a Joint Service Group, under chairmanship of Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff Vice 
Admiral Sir Frank Hopkins, was established to try to bridge the differences and reach an agreed 
recommendation during the winter months of 1965. Air Vice Marshal P.C. Fletcher represented 
the Air Ministry; Sir William Cook represented the Scientific Advisor. In addition, a broad 
ranging group of experts participated. However, it became clear that such ‘joint’ study-groups 




            
   
 
 
had limited effect. The study-group had to deliver a report on ‘deployment of fixed-wing aircraft 
for purely maritime tasks’. The group found it impossible to deliver a report giving a complete 
picture, as it had to be seen in conjunction with the broader question of ‘seaborne and land-based 
air power’ for the next twenty years. The question of the shape and size of the RAF as well as the 
shape and size of the ‘Navy without carriers’ also had to be further studied and resolved. The 
group still managed to come out with the broad conclusion that fixed-wing carriers would not be 
indispensable for purely maritime tasks, with the assumption that:67 
 
• The whole concept of future land-based air operations was valid (but there were a 
number of uncertainties which still needed to be evaluated more fully).  
• The British could rely on sufficient airfields and reinforcement routes in those areas of 
the world where the future defence interests were.  
• The aircraft of the type, and in the numbers planned for, did in fact come into service.  
 
However, the compromises of this joint study so limited the written reports that most arguments 
both for and against carriers, or land-based air power, proved to find other channels of 
communication. By mid 1965, there developed a habit of writing service studies, where both 
services got to present their arguments and counter-arguments. Still, this study had some 
influence, as it pointed the way for many of the studies conducted later in 1965.  
During the winter months of 1965, the work on a report on ‘Alternative Carrier Fleets for the 
1970s’ was undertaken by the Admiralty under lead of Vice Chief of the Naval Staff John Bush. 
He presented this paper by 17 May 1965. In essence this was a report studying two proposals: 
The first being for a carrier fleet consisting of HMS EAGLE, HMS ARK ROYAL, HMS 
VICTORIOUS, and the new CVA-01. This first alternative was without HMS HERMES (which 
had less capacity to operate strike aircraft than the others). The second, optimistic alternative, 
proposed a five-carrier fleet using HMS HERMES to back up the striking capabilities of the 
other carriers.68 None of these optimistic studies were carried on.  
CVA-01 in the Commando Ship Role 
Another alternative examined whether the CVA-01 could fill the role of a commando ship, in 
addition to being a fleet carrier. This was primarily a Material Division study, regarding whether 
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it was possible to accommodate the Commando Forces.69 The conclusion of this case-study was 
positive, the accommodation was fully possible from a technical point of view. The sacrifice of 
fixed-wing aircraft would also be limited to 4 aircraft, to give place to the much needed 
helicopters. However, from an operational perspective, it was only possible for limited 
incursions and not for full scale assault operations. In such cases, the CVA-01 was needed in its 
original primary role as a fleet carrier for strikes and defence of its own forces. A limited force of 
up to 950 Commandos could use the CVA-01 for a limited period (up to 14 days).70 The capacity 
to carry a limited number of Commando forces and helicopters, for a limited period, was 
accepted and implemented in the design details of the CVA-01 from 1965 onward. 
Refit of the existing carriers 
The HMS ARK ROYAL was in poor shape by 1963, and some modernisation was urgently 
needed. One or two new carriers were to be ordered, but some of the old carriers had to be kept 
operational into the 1970s. As for HMS ARK ROYAL, it was discussed whether the planned 
1966/67 refit should be a full overhaul or whether only the most pressing needs should be tended 
to; in the end, only essential maintenance and small defects were fixed. The whole refit came 
only to £ 4 million.71 By 1965 it became clear that a major refit was needed in any case. HMS 
ARK ROYAL was needed to operate the most modern aircraft of the Royal Navy, (except the 
Phantoms) to improve the ship’s radar to modern standards, and a refit would improve the 
general living conditions for the crew.  
The offer of US carriers 
As an alternative, Denis Healey asked the Americans for the transfer of some of their carriers, as 
they were known still to be in good condition and about to be replaced. This was a consequence 
of an informal suggestion by Mr. McNaughton of the US Defence Department directly to Healey 
in July 1965.72  
Mr. McNamara, the Secretary of Defence in the US, replied to Healey by mid August 1965 with 
a positive answer. The case had been discussed within the US Department of Defence, and they 
were willing to consider the transfer of one or more ESSEX class carriers. It was not subject to 
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Congressional approval. However, it was clear that these carriers would require modification.73 
The British soon sent a delegation, led by the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff Vice Admiral Sir 
Frank Hopkins, to the US for detailed talks on the subject. Already by late August, less than a 
week after the Americans’ reply, a more specific proposition was on the table. Together, the 
Americans and the British delegation had agreed that a HANCOCK class, a long-hulled ESSEX 
class carrier, was the best offer for British needs. The first carrier was intended as a replacement 
for HMS HERMES, and the second as a replacement for HMS VICTORIOUS or HMS ARK 
ROYAL.74 The costs were estimated to be about $50 million, including a total overhaul to 
modern and British standards. $30 million of this could be spent in UK dockyards. A second 
Hancock class could be delivered by the early 1970s.75 The total cost was estimated to come to 
$150 million.76  
Transferring USN carriers to the Royal Navy would be a swift affair. But for the British, this was 
just one option on the table. Denis Healey put the Americans on hold until the greater Defence 
Review was conducted. As he wrote to the Deputy Secretary of Defence in the US: ‘This matter 
of course impinges on several other major defence problems which we have got under 
consideration at present. It will, therefore, be a little while before we can reach a firm 
conclusion’.77  
After more considerations within both the Naval Staff and the MoD, the option proved both 
practical and financially challenging.78 Even though the carriers could be handed over at ‘knock-
out’ prices, the refit needed would make this option about half the price of brand new carriers. 
Still, it was kept open as an option.79 By January 1966, the Secretary of State had explained the 
probable outcome, and by February a definite answer was given to the Americans; there would 
be no requirement for the proposed ESSEX carrier.80  
Despite the final answer in January, by March 1966, after the Defence Review of February 1966, 
the American diplomat, Mr. Goldberg, came to see the Prime Minister in the House of 
                                                 
73
 NAUK DEFE 13/589, ‘Defence review: aircraft carrier plan’, 1965-1966. Letter form The Secretary of Defence 
(US) to Denis Healey, 24 August 1965.  
74
 NAUK DEFE 24/92, ‘USN carriers: possible transfer to Royal Navy’, 1965. Note by DN Plans, DNWTP and 
DS4, 22 September, 1965.  
75
 NAUK DEFE 13/589. Letter from the Deputy Secretary of Defence (US) to Healey, 8 September 1965.  
76
 NAUK DEFE 24/92. Note by DN Plans, DNWTP and DS4, 22 September, 1965). 
77
 NAUK DEFE 13/589. Letter from Denis Healey to Mr Cyrus Vance, Deputy Secretary of State (US), 17 
September 1965.  
78
 See detailed studies in: NAUK DEFE 69/344, ‘Proposed Royal Navy purchase of US aircraft carrier SHANGRI-
LA’, 1965 Jan 01 – 1965 Dec 31. 
79
 NAUK DEFE 69/344. Letter by Chief of the Naval Staff, 28 October 1965; NAUK DEFE 13/589. Healey to 
Chief of the Naval Staff, 1 November 1965 
80
 NAUK DEFE 13/590. Healey to McNamara, 14 February 1966.  




            
   
 
 
Commons. He presented a ‘unofficial offer’ for the British to consider: The Americans were 
‘…prepared to give the Royal Navy two aircraft carriers, completely refitted, free of charge, 
simply in order to have the White Ensign flying alongside the United States navy.’ 81 The British 
did not take the Americans up on this unofficial proposal. They would not now go back on the 
conclusions of the resent and controversial Defence Review.  
 
Chapter 3-D: Land based air power; economically and strategically 
feasible  
I have for some time been concerned about what seems to me to be the unavoidable need 
to look closely at the question of land-based and sea-borne air power in the context of the 
Defence Review. It will be essential to ensure that we are getting the best answer in terms 
of cost-effectiveness…82  
Denis Healey, 5 March 1965 
 
The basic ideas of the Island Strategy remain current 
In the summer of 1965, Secretary of State for Defence Denis Healey asked for a re-examination 
of the feasibility of the use of land-based aircraft instead of carrier-based aircraft in maritime 
roles.83  
One issue that had changed by this time, was the cancellation of the TSR.2 project, and the 
decision to go for the American F.111 strike aircraft. Originally, the plan was that the F.111 
would be the Canberra replacement. By April 1965, it was envisaged to buy 10 Mark.1 F.111’s, 
followed by a larger buy of 70-100 Mark.2 F.111’s. This plan was soon abandoned. By 
December 1965, it was decided to become one single order of 50 modern F.111’s, equipped with 
the Martel anti-radiation missile (AJ 168) and prepared as bombers (B.111 weapons computer 
and strengthened undercarriage). These F.111 was to undertake the following roles:84  
 
• To obtain reconnaissance information for all tactical purposes, including target mapping at 
low altitude, under all-weather conditions by day and by night using radar and/or 
photographic methods.  
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• To deliver effectively a wide rage of non-nuclear weapons from low altitudes at the 
maximum ranges obtainable and with minimum considerations for the prevailing weather 
conditions, by day and by night.  
• To deliver effectively tactical nuclear weapons as an alternative to non-nuclear weapons. 
 
Figure 6: F.111: Strike range and bases.85  
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Figure 7: F.111: Reconnaissance coverage.86 
 
The Air Ministry was among others ordered to deliver two comprehensive reports under the 
‘Program Working Group’; studying the alternative RAF consolations of the aircraft 
programmes which could also possibly take on the maritime tasks of the carriers. The Air 
Ministry delivered the initial Stage I and Stage II reports to the Secretary of State for Defence by 
21 October 1965. These studies discussed ‘broad possible combinations’ of forces, and 
suggested many ‘alternative mixes’ of RAF aircraft requirements for the future.87 As the studies 
discussed only broad alternatives, and were not conclusive, they did not have much immediate 
effect. Still, they were comprehensive, almost to the extent that they were hardly possible to 
grasp and thus continued to hold the land-based air power option as a feasible political 
alternative to carriers. It was hard for politicians to argue against such comprehensive and 
technically detailed studies presented by the ‘air experts’.  
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Healey found the reports very promising, but too extensive. He therefore ordered a continuation 
of the studies, limiting the alternatives to the following guidelines:88 
 
• Strike/reconnaissance aircraft: The Canberra aircraft should only be retained until the 
F.111A came into service. There should be alternatives of 36 or 53 F.111A’s, both with 
the assumption that one would co-operate with the Australians, which also bought 
F.111’s. The V-bombers should only be retained until the Variable Geometry wing 
aircraft became available in 1975.  
• Fighter/Ground attack aircraft: Alternatives should be examined both with and without 
the P.1127 VTOL aircraft, the Jaguar or the ADO12. Healey did not really have a total 
number of Phantom aircraft in mind, but ordered the Air Staff to use the number 68 
suggested earlier by the Deputy Chief Scientific Advisor. The existing numbers of 
Buccaneer II and Sea Vixen were envisaged.  
 
Healey ordered these studies to examine the consequences of a possible decision to dispense 
with fleet carriers. The problems of the British economy had not diminished, but rather 
increased, and thus all possible solutions which would make the case for cancellation had to be 
examined.  
There were of course great disagreements between the Air Ministry and Admiralty in preparing 
their expert advice. Still, they did have some common ground:89  
 
• It was vital for the Navy to be able to rely on land-based aircraft for maritime operations 
in any operation.  
• The provision of land-based support for the Navy would entail an addition to the RAF 
front line. 
• Specialist Long-Range Maritime Reconnaissance (LRMR) aircraft under special 
command and control arrangements would be required. 
• The Naval interests had to be properly represented when decisions were to be taken on 
issues like; numbers, characteristics, and deployment of land-based aircraft to be used for 
maritime tasks.  
 
The specific Air Staff recommendation, if the decision was made to dispense with the carriers 
and to rely on land-based air power for all maritime roles, argued that the roles of air defence, 
and air strikes, as well supporting tankers and transports, could be covered by the overall 
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resources of the RAF.90 With this recommendation, instead of asking for ever more resources to 
take on additional tasks, the Air Staff presented a very tempting offer for politicians concerned 
with an already over-stretched defence expenditure. The Air Staff agreed that joint training had 
to increase, both for the sake of the RAF pilots as well as for the Navy’s confidence in the 
effectiveness of the maritime support provided for them.  
As for the Naval Staff’s view, this was even more detailed than the joint document. This was 
perhaps not unexpected, as such a decision would have grave implications for the Navy. First of 
all, the Navy described the entire idea of ‘flexible multi-purpose air reserves for maritime tasks’ 
stationed in the UK, to be used when needed, as ‘fundamentally unsound’. One case was the 
LRMR, which could be used in such a way, and had the respect of the Navy – a totally different 
case from the forces needed for air defence and air strikes. The Naval Staff argued that these 
tasks were ‘absolutely vital’ for the naval forces, and had to be kept on hand at all times. Such 
operations were complex, needing close and complete integration with other aspects of naval 
operations.91 Another issue was training. The Naval Staff was very critical of the RAF’s position 
that ‘the techniques of strike and air defence are fundamentally the same, whether over land or 
over sea’. As the Navy normally had to deal with the problem of training its pilots and crews for 
both naval strikes and Army support – they were greatly aware of the demands that this put on 
training. It would put a far greater burden on the RAF than they were prepared for.  
The content of this joint RAF and RN study was important for the greater Defence Review under 
Healey. However, by August 1965 Healey agreed that there were such basic differences of 
professional opinion on these subjects, that he found it impractical to continue this as a joint 
study. He therefore asked for the questions to be considered, but that studies and reports should 
be produced separately by the services, rather than attempting to reconcile the two in a 
compromise which clearly would not reflect the views of either service.92  
In September, Chief Scientific Advisor Zuckerman wrote an independent note to Denis Healey 
discussing the studies of land-based air power in support of maritime operations.93 The letter was 
also widely circulated, and created a new round of debate. In essence, Zuckerman pulled out the 
same arguments and scepticism he had had over the Island Strategy concept two years previously 
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(discussed extensively in chapter three). The two main questions he asked were whether land-
based air power could protect the fleet and merchant vessels as effectively as a carrier task force, 
and whether land-based air power proved as effective as carrier-borne aircraft in ‘intervention 
operations’. Firstly, Zuckerman stressed the case that, up to a point of distance – land-based air 
power would prove both more effective and economical. However, it was also obvious that at a 
given range, the carrier concept would be the more effective. As for the Island Strategy, a 
maximum distance of 1000 NM had been proposed by the Air Staff; while now the Air Staff had 
come down to a useful range of 700 NM. The Admiralty on the other hand argued that the great 
difference would come at about 300 NM. Again, a great discrepancy between the military 
experts was labelled ‘black-and-white answers’ by Zuckerman. Therefore, an independent 
working-group had to look into this, as well as other questions related to these ‘…two major but 
totally different operational systems…’.94 Zuckerman argued for the advantages of the carrier 
task force concept with its interdependence and mobility. However, he also saw that the carrier 
option was so expensive that the British would most likely not be able to exploit all its military 
advantages, despite increased technical capabilities. Concerning the land-based air power option; 
the complexity of operating an air force; reconnaissance and AEW aircraft, interceptors and 
strike aircraft, air defence aircraft on Combat Air Patrol (CAP), as well as ASW aircraft out to 
several hundred miles (700 NM. argued in the 1965 discussions) – it was very difficult to judge 
its realistic potential. At least the carrier concept was a proven one.   
Land-based aircraft in support of maritime operations 
As both the Admiralty and the Chief Scientific Advisor were still arguing against the land-based 
option, Healey had to rethink the arguments. For all practical purposes, he had used the 
arguments presented by the Air Ministry and was warned about and therefore knew he would be 
challenged on this ground when meeting Ministerial colleagues.95   
A Working Party under the chairmanship of the Deputy Chief Scientific Advisor was put 
together in October 1965 to examine the challenges related to land-based aircraft taking over the 
maritime roles of the Navy ‘without carriers’ in 1970 and 1975.96 This was a continuation of the 
previous joint study; ‘The allocation and control of shore-based aircraft in support of maritime 
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forces’. The working-group was further asked to determine the practical ranges (including air-air 
refuelling capability), duration and intensity possible, as well as the necessary numbers of 
aircraft needed for strike and air defence operations in support of the Navy. Also questions 
requiring command and control were to be examined. Relevant scenarios for war-gaming were to 
be found. The working-group discussed a range of scenarios for the East of Suez and the eastern 
Mediterranean areas. The report was finished by 22 October 1965.97 In addition to delivering the 
report, Chief Scientific Advisor Zuckerman also wrote a letter to Healey to note his scepticism 
regarding the pace of the studies. Only 2-3 weeks had been permitted for such an important 
question. There was some risk that the studies would not be the scientific and objective studies 
which were needed. However, his voice did not seem to be heard by Healey. The pace and speed 
of the studies continued.  
Land-based air forces would be required to support the maritime forces with air defence. The 
most critical factors for success would be the ability to refuel aircraft in-flight and the time that 
the aircraft could be kept airborne – and still be effective. The working-group found the land-
based air power alternative viable, due to the new in-flight refuelling capabilities. Therefore, the 
limiting factor of a land-based air defence capability rested with the question of crew fatigue. As 
for crew performance, operations of 5-7 hours on a regular basis, with a peak of 8-10 hours in 
limited periods, were viable. The working-group used 7 hours as the average for crew-
endurance. Such extensive operations would require a rest of 16-20 hours between the flights for 
the crew to be effective over time. The aim was to cover the maritime forces with a CAP of 6 
aircraft at any time.  
The second role involved probing shipping and enemy contacts for identification regarding their 
own maritime forces. The RAF strongly argued that the new Comet (Nimrod) maritime long 
range aircraft would effectively be able to fill this role, and even take on more duties. However, 
the working-group found that the Nimrod should be kept to a reconnaissance role, while other 
dedicated probing aircraft would be more effective in identifying the surface contracts detected.  
The third role to be filled by land-based air power was the provision of airborne early warning 
(AEW) for the maritime forces. As the fleet carriers were taken out of service, the organic AEW 
aircraft would disappear. Airborne early warning and air defence was crucial for all naval forces. 
The working-group argued that new land-based aircraft would be required to solve this demand, 
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but they had no concrete proposals on hand. (Later, some Shackleton aircraft were developed 
into AEW aircraft, in wait for the British Nimrod AEW (which never became a reality)).  
The fourth role performed by land-based air power was a strike role against enemy shipping and 
naval forces. The working-group used F-111 and the Buccaneer II aircraft in their calculations.  
In the conclusion, the working-group used two island bases; Gan and Cocos, as well as one 
airfield belonging to a host nation. As for the forces required for the support of maritime 
operations, the numbers needed for the Far East scenario against Indonesia were the most 
extensive.98 The British forces directly required for maritime tasks included:99  
 
(a) AEW and Air Defence: 
• 6 Comet type AEW or 12 NAST 6166 (the proposed new organic AEW for CVA-01). 
• 53-56 Phantom aircraft 
• 12 Victor tanker aircraft 
(b) Maritime Reconnaissance (excluding A/S tasks100):  
• 9 Comet aircraft for reconnaissance 
(c) Tactical Recce and Strike: 
• 17 F.111A or 24 Buccaneer II+ 
• 6 Victor tanker aircraft  
(d) ANDAMAN Patrol101:  
• 4 Comet type AEW or 11 NAST 6166 
• 12 Phantom aircraft 
• 3 Victor tanker aircraft 
 
There were no great disagreements between the Air Force and Navy concerning tactical control 
and communication between land-based aircraft, ships, and shore-facilities.102 However, as for 
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the extent and practicality of air defence cover for maritime forces, the services did not come to 
any agreement. As for the threats posed to friendly shipping, they assessed these to be largely 
confined to the Red Sea and the north-east Indian Ocean. The working-group concluded that 
despite obvious challenges, the land-based option was viable.  
Strategic and tactical transport aircraft 
The air mobility forces were increasing in this period. The V/STOL medium transport aircraft 
had been dropped, but other new procurements would ensure a solid strategic and tactical 
transport capacity to support forces of all the three services on the global scene. This included a 
solid tanker (AAR) fleet. A large part of the transport aircraft fleet was intended to mount 
contingency and emergency operations within 72 hours, while a percentage of the fleet was held 
at a higher degree of readiness.103 
In 1966, the strategic transport capacity consisted of Britannia, Comet Mk.2 (soon to be 
withdrawn), and Comet Mk.4 aircraft. The Belfast aircraft was entering service, and the VC 10 
aircraft was soon to be introduced. The tactical (medium range) transport aircraft included the 
Hastings, Beverly and Argosy aircraft, as well as 48 American C-130 Hercules aircraft which 
had just been ordered to replace the existing Hastings and Beverly aircraft.   
It was clear from discussions within the Defence and Overseas Policy (Official) Committee that 
the transport forces would see no reduction in capacity whether the carriers were to be phased 
out or not. Maximum reliance was to be placed on the principle of reinforcements by the 
strategic reserves by air in either case.104  
Strike and air defence aircraft for maritime operations  
The TSR-2 had been the golden child of the Air Ministry and British aircraft industry. However, 
due to spiralling development costs and the advent of the cheaper, but still technically impressive 
American F-111 aircraft, the TSR-2 was cancelled by April 1965. In addition to the F-111 as an 
alternative aircraft, the Royal Navy argued a modernised and upgraded Buccaneer aircraft for the 
role. However, by January 1966 the case for F-111 as the preferred tactical strike aircraft had 
been firmly set.105 The proposed F-111 showed a cost-effectiveness ratio of 2:1, compared with 
the updated Buccaneer. As for the need for new aircraft, the ageing Canberras (which are still 
with us today…) clearly required replacing for both the tactical strike and reconnaissance roles. 
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A limited number of F-111s would be supplemented by the retention of some of the V-bombers 
(which lost their strategic strike role to the Navy’s Polaris submarines) for the tactical strike 
roles. The V-bomber fleet of 1965 consisted of 96 aircraft and their 150 operational Canberra 
aircraft.106 This was a substantial force of which many could be converted for tactical strike and 
reconnaissance purposes. However, they also had limitations for modern air warfare. Therefore, 
the purchase of F-111 strike aircraft was the preferred option.107  
The British, especially the Treasury, also hoped that a purchase of a limited number of F-111 
would prompt an American purchase of British military equipment. This force would eventually 
be replaced by the Anglo-French Variable-Geometry wing aircraft by the mid-1970s.  
Despite the many studies that had been undertaken, Denis Healey remained reluctant regarding 
big carriers and the cost they demanded. The ‘value for money’ issue discussed in this chapter 
made a strong case for ‘alternative solutions’, be it American carriers, refitting the old or a shift 
to rely on land-based air power for maritime strikes or protection of shipping. Neither the Deputy 
Chief Scientific Advisor’s working-group or Zuckerman himself, had any influence on Healey. 
As a consequence, Zuckerman wrote a personal letter to the Prime Minister, with a copy to 
Cabinet Secretary Sir Burke Trend, by 14 October 1965 explaining his scepticism and his 
perspectives. Zuckerman started out discussing his views on strategy; arguing for nuclear 
deterrence forces in Europe and the mobile maritime forces East of Suez. This again led into his 
arguments for ‘highly mobile amphibious task forces’, supported by one strike carrier, and for 
the general concept of carrier task forces for the protection of shipping. The main concern for 
Zuckerman was that it would be impossible to precisely evaluate this strategic option in ‘cost-
effective financial terms’.108 
Healey was clearly aware of the difficulties involved in relying solely on land-based air power 
for support of naval forces and for the protection of merchant shipping. However, in response to 
the Deputy Chief Scientific Advisor’s report on the issue, where the study-group was sceptical of 
its practical feasibility, Healey counter-argued that one could feel certain that such extensive 
operations (a long war game) would be necessary in the future. It would be just as uncertain 
whether a small carrier force could fill the same requirements.109  
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At the end of the day, Denis Healey played a political game, needing to find a cost-effective 
solution to the challenges East of Suez and the economic stress on the Government.  
 
Chapter conclusion  
The 1960-63 debate on land-based air power versus carrier aviation was great from a conceptual 
debate perspective. The ‘final’ discussion of July 1963 was still more of a political decision, with 
few references back to the inter-service rivalry over the two military strategic options.  
The debate that developed a few months after Labour came to power, and Secretary of Defence 
Healey took the lead, became different. During the 1965-66 period, the Royal Navy did not 
manage to push many new arguments forward. Neither did they manage to make use of all the 
good arguments of the 1960-63 debates. Simply put, the Royal Navy argued that as long as the 
Government’s grand strategy required the deployment of military forces overseas, it needed 
carriers to exercise maritime control. The carriers were by 1965 argued to be important for three 
main reasons: First; to control the military situation at sea (including strike, air defence, 
surveillance, and anti-submarine warfare). Secondly, to provide the air support required for 
intervention operations (treaty obligations, continued internal and external security of those 
countries which relied upon the British and as answers to calls from nations in distress). Thirdly, 
to deter limited aggression against British interests overseas. The mobility of the carrier with 
striking power would enable the British to exert influence without a provocative presence.  
As we see, the arguments were not really different than previously. However, the Royal Navy 
never managed to get them well communicated to the public, the politicians, nor within the 
Ministry of Defence.  
Both the Treasury and the Air Ministry had effectively re-entered the stage in late 1964, after the 
new Labour Government had been established. Several studies emerged, and by the summer of 
1965 Healey asked for a concrete re-examination of the feasibility of using land-based aircraft 
instead of carrier-based aircraft in maritime roles. Land-based air power, no longer under the 
name the ‘Island strategy’, but with still very much the same arguments, had gradually re-
emerged as a viable military strategic alternative.  
The ‘Island Strategy’ term did not appear often in this period. The Air Ministry now argued the 
case for land-based air power as a general alternative. This was probably a good strategic choice. 
The argument was now less concrete, but still comprehensive. At the same time, it was much 
harder to counter-argue the land-based air power option as a feasible political alternative to 




            
   
 
 
carriers. It was hard for both military experts and politicians to argue against such 
comprehensive and technically detailed studies as presented by the ‘air power experts’. The Air 
Staff argued that land-based air power could effectively and cheaply fill all maritime roles; 
including air defence, air strikes, as well supporting tankers and transports on the seaways. With 
this political approach of stating what they could do with existing aircraft, instead of asking for 
ever more resources to take on additional tasks, the Air Staff presented a very tempting offer for 
politicians concerned with already over-stretched defence expenditure.  
As Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Elworthy wrote in a ‘personal and secret note’ to Lord 
Shackleton in the MoD in November 1965:  
 
I know that in a ideal logical world commitments should determine forces, not the other 
way about; but I think that in the awkward and imperfect real world we live in this simply 
does not work – and indeed the course of studies during these last several months 
illustrates the fact. The political departments want us quite simply to support as many 
commitments as we possibly can support; and it is for us therefore to tell them what we 
possibly can support within the means available to us.110  
Charles Elworthy, 1 November 1965 
 
In the period after the Labour Government came to power and up to the decision on CVA-01 in 
1966, the inter-service rivalry continued. As for the conceptual debate on land-based air power 
and carrier aviation, two issues were different from the previous debate of 1960-63: Firstly, the 
Royal Navy did not manage to communicate the purpose and reason for costly carrier task 
forces. They were largely reduced to focus on technical issues regarding the CVA-01 
programme. The Royal Air Force on the contrary were very aggressive, and communicated the 
concept of land-based air power successfully. The Royal Air Force clearly managed to link their 
concept better to British foreign and defence policy – and not least successfully linking with the 
Treasury and arguing the better cost-effectiveness of land-based air power.  
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Chapter 4: The fate of the CVA-01, 1965-66 
If the Government’s defence review can be said to revolve around any single concept it is 
the aircraft carrier. Is it the supreme fighting ship which provides a flexible inexpensive 
answer to Britain’s commitments along the shores of the Indian Ocean, or a vulnerable 
white elephant that should be replaced by long-range land-based aircraft? 1 
David Fairhall, in the Guardian, 2 October 1965 
 
Gradually during 1965, it became clearer that the CVA-01 project was possibly heading for the 
unlikely conclusion, a cancellation. The first part of this chapter discusses how land-based air 
power gradually became the preferred option because of its economic feasibility. The first part 
also discusses the Defence Review, which was the framework for the debate and the many 
studies that were conducted in the autumn of 1965.  
The second part of the chapter deals with the cancellation that followed the Defence Review in 
February 1966. The final part of the chapter discusses the planned run-down of the carrier forces. 
Not only the CVA-01 was cancelled, but the whole British carrier force was to be phased out by 
the mid-1970s – and relieved by land-based air power.  
 
Chapter 4-A: Heading for cancellation  
Already from early 1965, several alternatives for the carrier programme were discussed. First of 
all, the alternative carrier solutions (CVA-01, modernisation, etc) had to be re-examined. All the 
carrier alternatives could yet prove too far-stretched because of the economical constrains put 
upon the defence sector. If so, two other solutions had to be evaluated. The first alternative; the 
military strategy question of land-based air power versus carriers. Second; the political question 
of whether Britain wished to retain the power to mount an intervention operation independently. 
Throughout 1965, but especially from August 1965 onward, the carrier option had to be 
evaluated against both these other issues.  
By November 1965, the Defence and Overseas Policy (Official) Committee had limited the 
options to two concrete alternatives to be examined in the ongoing Defence Review.2  
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Alternative A: No carriers: 
(a) The RAF to provide an extra 36 UK Phantom aircraft for maritime tasks. 
(b) The escort cruiser to be provided. 
(c) No changes in SSN programmes  
(d) The short-range anti-ship missile to be provided  
Alternative B: With carriers: 
A revised and simplified carrier plan, without US carriers, Buccaneer II aircraft and 
CVA-02.  
 
The final document put forward for the Government’s decision in January 1966, the ‘Defence 
Review: Memorandum on Carrier Programme’, was guided by Healey personally. A draft was 
given to him by 7 January, and he commented upon it as follows: The introduction to the 
document, which argued the case for abandoning the carriers, was according to Healey much too 
thin. Therefore he wrote his own introduction laying out the arguments his staff should focus 
on:3 The first part of the Memorandum should emphasise the financial background. The second 
part, which should be very short, just ‘a paragraph or two’, should briefly mention the 
effectiveness of carriers. The third part should go into the issue of ‘future tasks of carrier forces’. 
This should start with the question of whether carriers could be argued to be cost-effective – with 
the above mentioned limitations. Then a statement should be inserted and make the case that in 
the land-strike role, carriers were two-to-three times more expensive than the land-based air 
power alternative. Further, the Minister already had accepted that the UK would no longer 
undertake any greater operations requiring carrier forces, without allies. UK forces would 
operate in co-operation with US and/or the Commonwealth partners in the future. Finally, the 
uncertainty regarding the cost-effectiveness of carriers should be attacked.  
On the request of the Defence and Overseas Policy (Official) Committee, the Ministry of 
Defence proposed two alternatives by November 1965. Common to both were the procurement 
of F-111, for the P.1127 aircraft, as well as plans for the Type 82 destroyer projects to continue 
and the Lance weapons system to be provided for British Army of the Rhine (BAOR)4 and the 
keeping of a limited ground force in Hong Kong. These were also presented to the Prime 
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Minister by Burke Trend in early January.5 However, in addition, Healey argued for a 
‘compromise solution’, Plan C, for the Committee and the Ministers to decide upon.6  
 
• Continue the existing carrier-plan and build the CVA-01.  
• Phase out the carrier fleet over the next five years.  
• The ‘compromise’: cancel the CVA-01 and give the existing carrier fleet a refit, enabling 
them to last until the mid-1970s.  
 
The last ‘compromise’ was the option preferred by Healey, as this would make a radical decision 
less immediate and therefore could be accepted more easily. In addition, the extension of the 
existing carriers would be useful until the retreat from East of Suez was finished. However, the 
Admiralty and the Navy Minister, Christopher Mayhew7, did not favour this ‘compromise’ 
alternative.8 The Admiralty was in fact quite optimistic, as long as there were only two 
alternatives. However, once Plan C emerged as Healey’s ‘Compromise Solution’, the Admiralty 
itself tried to get a revised carrier plan to the scene in January. In a last attempt to stay on the 
scene, they were opting for a modernisation of the existing carriers.9 They did not believe that 
the politicians would fully abandon the carrier forces – they could not. The Admiralty Board was 
clear that such a new strategy of land-based air power and a ‘new’ Navy, could not possibly be 
ready for the 1970s.  
It is clear that Denis Healey was not in favour of large fleet aircraft carriers. He was against 
them, as he had been since the late 1950s in political opposition. As he delivered the official 
study of the 3 alternatives to the Defence and Overseas Policy (Official) Committee 14 January 
1966, he wrote an additional Memorandum stating: ‘The purpose of this separate memorandum 
is to focus attention on one of the central features of my plan, which is the cancellation of CVA 
01, and with it, the phasing out of the carrier force by about the middle-1970s’.10 In addition, 
Healey also wrote a ‘Personal Note’ to the Cabinet (DOPC) discussing further arguments for 
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cancelling the CVA-01, as well as the P.1127 V/STOL aircraft.11 However, Healey’s ambition to 
cancel the P.1127 was not fulfilled.  Healey was also surprisingly frank with the Royal Navy, 
and presented his views on the carrier issue for the Navy Board on 7 February. He explained that 
cost was central to the case, but also that carrier forces had been useful for the operations over 
the last ten years, yet they had not been essential.12  
What arguments were made by those in favour of carriers, and particular of CVA-01? In fact, the 
arguments for carriers which won acceptance in the 1960-63 debates were largely ignored in the 
debate of 1965. The archival research clearly shows that the Royal Navy now was far less 
politically involved. Military strategic issues, at least from the Admiralty, were lacking in the 
debate. The Air Ministry had been slightly more active than the Admiralty in the 1960-63 
debates, but in the 1965 debates the Admiralty lost the political battle to the land-based air power 
advocates of the RAF and the Treasury. The Admiralty became fully occupied with the more 
technical studies of CVA-01 and was kept on the defensive, responding to the many alternative 
carrier studies they had to examine. This fact, which in any case was a politically strategic 
choice, was sole leadership responsibility that lay solely with the First Sea Lord and his 
immediate staff. Admiral David Luce was much criticised for this after the cancellation, a 
critique that was justified.  
From the early 1960s until the cancellation of 1966, the main rationale for carriers largely rested 
with the East of Suez missions, chiefly in the Indian Ocean. In the early 1960s, the roles included 
power projection as well as maritime protection of shipping. However, by 1966, the primary role 
for the carriers became more limited; now mainly to be argued against the role of maritime 
protection of shipping and surface naval forces. For this role, the carrier option was still assessed 
as superior to the land-based air power option by e.g. the scientific advisors and the Royal Navy. 
However, the RAF would also be able to fill this role satisfactorily. As a perception grew that the 
British were not able to conduct larger operations independently, the four-power defence 
arrangements with Australia, New Zealand, and the United States came into focus. The question 
of carriers became directly linked to the role of the British in the Indian Ocean, and here too they 
saw the possibility of establishing closer interdependence with the United States.  
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Opting for land-based air power  
I have become doubtful about the value of return we can expect from our 10-year 
programme for aircraft carriers and fixed-wing naval aircraft. I understand the need for 
some effective long-range strike aircraft; but I also have doubts about the planned size 
and ‘mix’ of the RAF programme, and about one or two of its current projects. 13  
Denis Healey, 3 August 1965 
 
The discussion concerning land-based air power versus carriers was largely about cost. It was 
impossible to judge which would be more militarily effective. Both the Air Ministry and the 
Admiralty argued that they would fill the operational requirements. The inter-service rivalry and 
self-esteem is well captured in the minute:  
 
Briefly the Air Force believe that in most likely circumstances land-based air power 
could be relied upon to do the job and that the Navy are unduly optimistic in their claims 
that aircraft carriers would be made available at the right time in the right place. The 
Navy, on the other hand, believe that, especially in the early phase of an intervention, the 
use of sea-borne air power would in many circumstances be essential to secure the 
success of the operation and that the Air Force, in their turn made some optimistic 
assumptions.14   
 
The elimination of the carrier fleet was discussed seriously in the early autumn of 1965. It was 
still a very secret option, not involving the departments and staff normally occupied with these 
questions. It now seemed more and more likely that the carrier force could be eliminated, 
because the concept of land-based air power from island bases was clearly less expensive, but at 
the same time a realistic alternative. What was proposed by the land-based air power advocates 
was in reality the same content that made up the ‘Island Strategy’ concept proposed in 1962-63. 
The land-based air power option argued in 1965-66 lacked the detailed and concrete ‘staging-’ 
and ‘mounting bases’ previously argued, but the repeated argumentation had gradually been 
broadly accepted. As the detailed suggestions by the Air Ministry were now lacking, it also made 
it harder for the Admiralty to counter-argue the somewhat more loose and general arguments. 
However, there was still concern about the political stability of the islands involved. Because of 
this uncertainty, it was clear that reservations had to be applied to the military capabilities in the 
1970s. The capability for air defence was particularly unsatisfactory with the ‘Island Strategy’ 
concept. An acceptable solution to the air defence of maritime operations had to be found.  
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If the carriers, and thus the Fleet Air Arm were eliminated, it was crucial to re-shape the entire 
naval programme in a way that it would ‘present – and be seen to present – the Royal Navy with 
a challenging and effective long-term role’. It was also clear that the run-down of the carrier 
programme had to be handled in such a way that it would sustain, as far as possible, the morale 
of the Fleet Air Arm.  
However important and much debated the carrier issue was, the greater Defence Review was 
concerned with all aspects of the ‘military capabilities in the 1970s’: By September 1965, all the 
programmes of the F.111A, the updated Buccaneer, the P.1127 Harrier, and the Belfast transport 
aircraft, as well as the entire naval programme within the ‘strategic framework surrounding any 
decision to abandon carriers’ had to be reviewed. A firm basis for the cost of the reduced defence 
programme as a whole was needed. As for the F.111A, Healey asked the Air Staff for updated 
reports with regards to numbers required etc. – in light of the ‘hypothetical assumption that we 
may decide to dispense with carrier-borne fixed-wing aircraft’. The Buccaneer update 
programme (II and II+) had also to be re-examined for the same reason; the assumption that 
there would be no carriers beyond 1970.15 
The land-based air power option was possible within the £ 2,000 million limit the politicians had 
agreed upon as an absolute limit to the defence sector during the future budget meetings of the 
Government in November 1965.16 This same cash limit also haunted the MoD, as demonstrated 
in the last bullet in an internal MoD paper titled the ‘Broad Conditions for Elimination of Carrier 
Force’:  
 
We must be sure that the consequent re-shaping of the naval program and the 
unavoidable increases in the R.A.F program will not lead to higher expenditure than the 
cheapest acceptable carrier plan; and that the elimination of carriers enables us (or very 
near so) to achieve the £2000m. Target in 1969/70.17  
 
By early January 1966, it was becoming ever clearer that the fate of the carriers would be sealed 
by the Defence White Paper. It was equally clear that the land-based air power option would be 
the politicians’ way out of the dilemma. The politicians could now, with reference to the argued 
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capabilities of the land-based air power option, argue for a cancellation of the costly carriers – 
but at the same time politically argue for the home-audience as well as the Commonwealth 
countries, and still adhere to their international commitments. In early January 1966, the Naval 
Staff prepared a paper ‘The Future of the Carrier Force’18, which started out by discussing the 
land-based air power versus carrier debate. The Chief of the Naval Staff said he understood that 
the Chief of the Air Staff would argue that the RAF would be able to support the Navy, as well 
as the Army, with air power as envisaged in the ‘Island Strategy’ from 1962-63. Still, he had to 
agree with the Chief Scientific Advisor when he stressed that relying on the untried ‘Island 
Strategy’ concept for such complex tasks was dangerous – and could well prove ‘unworkable’. 
The Admiralty and the Chief Scientific Advisor were one side, against the Air Ministry and the 
Secretary of State for Defence on the other side of the argument. The relationship between 
Healey, Mountbatten and Zuckerman had been quite good just after Healey’s entry into office. 
However, this relatively good relationship came to an end sometime during 1965. Thereafter, 
Zuckerman had little influence on Healey, and also tended to go directly to the Prime Minister 
with his concerns. This upset Healey and after one such incident, he wrote to Zuckerman: ‘I am 
surprised that you felt able to send a copy to the Prime Minister without consulting me first’.19 
Just a couple of months later, Zuckerman left his post as Chief Scientific Advisor to the Ministry 
of Defence, for a new Scientific Advisor’s position with the Cabinet Office, responsible for co-
ordinating work across the Departments.20 Alan Cottrell came on as the new Chief Scientific 
Advisor. However, the scientific advisors got less influence under Healey, and appear seldom in 
the archival files on the carrier versus land-based debate after 1965.  
The final comments of the Chief of the Naval Staff, David Luce, before the cancellation show 
his despair and doubts for the future:  
 
…if  we cancel CVA 01 now, we will be irrevocably committed to this concept. It seems 
to me that in common prudence we ought not to stake the whole of our overseas policy in 
the 1970s on this gamble; but that we should leave ourselves another option. If we do not, 
it is my professional opinion that we would place in grave jeopardy our ability to meet 
our revised commitments in the Indo-Pacific area – or indeed to exercise any influence 
outside Europe where this requires the use of maritime power.21  
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Healey’s Defence Review of 1966 
The re-examination of the defence requirements announced with the new government in October 
1964 ended up as a continuous review ranging from early 1965 till 1968. The financial target of 
£ 2,000 million22 which the Government had set in November 1965 for the defence sector was 
also important. However, that did not mean the outcomes were decided. The first major 
conclusions were presented as a two-part Defence White Paper in February 1966. Again, British 
economics had a central position, as defence expenditure was accessed to be still too high. They 
had managed to get it down from more than 10 per cent of the Gross National Product in the 
1950s to about 7 per cent by 1966; the aim was to lower it to a stable level of 6 per cent.23 
However, to be able to reach this goal, some of the major procurement-programmes had to be 
cut. At the same time, the Prime Minister had made it clear to the House of Commons in January 
1966 that the East of Suez presence would be maintained. This was a message Healey continued 
to preach, even in the Defence Review.  
Healey’s Defence Review of February 1966 consisted of two parts: The second part was called 
the ‘Defence Estimates 1966-67’. Healey concentrated on making this as non-controversial as 
possible, and focused solely on current activities. He wanted the annual administrative details 
endorsed quickly.24 The first part of the Defence White Paper, which was called ‘The Defence 
Review’, was on the other hand quite radical – and was expected to make quite a stir in both 
media and politics.  
 
Chapter 4-B: The Defence White Paper of 1966  
The Government, not the MoD, would decide the carriers’ fate. The first step of the official 
process was a Memorandum from the MoD, strategically worded and presented for the 
politicians to choose the ‘compromise solution’, cancelling the CVA-01, but keeping some of the 
carriers until well into the 1970s. The Memorandum was then approved by the Defence and 
Overseas Policy (Official) Committee, and presented to Ministers for consideration. The 
Ministers in full Cabinet made the final decision on 14 and 15 February. The process was very 
much driven by Healey, as he had a strong position externally as a politician and internally as a 
Secretary of State.  
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The famous Defence White Paper of 1966, presented on 22 February 1966, is known chiefly for 
its cancellation of the CVA-01. A controversial decision, where the prospects of land-based air 
power were in fact the official rationale used:  
 
… the tasks, for which carrier-borne aircraft might be required in the later 1970s, can be 
more cheaply performed in other ways. Our plan is that, in the future, aircraft operating 
from land bases should take over the strike-reconnaissance and air-defence functions of 
the carrier…25 
 
The defence paper argued the future of the carrier force in some detail, but the core argument 
was that a carrier of this magnitude would occupy far too much of the resources. The first 
supporting argument of this decision was ‘…only one type of operation exists for which carriers 
and carrier-borne aircraft would be indispensable: that is for landing, or withdrawal, of troops 
against sophisticated opposition outside the range of land-based cover’. The second argument 
was that the future strike aircraft, the updated Buccaneer or more likely the American FB-111A, 
would take on the capabilities of the expensive carriers and that future operations would be in 
conjunction with other allied forces. In fact, the Defence Review argued it had already placed an 
order of ten F-111 aircraft, with an option of 40 more to be ordered soon. Future land-based 
aircraft would also take on all the strike-reconnaissance and air defence functions of the carrier 
aircraft. Only ten years earlier the Sandys Defence Review had proposed that the overseas 
garrisons could be replaced to an extent by aircraft carriers.  
Another argument included against the carriers was that in the land-strike role, carriers were two-
to-three times more expensive than the land-based air power alternative. This proportional 
number had just previously been counter-argued by Zuckerman as the Chief Scientific Advisor, 
who pointed out that that clearly would be different in different scenarios – depending on the 
location of the target area in relation to the land bases and the carriers.26 However, Zuckerman 
had far less influence under Healey than under earlier Ministers. He was at logger heads with 
Healey by the end of the Defence Review. Further it was argued that the UK would not 
undertake any greater operations requiring carrier forces, without allies. This statement was also 
challenged by Zuckerman (and in fact many others), who was deeply sceptical of the political 
consequences of being dependent upon US local support.27 However, Zuckerman had in the end 
very little influence on Healey, and his arguments were seldom taken in.  
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The decision to cancel the carrier project was not just about the CVA-01. As Healey explained; 
‘it was whether to build a new series of carriers, so that we could run on for another twenty years 
at least…’. This was in contradiction of the views of the Admiralty who in fact had argued in the 
end for an option of keeping the old ones, but it was Healey who decided the wording of the 
Defence Review.28 A few carriers were not cost-effective. The MoD argued that probably six, or 
at the minimum four, carriers were needed to give any value for money. The cost of running six, 
four or even three carriers could only be achieved by a serious reduction in all other areas of the 
Navy’s capabilities. Still, even with four or three carriers, only one could be kept East of Suez 
permanently. Healey put forward a devastating argument; ‘Now East of Suez is the only area 
where we regard carriers as necessary’.29 The view that carriers were irrelevant to the European 
theatre, and of only marginal relevance to the Middle East region, became widespread in 
political circles by late 1965.30 This perception of naval and maritime strategy, which had 
evolved from the days of Mountbatten as the First Sea Lord until Healey’s Defence Review, is 
central for understanding the elimination of the British carrier fleet. The rationale for fleet 
carriers was fully linked to the East of Suez missions, and it was now ‘proved’ that this role 
could be filled by land-based air power – at a lower price.  
Denis Healey stated that the carrier issue was by far the most complicated and difficult decision 
made in the course of the Defence Review. Some fifty high level meetings directly related to the 
decision were held during 1965, all of which had some twenty meetings of staff as preparation. 
The case fully occupied the Naval Staff, the Air Staff, as well as Healey’s personal staff.31 
The issue of land-based versus carrier-borne air power 
Britain’s poor economic state in the 1960s has been used extensively to explain the radical 
changes that hit the foreign and defence sectors. However, the controversy of land-based air 
power versus carrier task forces was also at the centre of the decision to abolish carriers in the 
1966 Defence Review. This story, which I have outlined in the previous chapters, should be 
given its rightful attention. The decision to abolish the carriers came from a combination of these 
two explanatory reasons. The economic question was important, as this led the military strategic 
debate into a track of examining ‘cost-effectiveness’. In the pursuit of cost-effective forces and 
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solutions, the land-based air power option emerged as the political winner with both the Treasury 
in general, as well as with the Secretary of State for Defence, Denis Healey. 
During his visit to Australia in February 1966, Healey discussed British policy and future 
presence in the East of Suez region with the Australian Government. Healey made sure that as 
the ‘confrontation’ in Borneo ended, British influence could remain, even though the current 
strength would be cut by half and the British carriers would be phased out. Healey stated to the 
National Press Club in Canberra:  
 
We intend to remain, and shall remain, fully capable of carrying out all the commitments 
we have at the present time, including those in the Far East, the Middle East, and in 
Africa and other parts of the world. We do intend to remain in the military sense a world 
power.32  
 
Regarding military forces, Healey brought forward the concept argued by the RAF for the last 
decade. Healey, in best Air Ministry language, explained that in spite of the phasing out of the 
carrier force, land-based air power would be able to keep a presence from its ‘island staging 
posts’.33  
The ideas and principles of the ‘Island Strategy’, even if not genuinely supported to the extent of 
fulfilment, became the practical political argument and explanation for Healey and the 
Government. The land-based air power option had been accepted, but Healey was still fully 
aware that it would not be as efficient as fleet carriers. As he stated:’… even though we might 
not be able to do the job as well with RAF aircraft and new types of naval weapons, it was not 
worth paying the extra money to do it as well as it’s done by the carriers today…’.  
By 1966, carriers were perceived to be important for East of Suez roles. All the rationale for 
carriers had been found there. As for all the other areas of British interest, be it the Middle East 
and the Mediterranean or the North Atlantic – the widely held perception was that this could be 
done more efficiently and cheaply by other means.34 A carrier fleet of only three carriers would 
cost about £200 million a year. That was roughly ten per cent of the entire Defence Budget, and 
about 30 per cent of the Navy’s budget. What type of Navy would this produce?  
The cancellation of CVA-01 was in the end based on these arguments: First of all the question of 
cost-effectiveness. The land-based air power alternative was argued as much cheaper. Secondly, 
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it was not just about the CVA-01, but whether the British should and could retain an effective 
carrier fleet. Thirdly, all the arguments for carriers were linked directly, and exclusively, to the 
East of Suez roles – and fell with this. This direct link may be traced back to Mountbatten’s 
strong focus on the Far East in his time as First Sea Lord in 1956, and to the Royal Navy’s 
intensive search for a new strong argument for the position of naval forces in the era of total 
nuclear war. In conclusion, the promise of a land-based air power option as a much cheaper, but 
still strategically feasible alternative, won the political battle in 1966.  
 
I decided on balance that the right thing to do was not to go ahead with a new generation 
of carriers, and therefore to plan to phase out the existing carrier force at the end of its 
natural life. 35 
Denis Healey, 14 July 1966 
 
Chapter 4-C: The planned run-down of the carriers 
The forces intended to take on the roles of the carriers 
The decision, of February 1966, not to build the CVA-01 and to end the carrier history of the 
Royal Navy rested upon the view that Britain’s presence East of Suez would be reduced. Some 
level of presence would still be required, including one carrier deployed to the Far East in the 
1970s. Britain still had interests in the region.36 However, full-scale independent operations 
could not be expected, and the allies had to take a greater share. The earlier roles of the carriers 
would be filled by other forces:37 Three ‘Tiger’ class cruisers, eventually succeeded by a new 
class of cruisers, the introduction of new powerful surface-surface weapons38 for the frigates and 
cruisers, the maintenance of HMS HERMES as a ASW carrier, and not least a strengthening of 
the RAF by 36 (ex RN) Buccaneers and 24 additional Phantoms for maritime strike, 12 AEW 
aircraft and 12 tanker aircraft. The 1966 Defence White Paper concluded:  
 
…only one type of operations exists for which carriers and carrier-borne aircraft would 
be indispensable: that is the landing, or withdrawal, of troops against sophisticated 
opposition outside the range of land-based air cover. 
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The cheaper solutions of and arguments for an ‘alternative navy’ and land-based air power had 
won the political battle. Healey compared the abolition of the carrier fleet with those days when 
the Navy moved from sail to steam, from coal to oil, and when the carrier replaced the battleship. 
The abolition of carriers was no different; like all other systems it was likely to have its day. The 
argument had been whether this should happen now, gradually over the next decade, or only 
when carriers truly were obsolete.  
However, the MoD, via the naval ‘Future Fleet Working Party’, was already in 1966 carefully 
looking at the possibility of using V/STOL aircraft to give the fleet some independent striking 
capability. Both large helicopter-ships and the possibility of V/STOL aircraft for the Navy would 
soon become a reality with the arrival of ‘through-deck cruisers’.  
The transfer of duties from the FAA to the RAF 
The transfer of duties from the FAA to the RAF for operating the aircraft in the phase-out period 
was not problem free. The Minister (RAF) wrote a personal, secret letter to Healey in March 
1966, explaining ‘all the disagreements’ which did not come to light in the official note by the 
Chief of the Naval Staff and Chief of the Air Staff.39 
A particular concern was the amount of work needed to define the relationship between the FAA 
and RAF. The Navy would not agree to a plan for RAF aircrew to rotate, taking one-two tours on 
carriers, and then returning to land stations. The Navy felt this would lead to a total takeover of 
the aviation service by RAF standards. Another issue was the basic criticism that air force pilots 
simply do not understand naval warfare and ways of operations. This would require that aircrews 
were much more permanently attached to naval wings. The next challenge, of which the Chief of 
the Air Staff and Chief of the Naval Staff came to no agreement, was the possibility of FAA 
personnel who, at some point, would prefer a transfer to the RAF.  
According to the Minister (RAF), a more thorough study should be conducted to examine the 
economics of the collaboration of the services during the carriers’ phase-out period. The issue 
included the questions of manning and the use of training facilities, deployments and the running 
of the squadrons. And finally, the closure of many facilities would most likely lead to 
considerable economies for ‘the sake of the Defence Budget as a whole’. He was playing the 
right ‘economic’ argument to Healy.  
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The 1967 Defence White Paper, and British defence policy heading for change  
The Labour Government’s aim for a positive rate of economic growth did not materialise. On the 
other hand, the demands from the public sector did not stop. Public spending kept rising, largely 
because of the escalating cost of the welfare state. The Government, despite great dedication and 
determination, did not manage to make much impact on the long-standing economic problems of 
the nation.40 The pressure on the pound sterling resulted in a controversial devaluation in 1967. 
What was different to the other north-western European nations which had adopted similar 
economic philosophies was the power of the trade unions and industrial relations. With 
continuous pressure from the increasing demands from welfare state growth and the many 
strikes, defence would naturally suffer as there was apparently no great external threat towards 
the British Isles. Even though people lived under a constant threat of nuclear war, and many 
were against nuclear weapons, most people tended to disengage and not relate this to greater 
defence spending. 
The plan for phasing out the old, 1966-68 
As discussed in the Defence Review of 1966, which cancelled the CVA-01, Britian hoped to 
meet future maritime challenges with a Navy with greater reliance on missile systems. It was 
also clear that there would be an increased focus on organic helicopter forces. This was in line 
with the international trend of building ASW ships carrying great numbers of helicopters. 
However, the greatest share of the previous carrier-tasks (i.e. strike, reconnaissance and air 
defence) would be taken on by land-based aircraft, albeit on a reduced scale. However, it was 
clear that it would take some time to reshape the Navy and get the Air Force settled into its 
maritime roles. Therefore, the Defence Review of 1966 considered it important to continue parts 
of the carrier fleet for as long as possible. The existing force was soon to be reduced to three 
carriers (which also would have been the case had the CVA-01 been built) in a few years time. 
The purchase of the Phantom for the old carriers would proceed, as would the Buccaneer II. In 
addition, HMS ARK ROYAL would be given a major refit.41 Relationships with contractors and 
industry, and also with the Labour organisations were eased after the cancellation, as new 
prospects for extensive refit programmes would keep them busy.42 HMS ARK ROYAL, which 
had been laid down during the Second World War and was largely outdated by 1965, was to be 
fully modernised. The ship was to get a ‘three-year special refit’, and a progress and finance 
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watch committee was established to discuss and follow the progress of the full modernisation of 
HMS ARK ROYAL. The ship was also now intended to operate the planned Phantoms.43 
The three (-four) carriers kept in service in 1966-67 included: HMS EAGLE, HMS HERMES 
and HMS VICTORIOUS, while HMS ARK ROYAL underwent a three-year refit. HMS 
VICTORIOUS would to be retired as HMS ARK ROYAL was completed. In addition, the 
amphibious forces had the small commando carriers HMS ALBION and HMS BULWARK in 
service44, as well as the new assault ships HMS FEARLESS and HMS INTREPID, carrying 
helicopters and Royal Marines Commandos.45 However, the Treasury kept up the fight against 
the modernisation programmes. As they argued in late 1966, the budget ceiling for the defence 
sector was yet far from being resolved.46   
In 1967, the Royal Navy kept up a solid detachment East of Suez: one carrier, one commando 
ship, and one assault ship operated between the Middle East and the Far East theatres. However, 
the Supplementary Defence White Paper of July 1967 decided that the carrier fleet must be 
further reduced, earlier than planed.47 HMS VICTORIOUS would be scrapped by 1969, 
followed by HMS HERMES in 1971. However, while HMS VICTORIOUS was in for an 
overhaul in the autumn of 1967, it was suddenly decided to scrap her even before she became 
operational.48 The 1967 Supplementary Defence White Paper further decided that the two last 
carriers, HMS ARK ROYAL and HMS EAGLE would be phased out by the mid-1970s. 
Following the decision to stay with two carriers, the Royal Navy saw problems in keeping the 
carrier presence East of Suez, and many raised their concerns. From their perspective, it was 
unrealistic to keep a permanent presence after mid-1968.49 The realistic aim presented by the 
Navy involved a 4 month deployment, East of Suez, per year, up to the full retirement of the 
carrier fleet in 1975-76.50  
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The 1968 debate on the future of HMS ARK ROYAL 
The greatest controversy during the phase-out period was the question of whether HMS ARK 
ROYAL should or should not complete its refit. The question became an issue in October 
1966.51 The Treasury wanted to cancel the refit.52 This debate was however quickly ended, as 
Healey had explained his political tactics to Chancellor Callaghan. Healey wanted to avoid 
further reference to the future shape of the Navy. The outcome of a decision to cancel the 
promised refit could well be grounds for a new discussion of the future of the other carriers. 
However, most importantly, Healey made it clear to Callaghan, as well as to the Cabinet (DOPC) 
and the Prime Minister, that he wanted to use the controversial question of ‘the future of NATO’ 
due to the French retreat from the leadership of the organisation, the emerging détente, and the 
new Flexible Response doctrinal developments – to make the case for the cuts argued in the 
1968 Defence White Paper.53 On this basis, as these cuts of commitments would mean great 
savings in time, it was well supported by the Treasury, and Chancellor Callaghan decided to 
leave the matter of the cancellation of HMS ARK ROYAL’s refit in January 1967.  
Following this letter from Healey, Callaghan concluded by 20 January that:  
 
I have naturally reviewed this decision in the light of the current defence studies and have 
carefully considered its financial and other implications. As a result I am in no doubt that 
the right thing and indeed the only course at this stage is to go ahead. 54   
 
It was unofficially accepted that the debate between the Treasury and the MoD would be held off 
until 1968.   
The next round of debate occurred during the winter months of 1968. The strain on the British 
economy was immense in 1967, with poor prospects for 1968. Prime Minister Wilson announced 
in the House of Commons in January 1968 that a new direction in defence policy was urgently 
needed.55 This announcement led to hasty work on the Defence White Paper. The existing 
carriers could be taken out of service when the withdrawal from the East of Suez region, which 
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was planned for late 1971, was complete.56 This controversial decision was heavily debated in 
January and February, all the way up to the printing of the White Paper in February 1968. There 
was a long discussion between the MoD and the Treasury on this issue. Chancellor James 
Callaghan and Roy Jenkins of the Treasury were especially active, arguing for taking HMS ARK 
ROYAL out of service before it was finished. They debated this vigorously with Healey.57 After 
the 1967 Supplementary Defence White Paper, it had been decided that the Treasury and MoD 
should reach an agreement on the issue of the refit. However, they did not manage to agree. The 
Treasury wanted to cancel the HMS ARK ROYAL refit and extend the life of HMS HERMES. 
As they argued; it was ridiculous to complete a refit for the carrier that would operate for only 
two years. It did not give conviction to the Prime Minister’s announcement of a changing 
defence policy, and it would be tempting in the future to argue for a continued worldwide role in 
the 1970s.58 Healey on the contrary saw the refit of the large HMS ARK ROYAL as absolutely 
necessary for a safe and orderly withdrawal. In the end, the Prime Minister became involved. He 
ordered the issue be raised with the Cabinet (DOPC).59 Healey argued that capable carriers, able 
to carry modern aircraft, were needed for the critical withdrawals of 1971. HMS HERMES, 
which could only carry seven strike aircraft, was a poor alternative.60 HMS ARK ROYAL 
would, after her ‘Phantom refit’, be the main protector for the withdrawal. In addition, one more 
ship was needed to carry the Navy’s carrier-operation competence while HMS ARK ROYAL 
was in refit, and a second carrier was needed as back-up.61 The Cabinet (DOPC) supported 
Healey’s arguments, and also took note of the Treasury’s fear of a new debate on the fate of the 
carriers after the coming election in 1970. However, the Cabinet saw this as a sensible option. In 
fact, they had become seriously concerned at the rise of the Soviet Navy and its increased 
operations in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean.62 In the end, Healey’s position won 
support, and the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee decided by 28 February, just in time for 
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the hasty Defence White Paper, to go ahead with the refit of HMS ARK ROYAL.63  HMS ARK 
ROYAL was agreed upon as the main ship for the Navy, with HMS EAGLE as back-up.  
The infrastructure of the Royal Navy was also to undergo great changes. About half the naval air 
stations were expected to be handed off as the planned fixed-wing air operations ended within 
the Navy. The fixed-wing aircraft support facilities were soon scaled down, creating more 
problems for the Royal Navy carrier operations East of Suez. It therefore proved challenging to 
keep up the permanent stationing of even one fleet carrier in the eastern areas.  
However, as the end of the carrier history of the Royal Navy drew nearer; it was not to take place  
in silence. The Press re-opened the case for keeping the carriers on several occasions. HMS ARK 
ROYAL and HMS EAGLE, as well as the planned retired HMS HERMES, were all discussed as 
potential commando carriers in the 1970s.64 Although both the two large carriers were assessed 
to be too demanding of manpower and resources to be cost-effective as commando carriers, 
HMS HERMES was assessed as a good option for conversion.65 HMS HERMES was kept in 
service as a fleet carrier, mainly for ASW as decided in the 1967 Defence White Paper, until July 
1970. She was then converted into a commando carrier.66  
The two last fleet carriers planned in British service, HMS ARK ROYAL and HMS EAGLE, 
were projected to be scrapped by the end of 1971. However, by 1969 it had become clear that the 
withdrawal would not be finished until the first half of 1972. Inevitably, carriers would also be 
needed until that time. 
Another aspect which (could have) helped the case for the carriers, was NATO and SACLANT’s 
growing concern over the rising Soviet Navy.  
Chapter conclusion  
With the Defence White Paper of 22 February 1966, the CVA-01 was cancelled. Also the 
existing carriers would be phased out by the mid-1970s. The defence paper stated that:  
 
…only one type of operation exists for which carriers and carrier-borne aircraft would be 
indispensable: that is for landing, or withdrawal, of troops against sophisticated 
opposition outside the range of land-based cover.67  
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Healey’s Defence Review that presented this decision consisted of two parts: The first part 
argued that the British would balance the Armed Forces within the decided £2,000 Million 
budget. This was a high benchmark set by the Government in November 1965. It had been made 
clear by Prime Minister Wilson that the British would still be present East of Suez. However, it 
was obvious that some limitations to previous capacity had to be made. It came to a general 
statement explaining that independent operations against another nation were no longer possible. 
It would be done in co-operation with allies. The second part was mainly a row of arguments 
about how and to what extent land-based air power could replace carrier-based aircraft. The 
Royal Air Force had won the second round of the inter-service battle. 
The Defence Review had found that the future strike aircraft; the updated Buccaneer and the 
American FB-111A, would take on the capabilities of the expensive carriers. Land-based aircraft 
would take on all the strike-reconnaissance and air defence functions of the carrier aircraft. 
Another argument against the carriers concluded that in the land-strike role, carriers were two-to-
three times more expensive than the land-based air power alternative. Healey put forward a 
devastating argument: ‘Now East of Suez is the only area where we regard carriers as 
necessary’.68 The view that carriers were irrelevant to the European theatre, and of only marginal 
relevance to the Middle East region, had become widespread in political circles by late 1965.  
The rationale for fleet carriers had become fully linked to the East of Suez missions. Arguably, 
this was the worst political strategic mistake made by the Royal Navy in this period of inter-
service rivalry. Additionally, the Royal Navy stayed focused on technical aspects throughout the 
1965-66 debate, and did little to involve them in the greater political discussion regarding policy. 
By this they were constantly kept on the defensive. Towards the end of 1965, they did try to 
downscale the technical requirements to save money. However, they did not manage to get 
expenditure down to a manageable level acceptable to the Government.  
Even though the carriers were to be abandoned, the Government was far from ready to leave the 
East of Suez region yet. Healey tried to convince the Commonwealth countries that in spite of 
the phasing-out of the carrier force; land-based air power would still allow the British the ability 
to maintain a presence from its ‘island staging posts’.69 Therefore, the cancellation of CVA-01 
may not be directly explained by the ‘retreat from empire’. This has previously been a 
misunderstood perception in British naval history. In the end, the Air Ministry’s arguments on 
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the ‘Island Strategy’ (1960-63) and land-based air power in general (1965-66), became the 
politicians’ practical way out of the costly carrier programme for Healey and the Government.  
Throughout the 1960s, the Air Ministry was clearly on the offensive regarding the ‘inter-service 
rivalry’. During the 1965 debates, Chief of the Air Staff Elworthy made it clear to his staff that 
they should be frank and outspoken in all ‘joint’ settings, e.g. study committees. There was no 
reason for joint groups if one was reserved.70 From an extensive review of the archives, it is clear 
that the Air Ministry had the most aggressive attitude, including a greater pace of studies and 
correspondence. The Admiralty produced fewer studies, centred mainly on technical issues of 
the prospective carriers and not so much on strategy. This fact was also stressed during the 
interviews made with Air Ministry and Admiralty representatives of the period.71 Especially 
during the last period before the cancellation of the CVA-01; Sir Michael Quinlan noted that the 
Air Force clearly had the ‘most able’ Chief of Staff (CAS Elworthy against CNS David Luce), as 
well as better senior civil servants. The Vice Chief of the Naval Staff was on the contrary 
regarded very able and ‘had to be avoided’. Accordingly, the Air Ministry civil servants and staff 
officers preferred to keep the debates at either higher or lower levels.72 Admiral Sir David Luce 
for instance, who was known as a pleasant and easy going officer, was clearly not the political 
bulldog needed for this period. His own description of the 1963 battle gives us a good picture of 
his lack of aggressiveness, determination and political skill:  
 
We have not been able, until now, to let anyone outside Whitehall into our detailed 
thinking of the carrier replacement programme. This has been simply because the pace 
has been so hot, with the direction and ground of attack shifting so radically and so 
frequent, that any papers we might have sent out were apt to have been overtaken by 
events, almost before we got them.73   
 
In defence of the Admiralty, the Air Ministry was also known to have a far greater part of its 
staff involved in these issues. According to Sir Henry Leach: ‘They put more resources into the 
staff functions for this critical period. Where the Navy were out-witted,  the Air Force were 
better and had better staff officers – and more of them’. Sir Henry described further the 
Admiralty as ‘arrogant’ and too self-centred and naïve. His conclusion was that ‘the Air Force 
had strong leaders and their arguments won – it is as simple as that’. 74 
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Chapter 5: The Soviet naval build-up, in the shadow of Britain’s ‘East 
of Suez’ pre-occupation 
 
Although the move from East of Suez had primarily economical motives, the 
improvements in Soviet naval capability … made a move westwards well advised. 
There was thus a strategic as well as a financial imperative for Britain to withdraw 
her fleet from colonial and post-colonial policing around the world.1  
Eric Grove 
 
As previously argued, the British were preoccupied with their own economic problems, the 
challenges East of Suez, and thereby the radical defence reviews. They were surprisingly little 
involved in NATO’s changing strategic thinking and curiously unconcerned by the gradual 
Soviet build-up in the northern Atlantic. However, this reality hit the British at the end of the 
1960s. This chapter focuses entirely on this strategic framework created by the Soviet 
developments. As the topic of the chapter is far too large for any limited single study, I will 
necessarily rely on secondary sources of primary research on the Soviet Navy during the Cold 
War.2 The next chapter in turn reviews British and NATO primary archival sources in order to 
analyse the response to the increasing challenge posed by the Soviet forces in the northern 
Atlantic.  
 
Chapter 5-A: The Soviet Navy  
The heritage 
Stalin had visions of an ocean going navy from his early days in power until his death. Due to 
the costs however, its building was repeatedly postponed. Following the Second World War, 
Stalin’s envisaged ‘ocean-going fleet’ plan of the second half of the 1930s was again on the 
agenda. The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Kuznetsov, made a ten-year naval plan 
for 9 battleships, 12 heavy and 60 light cruisers, a large number of destroyers, and submarines. 
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He also argued for carriers and landing ships. However, due to the post-war economy and the 
focus on merchant ship building these plans did not materialise.3 Despite his visions, Stalin’s 
‘ocean-going fleet’ never came about. Most of the project that started after the Second World 
War was cancelled by mid-1950s. Production was then halted on the three in-line 
STALINGRAD class heavy cruisers and seven SVERDLOV class light cruisers. In addition, 
three new cruisers which had become operational were dismantled.4 No carriers were 
constructed.  
The lack of air-cover from carriers and surface fleets, comprising mainly old design ships, 
confined the Navy of the 1950s to operations within the reach of its own supporting air power. 
The British Naval War Manual of 1957/61 stated that the Soviet surface forces did not constitute 
a decisive threat to British and NATO forces.5 
The death of Stalin; and Khrushchev changing the maritime strategy 
The death of Stalin in March 1953 threw the Soviet political and military leadership into a 
troublesome period. Khrushchev became first secretary of the Central Committee in 1953, and 
gained more influence from 1954. He had a temporary setback following Polish defiance of the 
USSR in 1956 and during the Hungarian revolution of the same year.6  
Khrushchev replaced Bulganin as Prime Minister in March 1958, becoming the undisputed 
leader of both the State and the Party. The role and position of Khrushchev as leader has been 
heavily debated. As Mawdsley and White point out, the period of the late 1950s and early 1960s 
has been and still is somewhat confusing for historians. At the time, Khrushchev was seen by the 
West as a ‘transitional leader’ and ‘supreme leader’ from 1957-1964. A more contemporary 
perspective is that Khrushchev was an ‘original leader’, who truly tried to modernise the system. 
His ideas have been viewed as the origin of the Perestroika of the 1980s. Another contemporary 
perspective on the leadership-struggle of this era, argued by Mawdsley and White, is that it was 
greatly influenced by the development of an powerful ruling elite.7 The elite in Soviet politics 
were clearly strongest during this Khrushchev-period.  
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Regarding defence policy, military strategy, and technology, Khrushchev pressed for a greater 
concentration on nuclear forces at the expense of conventional forces.8 This was motivated both 
by his personal strategic perspective, with focus on deterrence, as well as the aim of cutting costs 
and manpower. His ideas were not unique, as this belief in missiles and cutting conventional 
forces came exactly at the time of the same debate in western countries (e.g. Britain). Such a 
strong belief in strategic missiles, ICBMs especially in Khrushchev’s case, would still prove 
‘over-optimistic’. The best example of the latter is the Cuba crisis.  As for his aim of great 
reductions in the conventional Army, this also proved too dramatic.  Following the first Berlin 
crisis, a compromise was reached in 1961 which recognised the importance of all traditional 
conventional forces.9 Very similar lessons were learned in the West.  
The late 1950s were the gloomy years of missile technology throughout the world. Khrushchev 
criticised Stalin’s ambitious naval planning from the mid-1950s onward, especially his 
fascination with large ships. The philosophical perspective on naval strategy changed 
dramatically, as the effects of nuclear weapons and missiles influenced the debate. The central 
party policy was clearly in favour of an increased focus on the new technology, and less on 
traditional naval forces.10 This was especially viable from 1957, beginning with the removal of 
Marshal Zhukov and the increasing influence of Khrushchev. According to Khrushchev, carriers 
and submarines were the systems which had proved themselves during the Second World War. 
Carriers had become less important due their vulnerability to the (nuclear armed) long range 
missile systems – but the submarines’ potential was still indisputable. He therefore concluded: 
‘We must concentrate on developing our defensive weapons, our means of sinking enemy ships, 
rather than on building up an offensive surface fleet of our own…’11  
Khrushchev opting for submarines 
Admiral Kuznetsov, an outspoken and firm supporter of Stalin’s fleet-plans, had to give way to a 
new Commander-in-Chief of the Navy who would be able to work with the new leadership. The 
new leader, Admiral Gorshkov12, followed the official course set by Khrushchev and criticised 
Stalin’s naval position, but was at the same time a true believer in the fundamental ideas of a 
balanced ocean-going Soviet fleet. From the late 1950s, Admiral Gorshkov acquired more 
influence over maritime strategy, and with that he initiated surface ship programmes. Gorshkov’s 
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fascination with large surface combatants was apparent. It was also part of his personal history as 
commander of such fleets. In his memoirs from 1996 he makes this very clear:  
 
Large ships – battleships and cruisers – always appeared as the standard for fleet 
smartness, having a reputation for tight discipline (and) model organisation. To serve on 
them was not easy, but young commanders knew that, after such schooling, they were 
guaranteed success on any ship.13  
 
Still, the Soviet maritime position under Khrushchev would clearly focus on the potential of the 
submarine – and a massive building programme was started. In September 1955 the Soviet Navy 
launched their first nuclear-capable missile at sea from the conventional Zulu-class submarine, 
an event that set a new revolutionary standard in naval warfare.14 The Soviet Navy built a 
powerful and feared navy based on a large submarine fleet. It may be characterised as both 
asymmetric and alternative – but it was entirely suited to its tasks.  
Consequently the first and main threat posed by Soviet naval forces of the late 1950s and early 
1960s came from the Soviet submarine build-up. A fleet of attack submarines aimed to dispute 
the Sea Command of the NATO navies. The submarine build-up can be identified by some 
important steps in technological evolution.  
The submarine developments 
The Whiskey-class diesel-electric submarines were classical medium-range patrol and torpedo-
attack submarines (SS). They were produced in large numbers, and the class was operational 
from 1950 till the 1980s. Whiskeys I-V were produced. The Zulu-class diesel-electric patrol and 
attack submarines were in service by 1952, and in addition a Quebec Class diesel-electric was 
developed for coastal patrol, and was in service by 1954. The great changes came with the 
revolutionary Zulu IV ½15 and the following five Zulu V class boats were converted from earlier 
Zulus in the late 1950s. From the second boat onwards, they were armed with two SS-N-4 
SLBM16 missiles in addition to torpedo tubes.17 In addition, two new versions of the Whiskey-
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class called the Long Bin and the Twin Cylinder came by 1959-60, armed with the first 
submarine cruise missile, the P-5 (SS-N-3 Shaddock).  
In Britain, these Zulu- and Whiskey-class submarines were assessed as far more capable than the 
British conventional hunter submarines.18 About the same time, the Golf-class19 diesel-electric 
appeared. From 1958 to 1962, 23 missile submarines of this class were built, and they were fitted 
with the SS-N-4 from the beginning.20   
Two other classes of conventional patrol and attack submarines (not equipped with missiles) 
were also built in the following few years. The Foxtrot-class came in service from 1958, and 
consisted of 62 boats for Soviet use. They were initially designed for anti-surface and anti-
submarine warfare operations in northern latitudes.21 The Romeo-class came in service the same 
year, but only 20 were built. In 1962 a new and more specialised diesel-electric submarine came 
into service, the Juliet-class.  It was to carry the Soviet Union’s first cruise missile, the new P-5, 
and an increased torpedo load.  
Still, the drawbacks of conventional submarines were clear. On patrol out in open waters they 
were very vulnerable to ASW aircraft while charging their batteries. Nuclear propulsion was 
being explored, and the November-class22 became the first Soviet nuclear-powered submarine. It 
was in service by April 1958, and 14 submarines were soon built. The November-class only 
carried torpedoes, but as the first Soviet nuclear submarine, it was significant.23  
During the second half of the 1960s, new powerful classes of nuclear submarines became 
operational. The Charlie-class cruise missile submarines, of which twelve Charlie I submarines 
were built from 1968, were equipped with the short-range anti-ship SS-N-7 Starbright and 6 
torpedo/launch tubes for the missile-torpedo SS-N-15 Starfish or Type 53 torpedoes. The 
Charlies were not too successful, as their lack of speed made them ineffective as hunters.24 The 
Victor-class attack submarine came along in 1967, of which 16 Victor I were built and equipped 
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with 6 torpedo/launch tubes for SS-N-15 or Type 53 torpedoes. This class had better 
performance than the rest of the fleet, and is still operational with the Victor III batch in the 
Russian Northern Fleet. These two submarine classes; the Charlie and Victor, as well as the first 
SSBN Yankee-class, marked the change to a ‘modern submarine fleet’.  
The submarine threat was clearly the threat that received the most attention, and rightly so, 
during the early 1960s. However, the Soviet focus on long-range bombers with missiles had to 
be taken seriously.  
The Soviet controversy of large surface ships 
From the early 1960s the Soviet surface fleet saw a gradual build-up. Carrier aviation has had a 
troubled position in Soviet naval thinking. The naval leadership has generally argued the need 
for carriers, especially as a means of giving air cover to surface forces at sea. Kuznetsov was the 
foremost advocate of carrier aviation; he considered air cover for ships at sea to be essential. 
Stalin was clearly in favour of large ships, but in the case of carriers he was reluctant. Stalin did 
not support them being included in the construction programmes of the 1940-50s. The 
bureaucratic infighting and misperceptions of cost and practicality did not help their advocates.25  
By 1954, Kuznetsov finally did manage to get an ASW carrier approved. In the period 1956-57, 
doctrines and reports, research, and even land-based training tests all reflected the naval 
leadership’s desire for carriers. This was a source of irritation for Khrushchev.26 During 
Gorshkov’s first years of office, he also spoke in favour of the carriers and large ships (as earlier 
mentioned), but by 1960 he had adjusted his perception in line with the ‘official view’. Gorshkov 
echoed the ideas of Khrushchev and Sokolovskiys in his statement of 1960: ‘Large ships, like 
cruisers or aircraft carriers, have on the whole become outdated as a means for conducting war at 
sea and are merely a good target for modern missiles’.27  
British intelligence also had no thoughts of the Russians planning for carriers, either for the 
purpose of limited war or a total war. If so, they would most likely be intended for making 
extended cover-range for the naval surface strike-forces. The British had made note of the 
official Russian literature arguing the vulnerability of carriers in modern war.28   
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The carriers never came about, and compared to the USN’s 23 attack and anti-submarine carriers 
by the late 1960s29, we are clearly discussing a very different navy. As discussed later in this 
dissertation, the Soviet Navy grew dramatically and became a powerful force at sea – but it was 
balanced in its own way. Even so, this crucial lack of air cover for the protection of surface 
forces, outside the reach of land-based fighter aircraft, limited their goal of a global navy, at least 
as greater task forces. The Soviet Navy has tried to cover this flaw since the 1960s, as most 
Soviet naval surface ships have since been equipped with extremely long range and effective 
surface-to-air missiles systems for air denial purposes. This started with the SVERDLOV-class, 
and has continued all the way up to the contemporary KIROV-class. For fighting the NATO 
anti-surface warfare aircraft, the SVERDLOV had the Big-Net radar of some 120 NM range on 
medium bombers. This radar was first seen on a SVERDLOV in 1957.30 The SVERDLOV-class 
were the main ships used for the air defence role. The rest of the major warships mainly used the 
Knife-Rest radar of some 90-110 NM. ranges on bombers. The SVERDLOV-class attracted 
great attention among the NATO maritime nations. NATO, Britain included, made aircraft and 
tactics directly to counter this. For instance, the Buccaneer project in its early phase was 
popularly labelled a ‘SVERDLOV-killer’. 
Ocean-going Soviet naval operations were sporadic up to the mid-1960s. The first large task 
force to operate outside its own waters after the Second World War came in 1954, when Vice-
Admiral Gorshkov took a cruiser and two destroyers on a visit to Albania.31 The following years 
saw some visits to Egypt and Syria by Soviet naval forces, and the first greater exercise in the 
Mediterranean came in 1960. The next great ocean deployment was the infamous Cuban 
deployment of merchant vessels and submarines.  
Soviet ASW forces, as a response to the American Polaris system 
The American George Washington class Polaris submarine became operational by 1960, and 
immediately influenced NATO and Soviet strategies and tactics, as well as the development of 
new technological responses. For instance, the 1963 American public announcement that a 
Polaris submarine was on patrol in the eastern Mediterranean provoked both a verbal and 
practical response by the Soviets. The Soviets argued that the Mediterranean should be a nuclear 
free zone. Stalin’s ocean-going vessels and submarines had been on visits and operations in the 
Mediterranean from 1953 onward and Soviet naval activity clearly increased from 1964 onward. 
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This was a means of military diplomacy – as well as a response to the Polaris threat in that 
region.  
Kuznetsov had always been a firm advocate of carriers. Gorshkov had a more pragmatic 
perspective. During his first years in office he spoke in favour of carriers, thereby avoiding 
conflict with those supporting his predecessor, Kuznetsov. From the late 1960s onward he 
focused on the place of carriers for ASW and air cover for his surface forces. It was a different 
rationale than the offensive USN use of carriers.  
The building of Soviet carriers seemed imminent in 1952-53, but did not materialise then. The 
first carriers became the two MOSCOW-class ASW carriers.32 Built in 1967-69, they were a 
response to the threat posed by the Polaris system. In addition, ASW carriers were needed for 
protection of the surface ships which began to operate for the purpose of diplomacy in the mid-
1960s. As the strategic submarine missiles got greater ranges (Polaris A-II, A-III, and in time 
Poseidon), the Soviet Navy could no longer effectively hunt down the strategic submarines. The 
Soviet submarines soon followed this missile evolution, and with this the Soviet ASW forces 
shifted from an offensive to a defensive role; the protection of the ‘Bastions’ of the 1970s. The 
Soviet Navy maintained this defensive ASW posture for the protection of its own forces, and did 
not build up an offensive ASW capacity parallel to the NATO and USN triad-concept of world-
wide SOSUS, ASW aircraft, and hunter submarines.  
The Cuban Crisis 
Experience gained during the Cuban Crisis is often cited as rationale for the Soviet Navy build-
up. However, this is a over-simplification of the story. The Cuban, or Caribbean Crisis, did not 
create a change in NATO or US maritime strategy. The conflict was short, and successful from a 
western point of view. For the Soviets, the operation would have a greater impact. The Cuban 
crisis had some clear lessons for the Soviet Navy. At the tactical level the Soviet Navy learned 
that:33 
 
• All submarines detected were surfacing for snorkelling or communication needs 
• All submarine detections were during daylight hours 
• The submarines were detected visually by aircraft or surface ships 
• The Soviet submarines managed to evade after completion of snorkelling 
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At a grand strategic level, it was evident that submarines were not the best tool for projecting 
influence by diplomacy over other nations or for limited wars or conflict.  
The Cuban Crisis has been seen as the rationale behind the new and more offensive Soviet naval 
strategy that evolved during the late 1960s and early 1970s. This explanation may be partially 
right, but must not be overstated. The explanation is more complicated. Gorshkov’s writing has 
been accepted as his true belief regarding naval strategy, and his quest for a balanced ocean-
going fleet was evident. This was a common perspective within the naval Admiralty that had 
been fostered in the ‘old school’ tradition since the mid-1930s. Before the Cuba crisis in 1962, 
the original plan was to send the Baltic Fleet on a mission of diplomacy.34 This never came 
about, probably because the status of the surface fleet was too limited after Khrushchev’s shift 
away from the original ocean-fleet plans in the mid-1950s.  
Gorshkov’s real views were unacceptable in 1956 when he entered office as the leader of the 
Navy.35 The Cuban Crisis should be viewed as an operation which confirmed these beliefs. The 
Cuban Crisis might be viewed as a turning-point for Khrushchev rather than for the naval 
establishment. The surface fleet build-up had started by 1961. As the Cuban Crisis unfolded, for 
instance, four KYNDA-class cruisers were under construction in Soviet shipyards. After 
Khrushchev’s humiliating defeat in the Caribbean, he told his naval chief that neither he, nor his 
successors should ever again experience this.36 Gorshkov could promise this, as the naval build-
up was already underway. However, emphasis on a balanced fleet for diplomacy did not 
materialise until after Brezhnev came to power in 1964.  
In fact, the Cuba Crisis rather normalised the views on sea power which had prevailed from the 
mid-1930s until Khrushchev came to power. Still, it is clear that the Cuban Crisis inflicted on 
Khrushchev’s fate as leader, and that the naval posture of the leadership changed with Brezhnev 
coming to power. Under Brezhnev, the services gained more independence for planning and 
manning, and conventional forces got increased attention.37 From 1964, the Soviet Navy also 
gained a more prominent place in the Soviet military. Sergei Chernyavskii describes the leader as 
central to this:  
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Gorshkov was not only a gifted strategist, but also excelled at bureaucratic politics, and 
proved remarkably successful in convincing the Soviet leadership of the imperative of 
developing an ocean-going fleet.38 
  
To conclude, the Soviet surface fleet expanded from 1961 and gradually increased its activity by 
the mid-1960s. Two main explanations may be found; an extension of Soviet defence zones and 
a traditional ocean-going fleet: 
 
• A direct response to the Polaris threat. The Soviets needed to extend their defence zones, 
and against the threat of the US submarines in the Eastern Mediterranean, Norwegian 
Sea, Japanese Sea’ and Indian Ocean39 – this could only be done by a more effective 
surface fleet.  
• It is important to note that the balanced ocean-going fleet had been the main idea from 
1936 until the mid-1950s. From 1961 onward, a balanced ocean-going fleet was again a 
reality. The experiences of the Cuban Crisis probably accelerated and underlined the wish 
for a surface fleet for the purpose of military diplomacy, thus an important, but not the 
only explanation.  
 
Chapter 5-B: Soviet fighting for the Norwegian Sea 
The definition of unified ‘theatres of military action’, TVDs (‘teatr voennekh deistvii’), were 
central in Soviet strategic planning and organisation. Within these theatres, there were unified 
concepts and perceptions about the character of war, defined by the characters of each of the 
TVDs. There were also clear perceptions that a war might well be limited to one or more of the 
TVDs. From the Soviet position, the Scandinavian Peninsula and the Norwegian Sea made up an 
independent theatre up to the mid-1980s and was regarded as an important battle-theatre, and not 
viewed as a flank. The entire north-western TVD was expected to ‘constitute an active military 
battlefield’ from the very outset of a war.40 This ‘area of military action’ was central for three 
main reasons: First for defensive purposes for stopping the offensive NATO forces, carriers at 
first, and later also the Polaris submarines; secondly for offensive purposes for securing access to 
the northern Atlantic; and thirdly for conducting their own offensive operations towards the 
European continent and the British Isles.  
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Figure 8: Soviet TVDs.41 
 
By the composition of the Soviet naval and air forces of the 1960s, there were mainly two 
dominant scenarios for the fight for control of the Norwegian Sea; namely who would have air 
superiority in the area – the Soviet Union or NATO? Control of the Norwegian Sea was 
dependent on who would be able to seize control of the airfields of northern Norway. The 
following general strategic perceptions were widespread in Western thinking. It remained much 
the same from the late 1960s until the end of the Cold War: 
If the Soviets were able to capture northern Norway with its airfields, this would pose a multi-
threat to NATO. With forwarded land-based air defences and combat aircraft, the Soviets would 
have air superiority – which in turn would enable their naval surface forces to move south-west. 
In the case of Soviet land-based strike air power, it would pose an immense offensive threat to 
northern continental Europe and Britain. Until the late 1960s, the submarine fleet was dependent 
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on breaking out of the Barents and closing the naval forces and shorelines to use its limited range 
missiles.42 
If NATO could keep control of northern Norway, they could effectively close off all Soviet 
naval surface forces, intercept the strike aircraft, and be able to put great ASW forces into the 
hunt for the Soviet submarines that were designed to dispute NATO’s control of the Norwegian 
Sea and attack Europe and Britain with missiles.  
As for combat between military forces, tactical nuclear weapons were expected to be used 
against groupings of enemy forces and the destruction of rocket sites. This single conviction at 
the military strategic level of decision-makers in the Soviet Union had a crucial impact on the 
conduct of maritime warfare and its technical development. Sokolovskiy stated about nuclear 
weapons ‘…profound changes will take place in the methods of carrying out military operations 
in naval theatre’.43 Further he specified:  
 
In a future war the tasks of destroying shore targets, of defeating grouping of the naval 
forces of an aggressor, his assault carrier formations and rocket-carrying submarines at 
bases and on the high seas, disruption of sea and ocean communication, will be 
accomplished by strikes of rocket troops and mobile operations of rocket-carrying 
submarines co-operating with rocket-carrying aircraft.   
 
Even Khrushchev argued that large surface ships, e.g. carriers, were ‘large sitting ducks’ for 
surface missiles.44 Later in his writing Sokolovskiy stressed that bombers and fighters were more 
successful at destroying moving targets than the rocket troops with their ballistic missiles.45 Here 
we see some of the background for the Soviet Navy’s heavy focus on aircraft in the anti-surface 
role of missions. This was supported by Khrushchev, who favoured ‘modest surface ships with 
anti-ship missiles and long range naval aviation’.46  
The British perspective is well described in the Naval War Manual of 1957. The threat of nuclear 
bombardment would be greatest to those forces in harbour. At sea, the threat would constitute 
submarines, operating independently but also in co-operation with long-range scouting aircraft. 
In addition to the submarine, the long-range bomber or strike aircraft armed with long-range 
missiles would be a great threat. Regarding the Soviet surface forces: ‘Surface raiders are not 
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likely to be used on any scale, but may possibly be deployed in more remote areas to attack 
independent shipping and to extend the protection of forces’.47 The Soviet vision and the threat 
posed to western forces is perhaps best summarised in the thought-provoking words of 
Sokolovskiy of the High Command of the Soviet forces: ‘Long-range bomber craft, armed with 
long-range missiles, retain the capacity of delivering independent blows to enemy targets, 
especially at sea and in the ocean, but also on the coast and in the deep areas of the enemy 
territory’.48 Further he stated about the balance of the surface, submarine, and air platforms:  
 
…the Navy will keep such important tasks as combating the enemy’s naval forces on the 
sea and at the bases and also disrupting his ocean and sea transport. These problems can 
be solved most effectively by submarines and planes armed with nuclear rocket weapons 
and torpedoes. A certain number of surface ships are also necessary to safeguard the 
activities of submarines and to perform secondary missions such as protection of naval 
communication lanes and co-ordination with Ground Troops in operations carried out in 
coastal regions. 
  
Continuing about naval aviation: ‘Naval aviation must be able to attack warships at sea at 
distances at which they will not be able to use their aircraft carrier forces and missiles for 
attacking targets in the socialist countries’, and ‘… naval aviation will be called upon to destroy 
enemy transport at sea and at their bases.’  
In conclusion, it is clear that fighting the Soviet submarines and the long-range bombers and 
missile carrying strike aircraft primarily, and secondary the Soviet surface navy, were the main 
threats to western conventional forces. Consequently, the British and NATO forces of northern 
Europe had to be planned and structured for establishing control of northern Norway and the 
Norwegian Sea. (To what degree they managed to meet this challenge will be discussed in the 
end of the next chapter). However, by early 1960 the importance of conventional military forces 
for the home region had only a subordinate position in British policy. The region off Britain’s 
north-eastern shores and the Soviet Northern Fleet was predominantly an American concern. The 
High North had been in focus because of the strategic bomber fleets and their ‘forward strategy’ 
in the 1950s, both for offensive operations with carrier forces and using Norwegian airfields. The 
Norwegians were in addition greatly concerned with a potential ‘limited incursion into northern 
Norway’. This was the reason for a Norwegian invitation to British officials to visit Oslo in 
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1960.49 The British had been part of NATO’s Striking Fleet in the Norwegian Sea and North Sea 
prior to this, but as the East of Suez challenges gradually got more attention, the 1960s saw far 
less participation by British forces in the northern region. Indeed the Norwegian concern about 
limited incursions towards northern Norway did not gain influence either with the British or 
Americans until the late 1960s.  
Land based aircraft fighting the naval ships 
The Soviet submarine build-up has traditionally received the greatest attention, but another 
important development was the threat posed by an extraordinary land-based maritime naval air 
force (Aviatsiya Voenno-Morskogo Flota, meaning ‘aviation of the military sea fleet’).  
This second threat from the Soviet military forces has been underestimated in military history 
literature. The capabilities and reach of Soviet maritime air power, both for strikes against 
maritime targets and land targets along the flanks of Europe, have not been given their rightful 
attention. The well-balanced and capable land-based air power of the Soviet Union would have 
seriously displaced the power balance of Britain and northern Europe operating from the 
Norwegian coastline. Jonathan Alford, former Director of the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, and a great debater on strategic issues in the 1980s, summed up the joint nature of 
maritime operations, and specifically the northern flank issue:  
 
In part this is about the Soviet interdiction of the trans-Atlantic routes; in part this is 
about the Soviet need to keep NATO naval forces well away from important Soviet 
assets; and in part it is about the reinforcement by the sea of the NATO north – and all are 
interconnected… 
I will assert that it is the Norwegian airfields which are – or ought to be – of greatest 
concern. I suggest the following syllogism: who controls the Norwegian Sea depends on 
who controls the North Norwegian airfields: who controls those airfields depends on who 
gets there first: and who gets there first depends on who controls the Norwegian Sea.50   
 
For the Soviet Union to be able to control the Norwegian Sea, or at least deny it to NATO forces, 
the two most important tasks of the Soviet Fleet and aircraft from the very outset of a war would 
be to destroy carrier based enemy striking units and to get hold of the airfields of northern 
Norway. The absence of carrier-borne aviation in the Soviet Navy – and their need for forward 
bases, brought northern Norway into military strategies. The bases in northern Norway became a 
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prerequisite for defensive operations to fight enemy carriers and for air cover of their own naval 
forces, as well as for offensive strike operations against Europe, the British Isles, and the 
northern Atlantic. The Soviets expected that NATO ASW ships, as well as ASW and air defence 
aircraft would protect the attack carriers. Still, they were strong in their belief that those forces 
and weapons could not effectively defend the vulnerable carriers from the Soviet submarines and 
aircraft armed with long-range missiles.  
As Sokolovskiy stated: ‘… our fleet of missile-carrying submarines and aircraft permit 
approaching the aircraft carrier to the distance of missile launch without entering the zone of 
antisubmarine and air defence of the attack carrier force’.51 To be able to do this, the geo-
strategic importance of northern Norway in this game was quite clear.  
Aircraft developments 
The Cold War Soviet medium- and long-range bomber and strike aircraft era started with the 
development of the Tupolev Tu-4 Bull in 1947. They were followed in the 1950s by the 
Myasischev M-4 Bison, the Tupolev Tu-16 Badger and the TU-95 Bear.  
The M-4 Bison has been somewhat overlooked, chiefly because of its failed performance in its 
original role as a long-range strategic bomber. The early Bison A aircraft from the early 1950s 
simply did not possess the range capabilities needed for those missions. The Bison B and the 
specialised Bison C with their large search radar for maritime reconnaissance and Electronic 
Intelligence (ELINT) operations became important for naval operations.52 But, the fact that the 
aircraft design was not suited for carrying large missiles still made this an expensive aircraft to 
maintain only for reconnaissance and tanker roles.  
The Tu-16 Badger was first flown in 1952, and entered service with the strategic aviation forces 
by 1955. 53 Within a few years most of the aircraft were fitted with flight-refuelling equipment. 
In the 1960s, after the rocket troops took on the strategic strike role, the aircraft were steadily 
transferred to the expanding Navy.54 The Badgers became the first missile carrying aircraft for 
the Navy. The first missile variant, the Badger B, was initially equipped with the 80km range 
AS-1 Kennel55 anti-ship missile and later with the more advanced anti-ship and land-attack 
missile AS-5 Kelt56. The Badger C production line came at about the same time – and with the 
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AS-2 Kipper57 missile for anti-ship and land-attack and its large radar installation, it became a 
feared strike-aircraft. The development of these first cruise missiles had begun in the early 
1950s, and they were from the start intended chiefly as radar-guided anti-ship missiles.58 The 
Badger D aircraft was equipped with the same radar and electronic surveillance capabilities as 
the previous aircraft of the series, but were more specialised for maritime reconnaissance. The 
Badgers E through L aircraft designations pointed to various roles; including reconnaissance, 
intelligence, and jamming. Some Badger (Tu-16Z) aircraft were also fitted for air-air refuelling, 
to keep up with the later Tu-22s with refuelling capability.  
Due to the development of the Badgers, SACLANT became greatly concerned at the growing 
threat from the expanding Soviet naval strike aircraft fleet. The air threat had now ’considerably 
increased’ according to SACLANT’s 1958 Emergency Defence Plan. As a consequence, the 
NATO Strike Fleet made special air defence arrangements with Norway to upgrade and link 
early warning information from shore-based systems to SACLANTs naval forces in 1958.59  
The reach of Soviet air power in maritime operations and along the flanks became an even 
greater threat with the introduction of the magnificent Tu-95 Bear aircraft. As Sweetman wrote, 
thirty years after its development: ‘unquestionably the most spectacular of contemporary 
warplanes’.60 Prototypes flew in the early 1950s, and by 1956 the aircraft was operational. For 
the next 10 years 49 Bear A were produced for the traditional bomber role and were soon 
reconfigured to carry nuclear bombs, and further 71 missile carrying Bear B and 23 Bear C for 
strike purposes were produced and operational by 1959. 61 The Bear D, operational by 1964-66, 
had a long-range maritime reconnaissance and targeting role and mid-course guidance for the 
long-range surface-to-surface as well as air-to-surface missile systems.62 The Bear D was 
equipped with the powerful Big Bulge radar and a secure communication link. The Bear D was 
renamed Tu-142 during the 1960s, indicating that it was a genuine maritime aircraft.  
The Tu-22 series, where the initial production line aircraft were named Blinders, was projected 
in the mid 1950s. It would give a supersonic penetration capability to the existing concept of the 
Tu-16 Badger. The effectiveness of western air defences with high altitude SAMs and radar 
controlled supersonic interceptors required the greater performance of the strategic bombers. 
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But, by the time the aircraft was fully operational, Soviet strategies had shifted to rely on 
strategic missile systems rather than aircraft. The radical doctrinal change of the Soviet Union63 
in the early 1960s assigned the land-based strategic ballistic missiles to the principal role of 
strategic strike and deterrence. Many of the first Tu-22s (as well as other types) were 
consequently transferred from the strategic aviation forces to naval aviation for precision 
maritime strikes and for strikes in the European regions along the flanks. These Tu-22s were 
named Blinder B.64 The Blinder C became an important ELINT aircraft for maritime 
reconnaissance. These latter B and C batches were accepted as fully operational by the late 
1960s. 
Another interesting aspect of the Soviet long-range reach air power was the development of the 
long-range and long-endurance fighter Yak-25P of 1953, later replaced by Yak-28Ps in 1960. In 
addition to the Tu-126 Moss AEW and the Tu-128 interceptors, this gave the Soviet Union a 
considerable reach in the northern areas. These were designed as interceptors and to deny the 
airspace to Western aircraft to far greater distances than normally capable of land-based fighter 
aircraft.65 Soviet long-range air power strike capabilities were immense, and clearly posed a 
great threat to British and NATO maritime forces and communication. They must not be 
overlooked.  
 
Chapter 5-C: Soviet SSBN’s and an established ocean-going fleet 
Soviet quest for a ocean-going fleet materialised 
As argued previously, Gorshkov was a genuine believer in the Soviet need for an ocean-going 
fleet and large ships. His statements from the late 1950s and up to 1960-61 still favoured the 
‘official views’. This period saw considerable doctrinal discussion in Soviet politics, but the 
influence of the Army and strategic-missile advocates66, including Khrushchev, was significant. 
By the early 1960s Gorshkov argued more for large ships. David Winkler argues that Gorshkovs’ 
                                                 
63
 After the “secret speech’ of Khrushchev in 1956, in which he denounced the cult of personality – is viewed as a 
turning point in Soviet military thought. In the period 1958-60 the theorists of the High Command agreed that the 
military doctrine needed revision. At the IV session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 14 January  1960 – 
Khrushchev outlined a new Soviet military doctrine. (Harriet Scott’s editors’ introduction of Sokolovskiys Military 
Strategy). 
64
 The Blinder B’s were armed with the AS-4 Kitchen missile, where the naval strike version were capable of a 
320km air-to-surface range. (Sweetman, Soviet Military Aircraft, p.169.) It is reported to have a range exceeding 
700km in other sources.  
65
 Note: Soviet fighter aircraft were not equipped with in-flight refuelling systems until 1979 with the Mig-31.          
(Sutyagin in Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, p.410.)  
66
 E.g. Sokolovskiy, Zhukov, Frunze 




            
   
 
 
‘deliberate campaign to urge Nikita Khrushchev to reverse his naval outlook’ came from the 
threat posed by the first Polaris system of 1960.67  
Some scholars, e.g. MccGwire68, noted this change at the time, prior to the Cuban Crisis. The 
planned scrapping of Stalins SVERDLOV-class was prevented, and the KYNDA-class missile-
cruiser was commissioned by 1962. The construction of various large ships came about in the 
early 1960s. As argued earlier; the turning away from the sole submarine fleet focus, and a quest 
for larger ships, clearly started to materialise before the Cuban Crisis. But although building 
started early in the 1960s, the Soviet Navy’s presence on the oceans did not materialise until the 
mid-1960s, with a rapid increase in activity on a global scale by the late 1960s.  
The first major operations by Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean were in 1964, and 
increased from the mid-1960s. The Caribbean was also visited regularly. The Indian Ocean was 
first visited by hydrographic survey ships in 1967, with the first naval task force spending four 
months showing the flag during the following year.69 The rationale for operations in this area 
was the Polaris deployment and reach from the northern Indian Ocean, together with naval 
diplomacy and in support of space operations. The first Soviet deployments were most evident 
with the Black Sea and Pacific Fleets. Another aspect, or fear, of Soviet expansion on the oceans, 
especially across the Indian Ocean, Middle East and Africa, was argued regarding the British 
withdrawal of its military presence in the region.70 There was a vacuum to be filled, and the 
Soviet Navy might fill this gap. It turned out that the Soviet Union gained less footing than 
expected in these regions, as the countries kept their newly gained independence, and the US 
increased its influence.  
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Figure 9: Soviet Naval Strength and Deployment. 71 
 
The MOSCOW-class ASW carriers, MOSCOW and LENINGRAD of 25000 tons, were laid 
down in 1967-69. They were from the beginning assigned to the Black Sea Fleet and operated in 
the Mediterranean. By 1970, the MOSCOW-class was also followed by a small conventional 
carrier, the KIEV-class. The four ships of this class were built to operate vertical take-off and 
landing (VTOL) fighter aircraft. Their rationale may be explained by several parallel needs. By 
the late 1960s, the fight for the Norwegian Sea was intensified. The Soviet nuclear powered and 
armed strategic submarines (SSBN) had to pass through this area to get within striking distance. 
The Polaris system often operated in this area. The SSBNs, on both sides, did not have truly 
inter-continental ranges yet.  
By the late 1960s, when Soviet confidence had grown, they began to design nuclear powered 
cruisers. This was a natural development, in light of Gorshkovs fascination with large surface 
combatants. The result, the KIROV-class of four cruisers, did not become operational until 1980. 
This class remains today the ultimate surface combat ship.  
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A new central element; the Soviet SSBN 
By 1967, NATO woke up to a new great threat; the SSBN. It had gone through some 
evolutionary steps – but from the late 1960s it considerably influenced maritime strategy as well 
as the greater nuclear strategies and the balance between the superpowers, because of its second 
strike capacity.  
The basic design of the first nuclear powered submarine, the November-class attack submarine, 
was used to create the first nuclear powered strategic submarine, the Hotel-class. The first of this 
class, the famous K-19, was commissioned at the end of 1960.72 The Echo-class cruise missile 
tactical submarine soon joined the ballistic missile Hotel-class. The first Echo I was in service by 
1960, and was armed with the P-5 cruise missile and had 6 torpedo tubes for Type 53 torpedoes, 
as well as 4 torpedo tubes for Type 40 torpedoes. The Echo II entered service in 1962, armed 
with the P-673 anti-ship and coastal-strike cruise missile (The P-6 was given the same name as 
the P-5 – the SS-N-3 Shaddock by NATO) and the same torpedo configuration. The submarines 
carrying these first generation missiles, with their relatively short range and requirement of a 
surface launch, made the submarines very vulnerable to air ASW forces. Projects to create 
missiles with underwater launch capability resulted in the SS-N-5 Sark SLBM missile. It had a 
far greater range74 and was able to launch from depths of 40-60 meters.75 Many of the earlier 
submarines were, from 1963 to 1967, refitted with the D-4 system to launch these missiles..  
Submarines were now nuclear powered, as well as able to launch long-range missiles whilst 
submerged. This was another significant development for maritime warfare. 
In the case of the ballistic-missile submarines, the US had a great lead with their George 
Washington-class Polaris submarine of 1960. These second-generation missiles ensured a true 
second-strike capability.76 The Soviet answer to this weapon system was the Yankee-class 
ballistic missiles submarines (SSBN). 34 Yankee I were built between 1967 and 1974.77 This 
first true Soviet strategic submarine was armed with 16 SS-N-6 Serb SLBM with a range of 2400 
km.78 – but even with this range, the strategic submarines had to move out of the Barents Sea to 
their combat patrol areas and strike position. The first generation strategic submarines had to 
move out through the GIUK Gap, and this fact, in addition to a steady decline in NATO 
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maritime capabilities in the late 1960s and early 1970s, was the basis of the rationale behind the 
focus on the GIUK Gap in NATO, US, and UK maritime thinking in the 1970s.   
 
Figure 10: SSBN YANKEE I.79 
 
The well known ‘Bastions’ of the Barents and the Arctic did not become a reality until after the 
SS-N-8 Sawfly80 SLBM entered service with the Delta-class in the early 1970s. The SSBN have 
since become the main focus and the greatest concern of the North Atlantic. As Bertram and 
Holst state in their introduction to their book ‘New Strategic Factors in the North Atlantic’ from 
1977: ‘For the Soviet Union and the United States, as well as for France and Britain, the North 
Atlantic will, for some time to come, remain an area which lends itself for the deployment of 
strategic nuclear forces’.81  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
78
 Miasnikov in Podvig ed., Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, p.240.  
79
 Provided by 333 Squadron RnoAF, Norwegian Armed Forces.  
80
 The SS-N-8 had a range of 7800 km, and the Bastion strategy soon became a reality. By 1975 the missile had 
even been tested launched from the piers.  
81
 Christoph Bertram and Johan Holst eds., New Strategic Factors in the North Atlantic (Oslo, Norway: 
Universitetsforlaget, 1977), p.5.  




            
   
 
 
Chapter 5-D: Gorshkov’s rising navy of the 1960s 
After the dynamic 1960s, the 1970s were a period of more stable challenges for NATO on the 
northern front. The Soviet naval position became more defined. By the 1970s and 1980s, a great 
debate focused on its true purpose; perceptions in the west ranged from the utterly traditional 
perspective of the Soviet naval posture as truly defensive and subordinate to the Army, to those 
who argued that the Soviet Navy was aiming at a superpower’s navy to challenge the United 
States in a true Mahanian style. Neither can be entirely true when looking at its balance and 
history. 
Admiral Gorshkov was in charge of the Soviet Navy for three decades, and as this period saw 
such great changes in terms of technological evolution and a fluctuating Cold War, it is difficult 
to make a simple description of its naval posture. Stalin had a clear vision of an ocean-going 
fleet, but did not truly accomplish it. The late 1950s were exceptional, as Khrushchev tried to cut 
conventional forces, and direct the Navy’s focus towards submarine warfare. The cost of 
building an ocean-going fleet was great. Nevertheless, Brezhnev still supported this investment. 
He also gave the services more freedom to develop strategic thinking and balance its forces. 
Naval spending was questioned more during Andropov’s short time in power, when reports of 
halting the Soviet naval programmes surfaced. Chernenko was more in line with Brezhnev, and 
thus saved the naval programmes of the mid-1980s.82 From 1985 until the end of the Cold war, 
the Soviet Navy’s activities were greatly reduced.83  
In total, the history of the red Soviet Navy shows a remarkably firm understanding of sea power. 
The navy we saw, what we may call ‘Gorshkov’s Navy’, may be characterised as both 
asymmetric and alternative. But it was beautifully balanced for its tasks.  
In the words of Gorshkov:  
 
In the search for the lines of development of our fleet we started not by simply copying 
the fleet of the most powerful maritime power of the world. The composition of the fleet, 
its weapons, ship design and the organisation of its forces were primarily determined by 
the tasks which are set before the armed forces and hence before the fleet by the political 
leadership of the country, its economic potential and the conditions in which the fleet will 
have to solve these tasks.84  
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It was clearly not ‘Mahanian’, and it was clearly not simply defensive. To the extent that we may 
compare it with other navies, the best parallels are to be found within German naval thinking of 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries85, and in the theoretical works of the French 
Admiral, Raoul Castex86 in the 1930s. Donald Mitchell perfectly summed up the Soviet naval 
developments from the Second World War until the 1970s: ‘Between 1945 and 1962 the Soviets 
attempted to achieve seapower. From 1962 to 1972 they attained it’.87 This was clearly a steady 
evolution towards a strong and balanced naval and merchant fleet, only broken by Khrushchev’s 
ideas of an alternative submarine focused fleet from 1957/58-1961/64.  
The navy Gorshkov created rested on four main military capabilities: strategic deterrence 
submarines; balanced sea denial and regional sea control forces and regional force projection 
forces for fighting a maritime war with NATO; and global naval diplomacy forces for times of 
peace and crisis.  
Concluding the Soviet naval build-up 
With the George Washington-class of Polaris submarines, the US had a definitive lead in naval 
strategic forces in the 1960s. This lead lasted up to the mid-1970s. The Soviet Navy’s modern 
SSBN fleet first saw light in 1967 with the Yankee-class. The year was an important milestone 
which was correctly noted by NATO intelligence. The Soviet SSBNs increased gradually from 2 
SSBNs in 1967, to 20 SSBNs in 1970, and then passed the 40 US SSBNs with 55 Soviet SSBNs 
by 1975.88 The Northern Fleet became the dominant home base and operating area for the 
SSBNs. The Soviet naval concept of ‘Bastions’ of SSBNs was well protected by land-based air 
power and a regional focused naval surface fleet. This was a successful concept, and therefore 
encapsulated by the 1970s. It ensured a true second strike capacity, and at the same time did not 
require an expensive build-up of ocean-going surface fleets. The latter issue, which had 
traditionally been a internal Soviet controversy, was thus solved.  
The SSBNs became important for the greater Cold War play, however, it was Soviet sea denial 
forces of attack submarines and strike aircraft there made up the most interesting and prominent 
part of Gorshkov’s war-fighting navy. As he so clearly stated: ‘Today submarines and naval 
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aviation, equipped with the most up-to-date weaponry, in which missiles play a major part, 
constitute the main type of forces of our fleet’.89  
 
The priority given to the development of the submarine forces made it possible in a very 
short time to increase sharply the strike possibilities of our fleet, to form a considerable 
counter-balance to the main force of the fleet of the enemy in the oceanic theatres, and, at 
the cost of fewer resources and less time, to multiply the growth of sea power of our 
country, thereby depriving an enemy of the advantages which could accrue to him in the 
event of war against the Soviet Union….90 
 
This sea denial force was both defensively and offensively oriented. Defensive in the sense that 
it would protect the Soviet coastlines as well as halt American and NATO offensive forces 
(carriers and Polaris submarines) operating in e.g. the Norwegian Sea. Offensive in the sense that 
it would attack and deny NATO the crucial sea lines of communication between North America 
and Europe. NATO was critically dependant on this communication link, and that was obvious 
to both sides. But as so clearly expressed in Gorshkov’s writing, he was occupied with the 
greater position of trade and commerce on the world’s oceans. Oceanic sea power was an 
indispensable tool for all superpowers.  
In addition tot he strategic forces and the sea-denial forces, Admiral Gorshkov created a 
balanced regional sea control force of surface ship, submarines, and aircraft. He realised that 
‘…the imperialist states possess advantageous positions in the World Ocean’.91 The role of 
surface ships in Gorshkov’s mind was still not ‘Mahanian’. For fighting an enemy navy, 
submarines and aircraft were the tools of the Soviet Navy. The roles of surface ships were still 
important. First of all, for diplomacy in peacetime and force projection in wartime: ‘Surface 
ships form the basis of the land disembarking aids and forces of support for landing’. As for 
regional conflicts, the surface ships were important for protecting their own and engaging enemy 
communication lines, as well as for mine-warfare tasks. The final task and that which constituted 
the greatest numbers of warships was that of ASW; for the coastal areas with smaller ships, and 
in the oceanic theatres with the larger warships with independent long-range surface-to-air 
capabilities.92 The Soviet strategic position regarding both air and naval forces, was inclined in 
wartime to protect its close regions, and to protect its SSBNs and deny US and NATO forces 
offensive naval operations. As Eric Grove noted about the surface fleet of the northern waters 
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towards the end of the Cold War; ‘Most intelligence analysts seem to agree that the main role of 
the rest of the Northern Fleet in war is the defence of the Barents and arctic Bastions using 
submarines, aircraft and surface ships’.93  
The Soviet naval forces became more focused on amphibious operations by the mid-1960s, 
requiring regional sea control forces. The Soviet Naval Infantry was re-activated as a force, with 
unusual official publicity, by 1964. Still, this was a limited force compared with the capabilities 
of the US Marines. The Soviet amphibious vessels were great in numbers, but many of these 
forces consisted of short range coastal vessels. Many air-cushion landing vessels were built. The 
larger Alligator-class landing ships started becoming operational by the mid-1960s, and gave a 
greater range than the smaller vessels. Yet, the capacity and numbers were limited and the 
logistical support insufficient for greater operations over any distance. In any case, the Soviet 
Navy never attained an organic air cover capacity to mount greater operations. The MOSCOW-
class ASW ships had good capacity for carrying helicopters, but these could only support limited 
force projection operations. The Soviet naval forces’ capacities to mount larger operations over 
greater distances were clearly limited, even though they had a large number of vessels designed 
for amphibious warfare. Thus, the Soviet naval capacity for force projection must be viewed as 
one of a ‘regional’ reach and purpose only. For instance, the Baltic Sea and its approaches to the 
west were from a Soviet perspective related directly to the northern part of the Central Front. 
This included Denmark and the southern part of the Baltic Sea, the northern part of the Irish Sea, 
the English Channel and the Straits of Kattegat and Skagerak.94  
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Figure 11: European TVDs in Soviet strategy, 1970.95 
 
In the 1950s and early 1960s, the Soviet Baltic Fleet was defensively oriented, and concentrated 
its operations on the eastern parts of the Baltic. By the late 1960s, a more self-conscious Soviet 
Union began to operate in the western parts as well.96 As the main larger surface vessels were 
transferred to the Northern Fleet by the mid-1960s, the amphibious forces were retained. The 
Soviet Baltic Fleet effectively became a close-sea navy. Soviet regional sea control forces were 
designed to control their own shorelines, giving cover for force projection forces supporting the 
Army in land war, and for protecting the evolving bastions of the 1970s. 
The final element of the Soviet was the naval diplomacy surface forces. For Gorshkov military 
forces was all about strategic influence, and strategic reach by naval forces around the globe was 
crucial for the growth of the State.  
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Demonstrative actions by the fleet in many cases have made it possible to achieve 
political ends without resorting to armed struggle, merely by putting on pressure with 
one’s own potential and threatening to start military operations. Thus, the fleet has always 
been an instrument of the policy of states, an important aid to diplomacy in peacetime.97  
 
Before and during the Arab-Israeli War, from June 1967, Soviet naval forces greatly increased 
their presence in the region. The Sixth Fleet was continuously shadowed by intelligence and 
naval ships, and the ports of Egypt and Algeria were frequently visited. The Soviet naval force 
consisted of 31 surface ships and 13 submarines during the most intense periods.98 The Soviet 
naval forces were able to show force to promote their interests, in this case, in support of the 
Arabs. To what extent naval diplomacy bore fruits is hard to judge. However, as Bertram noted 
in a discussion on naval diplomacy in 1977, related to the discussion on the Soviet Navy:  
 
We all know that the silhouettes of warship over the horizon have some kind of effect on 
the coastal observer; but given the complexity of human reactions, and of the reactions of 
human society, it is very difficult to say in advance what exactly the effect will be: 
resigned acceptance, indifference or heightened opposition.99  
 
As a means of diplomacy, the Soviet Union also engaged in building up a merchant fleet. This 
made possible the goal of developing trading partners and supporting friendly governments on a 
global scale. From the early 1950s to the late 1960s; the Soviet merchant navy grew from some 
500 ships to more than 1400 ships and by the late 1960s continuously visited ports around the 
world. This was a modern fleet, and it matched the numbers of the US merchant fleet. Sea power 
for diplomacy, a necessity for any global power, had a prominent position in Admiral 
Gorshkov’s thinking. As noted by Admiral Moorer, US Chief of Naval Operations in 1969:  
 
Sea power, inescapably, derives from the quality and quantity of a nation’s merchant 
marine, shipyards, fishing fleet, and oceanographic enterprise – as well as its combatant 
forces, i.e., the sum of its maritime potential. If we can be said to have demonstrated a 
lack of appreciation for this definition, the Kremlin, on the other hand, seems not only to 
fully appreciate it, but is actively applying it.100  
 
                                                 
97
 Gorshkov, The sea power of the State, pp.247-248.  
98
 Ignatius, ‘The Soviet Navy’ from Vital Speeches of the Day. 
99
 Bertram and Holst eds., New Strategic Factors in the North Atlantic, p.11.  
100
 T.H., Moorer, ‘The Soviet Navy: Our ability to meet the challenge’ from Vital Speeches of the Day (Vol.24, Issue 
24, 01 October 1969).  




            
   
 
 
Admiral Gorshkov stressed the importance of the fleet as an instrument of the policy of the state; 
it was simply the most important aid to diplomacy in peacetime.  
Both military and political studies of Soviet strategy in this period have focused on whether the 
Soviet naval forces were defensive and protective – or offensively oriented. Was the main 
objective of the naval forces to add a layer to the traditional Russian protection of the homeland 
and, later, to their submarine bastions? Or did the Soviets have aspirations to a greater blue-
ocean navy, capable of projecting influence around the world and perhaps finally challenging the 
command of the United States on the world ocean? It is important to notice these two points of 
view regarding the Soviet naval build up.  
The Soviet Navy clearly became an important force at sea by the 1960s, and demonstrated a 
considerable global reach during the 1970s. The rationale behind this expansion has been a 
never-ending question in western debate. Many scholars have stressed the Soviet need for access 
to the high seas. This seems to be a miscalculation, if one thinks of it in terms of challenging the 
US Navy in classic battles. Gorshkov’s navy was focused on an ocean-going fleet. The Soviet 
surface fleet was great, but still definitely inferior to the American and NATO naval forces, so 
that it could not fight a war out at sea in a Mahanian traditional sense. The lack of organic air 
power supports this argument. Its purpose may be said to be dual; that of sea denial and sea 
control operations in defined regions for war-fighting – and for naval diplomacy with its ocean-
going fleet, in times of peace and crisis. 
The aspirations of the Soviet Navy were high by the end of the 1970s. It would be strange if 
political and military leaders, as well as writers and strategists, did not explore this possibility. 
However, the navy has classically had a subordinate position to the army in Soviet and Russian 
thinking, and if you go to sources other than those of naval experts – the homeland, army, and 
the strategic rocket troops do have a more prominent position.  
 
Chapter 5-E: British perception of this rising Soviet naval challenge 
In British politics, the Joint Intelligence Committee (often just referred to as the ‘JIC’) has had a 
central position in evaluating threats. The JIC was charged with giving direction to, as well as 
keeping under review, the organisation and working of intelligence as a whole at home and 
overseas. They set priorities and requirements. A review of the JIC archival files thus gives an 
impression of the intelligence and strategic focus areas for the British political-military decision 
makers of the period.  




            
   
 
 
Already from the late 1950s, Sir Norman Brook and Sir Patrick Dean’s studies were closely 
linked to the JIC studies in the same period, often setting the scene by asking for evaluations. In 
the early 1960s, the areas of focus were largely on: the outlook on the Horn of Africa, the threat 
to Jordan during 1960, the outlook on Yemen, petroleum exploration in North Africa, Soviet 
strategic air plan in the early stages of global war, and indicators of Sino-Soviet Bloc 
preparations for early war. Some other works-at-hand included the communist threat in Malaysia 
and related ANZAM studies, Berlin in Europe and several issues in the Middle East and 
Africa.101 Clearly, the focus was on the global role. As for the home-region, the fear of a sudden, 
devastating and all-out war set the framework. For the first half of the 1960s, there was little 
concern about maritime threats and national home-defence strategy. 
By 1964, a Joint Intelligence Committee ‘Soviet Bloc Study-Group’ was established.102 The 
group was chaired by various representatives of the Foreign Office, and the members of the 
group were experts from the Foreign Office, the three military services (the War Office, the 
Admiralty (initially Mr. A.N. Shores) and the Air Ministry (initially Wing Commander J.D. 
Wilson)), as well as the Security Service and the Joint Intelligence Bureau. The members of the 
group were intended to act as individual experts rather than representatives for their respective 
departments.  
During 1964, two questions were central to this Soviet study-group: the power structures within 
the Soviet Union and the Soviet forces confronting NATO Europe.103 As to the threat to NATO, 
several questions were raised: did recent Soviet military writings (e.g. the Sokolovsky’s book on 
Military Strategy) indicate any significant change in Soviet doctrine? And further about these 
writings, how representative were the writers, and were there any indications of changing views? 
Were there any indications of significant differences of view between the military and civilian 
leaders? And finally, the classic Cold War question; were the Soviet theatre forces in Europe 
basically offensive or defensive?   
On the topic of the Sokolovskiy book, the study-group argued that it represented an attempt to 
synthesise the views that had emerged in the military debate in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It 
was assessed to be intended for middle and junior rank officers. This judgement has recently 
been supported by Ghulam Wardak in ‘The Voroshilov Lectures’, where he states that 
Sokolovskiy’s  book was important reading literature at the Soviet Staff College during his time 
of study. The book was not an official document, and there were internal contradictions within 
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the Armed Forces. However, Sokolovskiy had a prominent position and was representative of the 
prevailing thoughts of the time. The most interesting fact is perhaps that the many doctrinal 
writings of the early 1960s clearly showed that questions of military thought were very much on 
the agenda in the Soviet Union. However, as for content, the writings did not show any change 
of thought regarding the prospect of limited wars. A war would still mean a full scale war.  
The study-group’s conclusion was that the main role of the Soviet forces was that of deterrence, 
but that the armed forces had to be prepared for war should deterrence fail. Thus, a defensive 
grand strategy arose, but with offensive operations of war. The Soviet civil leadership retained 
the main responsibility for the deterrence strategy; while the military was mainly occupied with 
the war-fighting should deterrence fail. This largely showed the division and responsibility of the 
two groups.104  
As for the Joint Intelligence Committee working parties on the questions of implications of the 
policy decisions of 1966-68, and the immediate years after, most are still withheld from public 
disclosure. As only limited parts of the reports are available, it is hardly possible to make any 
conclusion about the analysis made. Still, many of the content lists are available, showing what 
reports and studies were conducted and thus giving a broad picture of which focus was present. 
From these content lists of documents, it is possible to say that the Joint Intelligence Committee 
working-group was still preoccupied with the implications of leaving the East of Suez region. 
The commitments to CENTO and SEATO would be upheld, but without any force declarations. 
There are no references to the Soviet Naval build-up or changes in NATO strategy. 105  
Later, by 1969, the intelligence focus had shifted to a broader view on the world than they had 
for the last decade.106 Northern Ireland had become a great concern and NATO threats were 
more discussed. This included a renewed focus on Soviet developments, as well as the 
Mediterranean region. However, the East of Suez region still figured high. As for intelligence on 
the Soviet forces, Soviet strategic air and rocket forces remained the focus of attention. 
Additionally, the new Soviet satellite reconnaissance capabilities that had been built up in the 
late 1960s were under discussion. 
In 1968, new sub-committees of the Joint Intelligence Committee were created: the JIC (A) was 
to be concerned with external affairs and defence and the JIC (B) became responsible for 
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interdepartmental assessments of overseas economic matters.107 There were also some other sub-
committees. The Committees worked closely, and reported mainly to the Secretary of the 
Cabinet. Questions of a predominant military nature however, were to be reported to the Chiefs 
of Staff first.  
For the period of the 1970s, mainly economic intelligence (JIC (B)) files have been released. 
What may be concluded from these files is that the British kept mainly concerned with the 
traditional trading party countries of their former empire.108 Surprisingly little intelligence work 
on the Soviet Union was conducted. The British were however concerned over Soviet aims to 
threaten Western oil interests in the Middle East. Western Europe was dependant on Middle East 
oil (including Africa) for 82 percent of its supplies. The JIC (B) assessed that the Soviets would 
increase their import of oil from the Middle East.  
Many JIC (A) files are still withheld. The content lists are complete and available, but most 
individual chapters are withheld. What may be extracted from the 1969-1970 indexes is that the 
British were concerned with traditional global issues; i.e. East of Suez, Cyprus, Gibraltar, as well 
as some few military assessment studies on increased Soviet activity in the Indian Ocean and on 
Soviet interests in Africa. None (at least available) related to Soviet naval developments and 
activity in home-regions.109 
By 1971, the first greater studies on Soviet maritime strategy and threats towards the British Isles 
may be found in the JIC (A) series.110 The study ‘Soviet Maritime Strategy’ and ‘Uses of Soviet 
Military Forces Overseas’ were produced in July 1971, while the study ‘Likely scale, nature and 
methods of Soviet attacks on the United Kingdom’ was produced in August. However, it must be 
noted that these were still just a few of many studies. The focus was still of a global scale, 
predominantly against traditional empire countries and regions.  
Again, the full studies remain withheld. However, from the description of the ‘Maritime 
Strategy’ study, including the short abstract ‘main point made in the discussion’, we may detect 
no great concern. There were, for instance, proposed no further studies, but that ‘…the paper 
should be reviewed on a regular basis to take account of changing circumstances’. As for the 
‘threats against the United Kingdom’ study, there was a specific reference to the air- and ballistic 
missile threats.  
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From 1971, we may see a concrete example of the differing view between the American (who 
were more concerned with the Soviet naval build-up) and the British threat evaluations: The US 
forces in Europe had in July 1971 given credence to a threat to the United Kingdom from attack 
by Soviet conventional bombing. These assessments by the Americans were however at variance 
with the British assessment. The issue was decided to be studied in February 1971 by the JIC.111 




The Soviet naval build-up in the 1960s was great. The capabilities and the balance of the Soviet 
Navy and its long-range air force for influence in the Norwegian Sea, and for possible strikes on 
NATO’s Northern Flank, were also undisputed. Still, in the overall picture, these developments 
achieved surprisingly little influence on British foreign and defence policy in the early- and mid-
1960s. As discussed in the next two chapters, the British were fully occupied with traditional 
global interests, mainly with the former imperial countries throughout the 1960s. There was 
some increase in focus on the Soviet forces in home-waters by 1969-1971, however, this was far 
less the case than expected, given the Soviet naval build-up and heightening of activity. Neither 
the Royal Air Force nor the Royal Navy focused much on the new challenges. Thus, the Soviet 
naval build-up did not influence the inter-service rivalry or the policy discussions of the mid-
1960s. However, the Soviet developments proved to have great influence on NATO maritime 
strategy from around 1967, which soon proved to have great influence on Britain’s renewed 
interest in home-waters and Europe, and not least the development of the Royal Navy, and the 
carrier question of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The Royal Navy then saw a role to fill, and 
again conventional forces would prove to be necessary. It was time for a shift away from the 
maritime roles defined by Lord Mountbatten and the Admiralty in the 1950s. In due course, via 
NATO policy and strategic thinking, the Soviet naval build-up also influenced British policy.  
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Chapter 6: NATO strategy changing, and the demand for a new 
maritime posture 
 
Numbers of M.P. [maritime patrol] aircraft are being withdrawn. CVS numbers are 
reduced as are other surface forces. SACLANT faces a gradual erosion both in 
surveillance and in anti-submarine capability and I would note the clear implication 
arising from the Czech crisis that this erosion should be arrested.1 
SACLANT Holmes, 1968 
 
The former chapter explained and discussed the Soviet naval build-up. This chapter focuses on 
the response from NATO and Britain to these challenges. The first part of the chapter reviews 
and discusses the development of the Flexible Response strategy of 1967, NATO’s awakening to 
the first true Soviet SSBN threat, and the establishment of NATO’s maritime 
STANAVFORLANT force. The second part of the chapter discusses how the flanks became 
central in this new strategic thinking and the first steps NATO made to alter its maritime 
strategy. The final part of this chapter discusses British maritime surveillance and ASW 
capabilities. These roles were assessed by NATO and SACLANT to be the greatest challenges in 
the new strategic reality.  
 
Chapter 6-A: NATO’s ‘Flexible Response’ strategy of 1967 
In 1966, 7 March, President de Gaulle wrote to President Johnson stating the French intention to 
cease participation in NATO integrated military commands. Three days later an Aide Memoire 
went out to the other NATO countries proposing to end the assignment of French forces, and the 
removal of the headquarters from French territory.2 The new headquarters in Belgium opened in 
October 1967. This French decision is an important turning point in NATO history, as it is for 
this research on maritime strategy. The year after the French decision of 1966 proved very 
productive for NATO in the areas of strategic debate and change. The concept of a flexible 
strategy, which the Americans had earlier taken in their national policy and which they promoted 
heavily in NATO in 1962-63, was now easily accepted. The work started in 1966, but direct 
guidance was given to the NATO Military Authorities from the Ministers early in 1967. The 
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grand strategy of MC 14/3 ‘Flexible Response’ was prepared during 1967, and Ministers adopted 
the revised strategic concept at their December 1967 meeting – the first major update since 
1956/57.  
Three levels of ‘Flexible Response’ were described: ‘Direct defence’ was about seeking out the 
enemy to defeat him at a conventional level. If the conventional direct defence should fail, the 
plans were to go to the next level of ‘deliberate escalation’. At this level tactical nuclear weapons 
were intended to be used so that the attacker would cease his hostilities and withdraw from 
NATO territory. Should this fail, the last resort was to go to a ‘general nuclear response’.   
For this to be credible, the capabilities NATO required were based on three pillars: First of all 
the assured second-strike retaliatory nuclear capability based on a triad of land, sub-surface, and 
air-launched nuclear weapons. In addition, an acceptance of close control of tactical nuclear 
weapons was needed. The last capability, which also would have great importance regarding the 
High North, noted greatly increased and more mobile conventional forces. The strategy implied 
that NATO needed to prepare for limited incursions.  
The command relationships 
The command relationships concerning the northern flank of NATO are complicated. Several 
actors are involved; SACEUR3 (especially with the Commander-in-Chief Allied Force Northern 
Europe, in Oslo) and SACLANT (Norfolk, US), as well as CINCHAN (Northwood, UK). 
SACEURs Commander in-Chief Allied Force Northern Norway was primarily concerned with 
the Scandinavian approaches during the 1960s. The same goes for CINCHAN, and British 
strategic focus in home waters until the late 1960s. They were mainly focused on the Baltic 
approaches, the southern North Sea and the Channel. During 1966, CINCHAN and the Channel 
Committee lost operational status, and this was transferred to SACLANTs Commander-in-Chief, 
Eastern Atlantic Area4. The Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Atlantic Area was moved to 
Northwood, and has since been led by a British Commander.5 SACLANT was clearly the actor 
who prioritised and worked for the flank to become a central part of NATO’s strategic thinking 
in the mid-1960s.  
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During the 252nd meeting of the Military Committee at the Pentagon in 1967, the Deputy Chief 
of Staff at SACLANT, British Admiral Colbert, argued for the new concepts. The highlights of 
his speech came from a joint SACLANT and CINCHAN paper entitled the ‘Maritime Aspect of 
NATO Strategy’. In his briefing, Admiral Colbert stated: ‘We are hopeful, if not plain optimistic, 
that they will see the virtues of our recommendations for the creation of these two maritime 
forces from over-all NATO perspective. We believe that these forces could play an important 
role in connection with the support of SACEUR in defence of the northern flank as well as 
elsewhere’.6 SACLANT’s threat perspective on Soviet maritime strategy was the driving 
rationale; namely a clear perspective on a Soviet strategic shift ‘towards the use of open seas to 
gain their goal of communist word domination’.7 This included the great build-up of merchant 
and fishing fleets, as well as naval forces. The study was very much based on the growing 
‘strength and capabilities’, and not as much as previously, on the ‘unpredictable variations of 
Soviet intentions’.  
NATO awakening to the SSBN threat 
An additional and very significant development of NATO strategy was an awakening to the 
evolving threat of SSBNs. Submarines with missiles had existed for several years, but the threat 
was, by 1967, for the first time focused in the annual studies of ‘The Soviet Bloc Strength and 
Capabilities.8 The existing SSBNs were assessed to operate within two or three days steaming of 
launch areas off the United States. Many of these submarines were also capable of firing their 
missiles submerged. In addition to the submarines already operational, a new and very capable 
SSBN class was expected to come into service by 1968. This correlated to the Yankee-class, 
which were reported by Soviet sources to be operational by 1967. The SSBNs were concentrated 
with about 60 per cent of the ships to the Northern Fleet.9 
This shift in perception, the SSBNs being finally truly capable of strategic strikes and reckoned 
by NATO as a very significant threat, must be reckoned as one of the main explanations why the 
Northern Flank, with the Soviet Northern Fleet, came to the centre of NATO strategy, and was 
no longer a subordinate theatre as the flank of the Central Front. The general naval and maritime 
Soviet build-up did not receive the same focus (outside SACLANT) within greater NATO 
circles, which focused on the Central Front and strategic deterrence until 1967, by which time 
the Soviet submarines had become an important strategic weapon. By 1968 the NATO Military 
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Committee started to press for the flanks to be a priority. In response, SACLANT made a list of 
his planned priority of contingencies – and the top priority by 1968 was: ‘Support of AFNORTH 
in Northern Norway’.10 
By 1968 the strategic roles of NATO naval forces were summed up in the MC 118 document 
‘Roles and Tasks of Naval Forces and Their Relationship to Other NATO Forces’. The military 
committee report now stated that the overall strategy was derived from NATO’s ‘defensive 
strategy’ in conjunction with the new ‘strategic deployment of the Soviet maritime forces…’.11 
The roles of NATO’s naval forces were defined in the cases of peace, limited aggression, and 
major aggression.  
 
The roles of NATO naval forces in case of peace, limited aggression and major aggression 




To contribute to the overall 
deterrent capability of the Alliance 
by maintaining an overall readiness 
for conventional and nuclear war. 
To demonstrate the unity and 
capability of NATO in order to 
discourage or counter Soviet 
maritime activities aimed at gaining 
influence at the expense of NATO.  
To assist in providing intelligence 
necessary for an assessment of 
Soviet capabilities and intentions.  
To provide a NATO capability in 
periods of tension for quick naval 
reaction as a meaningful politico-
military instrument.  
To maintain the seaborne nuclear 
deterrent. 
To maintain control of the NATO 
sea areas. 
To support other NATO forces, as 
required.  
 
To maintain supremacy in the 
NATO sea areas. 
To conduct operations in support of 
other NATO forces, as required. 
To conduct strategic nuclear strikes, 
as applicable.  
 
Figure 12: The roles of NATO naval forces.12 
 
These roles described in MC 118 were the main focus of NATO naval forces at the end of the 
1960s. The concepts of ‘External Reinforcements for the Flanks’ also became a central part of 
NATO strategy. The military measures became focused on permanent reinforcements by 
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redistribution of SACEUR forces, modernisation of the flank forces, and improvements of 
infrastructure.13  
STANAVFORLANT 
By the end of 1967, the ideas of a new maritime strategic posture had been approved.14 
SACLANT’s follow-up paper on the ‘Concept of Activation and Operation of the Standing 
Naval Force Atlantic’ (from this data known to all naval officers simply by its acronym; 
‘STANAVFORLANT’) was approved with some amendments and sent forward to the Defence 
Planning Committee for final approval. The NATO Ministers met in mid December 1967 in 
Brussels, and approved the activation of STANAVFORLANT.15 The planned implementation 
date was set as 11 January 1968. The force was activated in Portland, England, on January 13 
1968, with ships from the Netherlands, Norway, the UK, and the US. This quick activation date 
was possible, since they planned to use the staff and ships already operational and assigned to 
‘Matchmaker IV’.16 As General De Cumont, the Chairman of the Military Committee, stated: 
‘…the Standing Naval Force is simply Matchmaker made permanent’.17 
The force was planned to consist of 8 destroyer ships, possibly as few as 5-6. In addition, no 
nations were allowed to contribute more than 25% of the ships. This was to be a joint 
international standing force. By the first 6 months, seven nations had contributed; the 
Netherlands, Norway, the UK, and US as the initial four, soon followed by Canada, Germany, 
and Portugal.18  
An additional and parallel study by SACLANT (Admiral Ephraim P. Holmes (US), SACLANT 
from June 1967) focused on ‘NATO Surveillance Requirements’. The findings in this study of 
September 1968 were that NATO surveillance had to shift from national operations and this 
selective and obsolete intelligence data, to increase its focus on multinational measures and the 
dissemination of information from the nations to the major NATO commanders. The study 
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indicated ‘…a requirement for substantial improvements in the NATO Maritime Surveillance 
effort…’.19   
 
Chapter 6-B: ‘External Reinforcements of the Flanks’ 
The SACLANT20 staff  and the Military Committee work on standing forces and contingency 
forces went on from 1967-69. In parallel, the Defence Planning Working Group (DPWG) 
worked on plans for ‘quick reaction forces’ and studies of ‘reinforcement of the flanks’. These 
concepts must be seen in conjunction with each other, even though there were great rivalries and 
criticism between the MC and DPWG in this period. As noted by SACLANT in the MC; ‘As 
you know, SACLANT strongly supported the Military Committee in the position that any study 
on this subject is rightfully the province of the military authorities and not the DPWG’.21 Still, 
the DPWG studies of reinforcement of the flanks came to the Military Committee’s table in due 
time. The name of the concept became ‘External Reinforcements of the Flanks’, and the Military 
Committee was supposed to complete the study and make recommendations to the DPC before 
this was forwarded to the Ministers.22 This was a complex study, dealing with everything from 
force requirements and composition, to issues of transportation, local infrastructure, logistical 
support, communication, and the principles of cost-sharing.23 In addition, SACEUR and the 
flank nations agreed that the defensive problems of the Southern and Northern Flanks were so 
different, that they should no longer be referred to as ‘the flanks’ – but as the ‘Northern Flank’ 
and the ‘Southern Flank’.24  
The ‘External Reinforcements of the Flanks’ study contained four operational elements; the 
Allied Mobile Force (AMF), the Standing Naval Force, the Quick Reacting Mobile Force 
(QRMF) and the Maritime Contingency Force. These four elements were then divided into two 
sets of forces: the Immediate Reaction Force (the AMF and the Standing Naval force), and the 
Reinforcement Forces (the QRMF and the Maritime Contingency Force).  
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The concept of Standing Naval Forces was a success, while the concept of Maritime 
Contingency Forces (known by the acronym ‘MARCONFORLANT’) met objections. The 
concept was ‘…in essence a planning concept for forces which would be called upon in periods 
of tension’.25 The British national Chief of the Defence Staff, Sir Charles Elworthy supported the 
concept, but had some concerns and felt that the forces should be used for the NATO area only.26  
The concepts of Immediate Reaction Forces and Reinforcement Forces were successful, and the 
principles have continued up to the present day.  
From the ‘tactical northern flank’ to the strategic ‘Northern Flank’ 
When discussing the ‘flanks’, it is important to note the terminology. Within the studies on 
‘maritime strategy’ of 1967 (starting with the 1965 SACLANT study on Maritime Strategy) and 
‘Reinforcement of the Flanks’, the terminology ‘Northern Flank’ shifted geographically from the 
Baltic Sea and strait, to the High North. Prior to 1965 the Baltic Sea was clearly the more 
important of the two areas in northern Europe. But this was about to change.  
The flanks were defined by the DPC of 14 July 1966 as:27 The northern region, with the critical 
areas being Finnmark-Troms and the Baltic Straits. The south-eastern region, with critical areas 
being northern Greece, Turkish Thrace, the Straits and eastern Turkey. During a SACLANT 
presentation and following discussion on Maritime Strategy in 196728, it was stated, with regard 
to the Baltic Sea, that this now was ‘very much a place where national forces [German and 
Danish] were located’ and should operate. The term Northern Flank clearly changed its meaning 
between 1965 and 1967. Prior to this the north flank had been a ‘tactical flank to the Central 
Front’ – while by the mid-1960s and onwards – the Northern Flank became a new theatre in its 
own right. This was chiefly due to the awakening to the SSBNs build-up in the High North.  
The ‘Brosio Study’ 
SACLANT’s work for a new maritime strategic posture and focus on the Soviet maritime build-
up bore fruit. The Secretary General, Brosio, supported his views on the maritime threat and 
strategy and asked for a continuation of the SACLANT study on ‘NATO and Soviet Bloc 
Maritime Capabilities and Strategies’. He also asked for two main questions to be answered; the 
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relative strength of NATO and Soviet maritime forces world-wide and the respective maritime 
strategic doctrines of NATO and the Soviet Union.29  
The study known as the ‘Brosio Study’ of 1969 was conducted entirely by SACLANT, but he 
named it after Brosio. As Admiral Holmes30, who had taken over as SACLANT in 1967, 
introduced his statement on the study for the Military Committee in a Chiefs of Staff session, 
November 1968: ‘…in my Headquarters we refer to this study as the “Brosio Study” because the 
idea originally stimulated from the Secretary General’.31 The highlights of the ‘NATO and 
Soviet Bloc Maritime Capabilities and Strategies’ study were first briefed by SACLANT for the 
Military Committee in May 1968, also after recommendations by Brosio.32 The ‘Brosio Study’ 
was controversial at the time – and today we can see that the study was the final important 
turning point regarding NATO’s maritime strategy and perspective of the high Northern Flank, a 
gradual evolution from SACLANT’s study on ‘Maritime Strategy’ from 1965. Towards the end 
of the ‘Brosio Study’, the final three-volume document was forwarded to the Military Committee 
by March 1969, classified as Cosmic Top Secret - with a limited distribution.33  
The (interim) report on the study by May 1968 focused on two main issues: first, the relative 
strength of the maritime forces of the two sides, and second; an analysis of the maritime strategic 
doctrine of the Soviets and the NATO countries.34 SACLANT was occupied with the 
increasingly global focus of the Soviet Navy, proved (according to SACLANT) by the steady 
increase in Soviet global maritime operations, from the Norwegian waters, the Mid-Atlantic, the 
Mediterranean, around Africa, and even in the eastern hemisphere. He also made references to 
the writings of Gorshkov.35 The perception of a strong Soviet naval build-up grew so strong, that 
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by the autumn of 1968, SACLANT, as well as many other national representatives, wanted to 
‘bring this out to the public’.36  
There were two additional factors influencing NATO strategy and force planning by 1968; 
namely the implications of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the general trend of 
détente and force build-down in central Europe. As for détente, the American December 1967 
announcement, pulling back some 35,000 US soldiers and airmen, from April 1968, made a great 
stir in European debates on defence policy. The invasion of Czechoslovakia was the main issue 
during the November 1968 meeting of the Military Committee. During this meeting, Admiral 
Holmes highlighted the need to recognise a significant reduction in the warning time available to 
NATO naval forces as well as to land and air forces.37 SACLANT saw this as a clear argument 
for his study regarding a radically increased maritime surveillance capability, as well as better 
co-ordination of surveillance within NATO. SACLANT was very clear about the critical status 
of NATO naval capabilities facing the Soviet naval build-up:  
 
Numbers of M.P. aircraft are being withdrawn. CVS numbers are reduced as are other 
surface forces. SACLANT faces a gradual erosion both in surveillance and in anti-
submarine capability and I would note the clear implication arising from the Czech crisis 
that this erosion should be arrested.38  
 
SACLANT followed up on the issue of anti-submarine decline; ‘ASW forces are minimal, to say 
the least; and that further reduction can be viewed only with apprehension, since such reductions 
are occurring at a time when Soviet maritime forces are increasing’.  Following these statements, 
he brought the focus onto his on-going radical comparative study of NATO and Warsaw Pact 
strategies and capabilities; ‘NATO and Soviet Bloc Maritime Capabilities and Strategies’. 
The first ideas of the ‘Brosio Study’ were presented to the Military Committee in May 1968. By 
late 1968 the study-group of American, Canadian, German, Italian, and British officers – as well 
as SACLANT’s staff – had divided the study into four main parts.39  
 
• The first part dealt with the political and economic background of the maritime strategy 
of the two sides, including a comparison.  
• The second part was the strategy paper from which the comparison of results was drawn.  
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• The third part discussed the maritime capabilities of both sides in a functional and 
geographical framework.  
• The fourth and final part was a computerised operational analysis which attempted to 
assess some of the maritime interactions between NATO and Warsaw Pact capabilities 
that could be met in 1977. This analysis included carrier and anti-carrier operations, anti-
submarine warfare barrier operations, protection and attrition of sea lines of 
communications, and afloat support.  
 
A final draft of the study was ready shortly after this status report by SACLANT, though the 
content of the still classified original document is not expected to differ much. The final version 
of the ‘Brosio Study’ was forwarded by March 1969 to the Military Committee40, and in due 
time the study was approved by the Ministers and the Secretary General. It was then issued in 
three volumes.  
The Brosio Study volumes:41 
 
• Volume I contained a summary of the report. 
• Volume II provided a comparison of strategies and capabilities.  This volume continued 
collected data on virtually every aspect of the maritime activities of NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact.  
• Volume III was the operational analysis based on one main scenario for military 
comparison of the two sides; a maritime war against the Soviet Northern Fleet in and 
around the Norwegian Sea as support to the northern flank of NATO.42  
 
From a presentation on the study during the 44th meeting of the Military Committee in Chiefs of 
Staff session, 6 May 1969, some months after submission of the study, it is clear that the content 
did not change substantially. SACLANT commented:  
 
In summary, SACLANT endorses this study to the Military Committee as a good first 
step. It states that there is little, if any, time left for NATO to improve its Maritime 
Forces, particularly in ASW, if NATO maritime freedom is to be maintained. To view 
this study in any other way would be to misread it completely.43 
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SACLANT underlined two main findings from the greater political-economic discussion:  
 
The results of the political-economic section indicates that the Soviets are embarked on a 
global maritime strategy stemming, first, from a realisation that the Alliance has 
successfully contained the spread of communist influence in Europe, and hence, they are 
looking elsewhere and; Second, from their realisation from being thwarted in Cuba in 
1962 that such ventures cannot succeed without adequate naval capability.44  
 
SACLANT made it clear after the study was submitted that Soviet maritime strategy was clearly 
global!45 SACLANT concluded from this that NATO’s maritime strategy should be broad, 
maintaining a continuing global knowledge of Soviet capabilities and patterns of operations.   
The results of the analytic studies of maritime interaction tended to vary, but some findings were 
clear:46 
 
• NATO attack carriers had to operate together for maximum survivability.  
• An air-to-surface missile attack was the greatest threat to naval survivability in the 
Norwegian Sea. (From this we se the origin of the strong focus on NATO interceptor 
aircraft operating from bases in northern Norway to stop the Soviet bomber aircraft from 
breaking out into the Norwegian Sea).  
• NATO should concentrate on ASW barriers to contain Soviet submarine egress to the 
Atlantic. (Particularly in the decade ahead when Soviet submarine forces might consist of 
increasing numbers of nuclear submarines). 
• There were significant deficiencies in NATO ASW forces which would become 
relatively greater if corrective action was not taken.  
 
The ‘Brosio Study’ concluded that a four attack carrier (CVA) task force, operating in this high 
threat of Soviet aircraft with air-to-surface missiles, would be able to operate indefinitely and 
exact a heavy toll on the attackers. If the Soviet Navy brought submarines into the scenario in 
addition to the aircraft, the four CVA task force would be able to operate for up to 27 days with a 
survivability of more than 50%. It was judged impossible to operate with a single CVA force. 
This was regarded as a good survivability for carrier forces. The greatest problem was assessed 
to be the lack of NATO ASW forces and escorts. Up to 1500 merchant ships were, in 1977, 
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expected to be lost during the first year of a war.47 For a few years during the late 1970s, both 
NATO and American perceptions of the balance of east versus west maritime forces in and 
around the Norwegian Sea led to less activity in the area. From about 1980 this escalated, and 
with the evolving US maritime strategy of Lehman and Reagan, American carriers were again 
seen off the Norwegian coast. This scenario of the ‘Norwegian Sea Battlefront’ following the 
‘Brosio Study’ greatly coloured NATO’s perceptions of maritime threats during the early and 
mid-1970s; its context is remarkably similar to the famous US maritime strategy and NATO 
maritime and flank posture of the 1980s.  
NATO maritime strategy changed during the period 1965-69. The 1965 study on maritime 
strategy by SACLANT was the first influential step. Although not initially recognised, this study 
was referred back to during the greater 1967 discussions of a new strategic posture. NATO, with 
the central leadership, did not awaken to the greatly increased Soviet naval threat until 1967. The 
final stage in this shift towards a more maritime focus in NATO strategy and a focus on the 
flanks became clear in the ‘Brosio Study’ of 1969. By the early 1970s, the changes materialised 
in new strategies and a new balance of forces. 
 
Chapter 6-C: The British maritime surveillance and ASW forces 
As we have seen, SACLANT had been greatly concerned over Soviet naval developments from 
the mid 1960s. From this general concern, NATO’s poor maritime surveillance and ASW 
capabilities were of most consequence. This last part of the chapter therefore discusses the status 
of British forces, and especially the contribution they had in relation to the Soviet naval threat.  
Maritime Surveillance 
Information collection by continuous surveillance and tactical reconnaissance, followed by 
effective management of the data, is essential for all military actions. Various British aircraft 
were used to collect information on potentially hostile forces operating below, at or above the 
ocean surface. Some aircraft, often fighter types, were focused on the tactical reconnaissance of 
enemy forces, some for long endurance general surveillance, while others were more specialised 
for the collection of enemy electronic, communication, and acoustic signatures.48  
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As for the role of continuous maritime surveillance, the long range and endurance aircraft were 
the main assets. By the late 1960s, NATO and SACLANT focused much on this and the British 
had to take their share of the surveillance of the Soviet naval forces that moved out of their home 
areas of the Barents Sea. The Shackleton aircraft, introduced in the early 1950s, was the 
principal patrol aircraft for surveillance and long-range reconnaissance. The Shackleton was the 
first aircraft built for this role and for Coastal Command. By a 1950s standard, the aircraft had a 
reasonably good surface search radar with all-around coverage introduced with the Mk.2, as well 
as ESM equipment and active and passive sonobuoy systems. However, the greatest attribute of 
the Shackleton was its range and endurance capabilities. On one occasion one of the aircraft 
reached a point 300 miles off New York to meet a cruiser carrying Sir Winston Churchill, before 
returning.49 Still, by the 1960s the Shackleton was already obsolete in several aspects. For the 
role of surveillance and reconnaissance, its range and endurance was a great attribute, but as 
radar technology improved, it became clear that the AVS-21 radar system performed poorly. The 
ASV-21 radar had a detection range of about 40 NM on fishing trawlers and smaller naval 
vessels.50 The Shackletons were the main asset for surface surveillance, but they often worked 
closely with other forces.  
The V-force of Bomber Command is not often mentioned in cases of maritime warfare, but 
contributed to maritime surveillance and reconnaissance roles (as well as in the strike role). The 
Victor PR aircraft had a good surface radar system with ranges of 100 NM detection-range on 
naval ships. The speed and sensor attributes of the Victors, added to the speed and radar 
limitations of the Shackleton, was the rationale behind the Victor-Shackleton co-operation for 
surveillance and reconnaissance of the Norwegian Sea.51 Three Victors were to fly racetracks at 
optimum radar-coverage height and report the surface picture to the six Shackletons which 
would stay at low level and identify all the contacts reported. These were time-consuming 
operations. Up to 150 ships could be within a radius of only 30 NM in the Norwegian Sea, and 
all ships had to be positively identified. Reconnaissance of British waters and the Norwegian Sea 
was a priority for Coastal Command, especially for identifying the large numbers of Soviet 
intelligence ships. These could be small naval-like ships, but were often trawlers and merchant 
ships with intelligence equipment.52 In the first half of the 1960s there were increasing numbers 
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of merchant, fishery, and research ships which offensively monitored British and NATO ports 
and naval operating areas.53  
 
Victor and Shackleton combined operations for maritime surveillance and reconnaissance 
 
 
Figure 13: Victor and Shackleton combined operations.54 
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The Shackletons were the backbone of Coastal Command’s surveillance and long-range 
reconnaissance capability throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Still, by design it was an old aircraft. 
Technical problems haunted it - and by the early 1960s a modern replacement was needed. This 
must be seen in relation to the introduction of the P3 Orion during the late 1950s, which set new 
standards for long-range maritime patrol aircraft. Four aircraft were evaluated as the 
Shackleton’s replacement: The modern P3 Orion and Dassault Atlantic, as well as two British 
designs based on commercial aircraft. There are some interesting notes from the project in 
NAUK DEFE 25/15.55 A note stated about the Orion: ‘… cheapest, but politically impossible to 
buy American…’, and regarding the Dassult Atlantic: ‘… Air Force Departments preference and 
cheapest after Orion, but politically difficult to buy French’. By 1965, Ministers agreed to go for 
a Comet variant.56 The jet aircraft Nimrod, based on the Comet, finally relieved the Shackletons 
in the period 1969-71 for traditional maritime reconnaissance roles.   
Maritime air forces for ASW  
An important aspect of maritime surveillance and intelligence is the collection of acoustic 
information. This became very important from the 1950s onward, by which time the SOSUS 
systems had become operational. From the early 1960s, an ASW triad of maritime surveillance 
aircraft, hunter submarines, and underwater passive acoustic surveillance systems were 
developed. Such long-range surveillance systems, as the SOSUS, were crucially dependent on 
good recognition data, positively matched to the true source by e.g. friendly aircraft.  
For the acoustic collection and intelligence, the British only had the Shackleton aircraft which 
had poor collection-capability on acoustics. The Shackletons were equipped with a 16 channel 
sonic system. The system could only display two sonobuoys, active or passive, at any one time. 
This was not a LOFAR57 system, but a system that looked for cavitation noise of the propellers.58  
ASW was the core focus of much of the Cold War, both for organic aircraft of the FAA and the 
land-based long-range aircraft of RAF Coastal Command. From the early 1950s until the late 
1970s, both submarines and ASW developed rapidly.  
The Shackletons stayed the main ASW asset of Coastal Command throughout the 1950s and 
1960s. To counter the Soviet submarine fleet build-up, especially the nuclear submarines, the 
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sonobuoy became the main sensor. The British had passive buoys, which searched for the 
propeller-noise of the Soviet submarines, as well as active buoys. In addition, the Shackleton 
used its ASV-21 search-radar and S- and X-band ECM equipment in ASW. 59 The Shackleton 
also had a diesel fume detection system called Utolycus, and an early magnetic system (MAD) to 
look for submarines. The ASV radar was not effective for detecting submarines operating at 
periscope depth. This was very rare.60 The APS-20 radar of the Fairey Gannet was actually much 
more capable of detecting small targets, and could even detect a periscope on occasions. The 
limitation of the ASV radar is also demonstrated by the need to develop a smoke detector system 
for finding nearby submarines at periscope depth charging their batteries by operating diesel 
engines. The MAD system of the Shackletons never worked properly, and was abandoned by the 
late 1950s. The sonar system consisted of the T9003 directional passive sonobuoy and the 
T11514 directional active sonobuoy. The system was known as the Mk1c Sonar System. As for 
the capabilities of the system, it was assumed to have a passive detection range of about 1000 
yards per knot of submarine speed above cavitation speed. For example: The Soviet Foxtrot-
class could have a cavitation speed of 6 knots. If the Foxtrot were transiting at a speed of 11 
knots, this would give a detection range of 5,000y per sonobuoy. For the active sonobuoys, they 
used 3 frequencies between 20.4 to 23.0khz, and had detection ranges of about 2-3000 yards.61 
However, up to the late 1960s, the active buoy-indicating equipment could not display contacts 
beyond 2000 yards.62   
The buoys used by the British were large – 5 feet long and 9 inches in diameter, weighing about 
80 lbs. They had to be carried in the aircraft's bomb bay, and consequently took up space 
intended for the torpedoes and depth charges. The Shackleton could not carry any large number 
of buoys. In any case, the operators could only display two buoys in the Mk1c system 
simultaneously. The Mk1c sonar system never gave the British ASW forces any capability to 
search larger areas.  
A British analysis report of the Shackleton trials in the mid-1960s gave the acoustic system, its 
radar and navigational, and weapon system a poor appraisal.63 Regarding the radar, submarine 
contacts could at best be detected at some 6-12 miles. These were the test ranges used. Even 
then, the navigational system was so poor that it normally had offsets of about 600-900 yards. 
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With the Mk30 passive homing torpedo, which had to be dropped within 900 yards of the target, 
and the Mk44 active homing torpedo that only had an acquisition range of about 400 yards – a  
disappearing radar contact (DRC) under attack was seldom killed. The crew had to drop buoys to 
relocate the submarine. Single buoys gave a poor detection percentage, so patterns of buoys had 
to be used. Tactical sonobuoy-patterns called P-A-P64 and PA-PA65 were used in the 1960s. The 
relatively poor kill rate by air, submarine, and surface forces in submarine hunts, as well as the 
acceptance that tactical nuclear weapons would be used – led the British forces to buy the AS-
1200 nuclear depth bomb for the Shackletons by the late 1960s.66 
The British were years behind the developments of the US and Canadian ‘Julie’ and ‘Jezebel’ 
sonar systems. The Julie-system was an early multi-static system of explosive echo ranging 
(EER67), and was designed to give long active sonar ranges in deep water. The passive Jezebel 
system comprised the CODAR (Correlated Detection And Ranging) and the LOFAR (Low 
Frequency Analysis and Recording) systems. The CODAR system was the pairing of 
information from two buoys, where the incoming signal was correlated to provide bearings to the 
sound-source. The LOFAR-system enabled the operators to analyse the acoustics in a wide 
frequency spectre for the recognition of submarines, even down to ‘fingerprints’ of single 
submarines. This became very important for the Cold War ASW game, especially when the 
nuclear submarines came into service. Tests in 1959 proved some 30 NM range for LOFAR, and 
20 NM for CODAR against British and US submarines.68 These capable systems first came to 
British forces with the Nimrod by the early 1970s.69  
The Shackleton had served well, but its flaws were too great, and the new standards set by the P3 
Orion made its replacement inevitable. Even in 1960, just after re-modernisation, the Shackleton 
was assessed as inadequate.70 By the mid 1960s, the Shackletons became haunted by fatigue 
problems, and aircraft had to be progressively withdrawn from squadrons to be reconditioned.71 
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The Nimrod replaced the Shackleton by 1969-70 as previously described. This gave British 
forces a great step forward – not at least for ASW.  
As for organic ASW aircraft, the Royal Navy got its first operational aircraft capable of 
combining search and attack roles in one single aircraft in 1955 with the Fairey Gannet. The 
Fairey Gannet had one pilot, one tactical observer and one aircrew. The aircraft were capable of 
carrying two Mk30 passive homing torpedoes, as well as bombs, depth charges, and rockets. The 
ASW aircraft were retired in 1960, as the naval helicopters proved effective. The Whirlwind 
helicopters were operational by 1960, and soon followed by the Wessex in 1961. These first 
organic helicopters were used in a range of missions. The Whirlwind had in addition to the ASW 
role (search or attack), the capability of surface reconnaissance, commando assault, search and 
rescue, and logistic support. The Whirlwinds were delivered in two main configurations, the 
HAR72 and the HAS.73 The HAS.7 being the main ASW helicopters, with a crew of three. The 
HAS.7 ASW helicopter had provision for only one MK30 passive homing torpedo. When 
carrying a torpedo it was not possible to operate the dipping sonar. This required the helicopters 
to operate in pairs for search and attack. The Whirlwind HAS.7s replaced the Gannet ASW 
aircraft from 1957 onward but suffered from technical problems. From the early 1960s it was 
already an obsolete helicopter design, soon replaced by the more modern Wessex, first the 
Westland Wessex HAS.1 utility batch, later followed by the more specialised, but somewhat 
unsuccessful HAS.3 ASW helicopter. The HAS.1 were equipped with the T.194 dipper sonar 
and carried the active Mk44, and, by the late 1960s, the more modern Mk46 torpedoes. It also 
carried Mk11 depth charges. The Wessex was the first British helicopter capable of night and all 
weather dipping operations – which were crucial necessities if the helicopters were to operate in 
the northern areas between Britain and the Soviet naval forces during winter-time. This was also 
a great step forward for all night-time and poor weather operations around the world. Due to the 
HAS.1’s problems with endurance, it had to be used in either a search-role or an attack-role.74 
The T.194 sonar normally had a 3000-yard detection range,75 and with no torpedoes loaded, the 
Wessex was able to cover up to 140sq.miles76. The later HAS.3, operational by 1966, was 
unsuccessful due to technical problems, but the HAS.3 helicopter introduced a new era of 
capacities with the integrated search radar.  
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The light helicopter Westland Wasp also had an ASW role, for which it carried the passive Mk30 
torpedo and later the active Mk44, as well as Mk11 depth charges. It did not have any search 
sensors, and was tactically operated as an attack unit, which delivered weapons on targeting 
directions from other units (another dipper helicopter or surface ship contacts). The arrival of the 
Wasp proved important, and since, light-medium helicopters have subsequently constituted an 
integrated part of all types of naval ships. 
The introduction of the helicopter was an important event in modern naval history. Multi-role 
capabilities and particularly the ASW dipping sonar system proved so effective, that many 
nations started building a new class of ships – the helicopter ASW carriers.77  
The Shackleton’s ASW capabilities were poor compared with American technology, as well as 
against the threat posed. However, the British were still capable of ASW due to a reasonably 
high number of aircraft. There were also operational and tactical concepts for air-sub co-
operation procedures, but the slow production pace of British nuclear hunter-killer submarines 
made these forces incapable of matching the growing numbers of Soviet nuclear submarines. 
Conventional British submarines were not able to match them in terms of speed, range or 
underwater performance.78  
The one positive development was the introduction of the dipping sonar, which considerably 
improved the traditionally defensive convoying system. Helicopters must be reckoned as one of 
the great technological inventions of maritime air power in this era. It enhanced everything from 
short-range ASW to effective control of shipping in defined areas, with its reconnaissance 
capabilities. The helicopters were first employed on existing carriers, but soon became available 
to smaller surface ships. Still, the helicopter saw many challenges in these early years – so the 
effect of helicopter ASW is hard to evaluate for this period.  
In the greater picture, the large numbers of Soviet submarines, nuclear powered and with missile 
capabilities, and the poor status of British ASW search and attack systems, made this a time of 
crisis for NATO and British ASW forces. 
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Chapter conclusion  
Up to the decision of 1966 to abandon the carrier forces, the rationale for carriers had rested 
entirely with the limited war scenario and military diplomatic influence East of Suez. This was a 
heritage we may trace back to Lord Mountbatten’s time as First Sea Lord in 1956, and his line of 
arguments in the military studies that made the foundation of the famous Sandys’s Defence 
Review of 1957. The Royal Navy had problems shifting from this line of thought. Even though 
the 1968 Defence White Paper argued for the NATO missions and the threat posed by the Soviet 
Navy, the carrier advocates still did little to take up the former decision made for the phasing out 
of the carriers by 1972, this even as SACLANT in 1968-69 publicly argued that the Royal Navy 
needed to keep the carriers manned, and that even NATO should consider paying for the carriers. 
They were absolutely needed in the North Atlantic.79 However, the Royal Navy did little to use 
this new NATO concern with the Soviet naval threat and focus on maritime strategy. Even the 
Treasury, as the department that argued for an abolishment of the carriers, expressed surprise 
over this.80 In fact, the Royal Navy had been extraordinarily quiet regarding the entire carrier 
issue since the cancellation of CVA-01. Some of this may be explained by the fact that the top 
leadership, especially Chief of the Naval Staff Varyl Begg (1966-68) had never been a carrier 
advocate. During his time as Vice Chief of the Naval Staff in the early 1960s, he had de facto 
been one of the few who expressed doubts about the entire validity of the carrier task force 
concept.81  
Since the land-based air power won the inter-service rivalry and political battle in 1966, the next 
couple of years were promising for the RAF. The development of the Harrier was well 
underway. The F.111 was ordered, and a number of the V-bombers were planned to serve as 
tactical strike aircraft. The Nimrod was soon to become operational. This successful story was 
the same for the transport fleet of aircraft. As the planned date for ending the carriers 
approached, the last existing naval Buccaneer and Phantom aircraft were also to be transferred to 
the RAF.  
Even though the British had focused surprisingly little on the Soviet naval build-up in the 
politically critical and demanding mid-1960s, the Soviet Navy’s developments happened, and 
clearly influenced NATO maritime strategy in the latter half of the 1960s. The Flexible Response 
strategy of 1967, NATO’s awakening to the first true Soviet SSBN threat, and the establishment 
of NATO’s maritime STANAVFORLANT force became important for British defence policy. It 
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also greatly influenced the restructuring of the Royal Navy and the carrier issue as they entered 
the 1970s. The surprising finding is that the Royal Navy was not a prominent actor in this 
restructuring. Indirectly, and in time, it proved that this Soviet naval build-up discussed in the 
previous chapter and the consequential NATO developments discussed in this chapter had great 
bearing on the future of the Royal Navy. Aircraft carriers became important once again, and 
maritime surveillance and ASW became prioritised roles. All these three issues were much in 
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Chapter 7: The British heading home, 1968-72 
 
Britain’s basic security continues to depend on the strength of the North Atlantic 
Alliance and it is NATO that by far the greater part of Britain’s military forces is 
committed. But the first of the Government’s objectives recognises that British 
interests and responsibilities are not confined to the NATO area. Britain’s political 
and trading interests are world-wide and they can flourish only in stable 
conditions.1 
Defence White Paper, 1971  
  
The retreat from East of Suez came as a result of financial problems in Britain, but was also just 
in time for NATO’s changing strategic thinking that resulted from the Soviet naval build-up. The 
Soviet naval build up had surprisingly little influence on the decision to cancel the CVA-01, and 
even for withdrawing from the East of Suez commitments. However, the Soviet naval build- up 
soon made the justification for the re-balancing of the maritime forces, including both the Royal 
Navy and the maritime elements of the RAF.  
This final chapter of the dissertation reviews the British retreat and the consequences it had for 
maritime air forces, both carrier forces and land-based aircraft. The first part of the chapter starts 
out by discussing the 1968 Defence White Paper, which announced a more hasty retreat than 
previously planned. First the British withdrew to the Mediterranean to meet the many challenges 
in that region in the mid-and late 1960s. Thereafter there was focus on the High North, where the 
Soviet Northern Fleet had grown to become the greatest Soviet fleet. The second part of the 
chapter reviews the fate of the carriers in their new scenario, and briefly discusses the carrier 
fleet of the 1970s. The third part of the chapter reviews the fate of the land-based option that had 
been chosen. The two last parts of this final chapter discuss how British maritime strategy 
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Chapter 7-A: A hasty retreat from East of Suez 
The 1968 Defence White Paper  
The ending of the ‘Confrontation’ in August 1966, after a signed agreement between Indonesia 
and Malaysia, further made the case for a British withdrawal from the region. However, as the 
1967 Defence White Paper stated: ‘It is too early to make firm assumptions about the political 
pattern of South East Asia…’.2  
The Defence White Paper of 1967 did not in reality alter much of the planned structures and 
defence policy of the 1966 Defence Review. However, an adjustment came with the 
Supplementary Defence White Paper of July 1967. In particular, forces in the Far East were now 
to be greatly reduced.3 Several major developments of 1967 determined this change: the 
evolution of the Government’s policy towards Europe, the changing NATO strategy, the Middle 
East Crisis and the ending of the ‘Confrontation’. In addition, the strain on the British economy 
had even become more severe, and this also demanded an increased reduction of overseas 
expenditure.  
According to Dockrill, the 1967 Supplementary Defence White Paper represented the Wilson 
Government’s first real admission that financial and political realities ‘…had made the sacrifice 
of the major part of Britain’s responsibilities East of Suez inevitable’.4  
It was not only the overseas forces there were to be pulled back, one brigade of BAOR and one 
squadron of RAF Germany were also to be withdrawn. The argument was that an attack by the 
Soviet Union was unlikely and, if so, an ample warning would be given. However, it was a 
financially driven decision.  
More drastic measures would soon follow. The Cabinet discussed the need for a hasty retreat 
from the East of Suez region throughout the winter-months of 1967-68. There was a broad 
consensus within the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, including the Prime Minister.5 
The Defence White Paper of February 1968 went much further than the 1966 Defence Review 
and the Defence White Papers of 1967 in its attempt to stay within a £ 2,000 million cash limit.6 
By 1968, the Government had carried out a broad review of all aspects of government spending 
in its attempt to get this under control. Among many other posts, the defence budget was, as a 
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direct result of the devaluation, further cut by some £210-260 million from the £2,000 million 
target for the 1970s.7 After the 1967 devaluation many more difficult decisions had to be made. 
The 1968 Defence Review now proposed a serious cut in tasks for the Armed Forces, and an 
accelerated withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia as well as from the Persian Gulf. They 
were all to be completed by 1971. The East of Suez withdrawal, which had been a political issue 
since 1965, was now to become a reality, and earlier than previously expected. The focus for all 
British military forces would be Europe and the North Atlantic area.  
With the release of the 1968 Defence White Paper, a hasty retreat had been announced. The 
wording used in the White Paper clearly bears witness to a nation in distress. The economic state 
of the country had come to such a poor state, that the politicians sought extreme measures. The 
White Paper succinctly stated:8 ‘No special capability for use outside Europe will be maintained 
when our withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia, and the Persian Gulf, is complete’. The 
White Paper further specified that the UK would keep some capability to deploy overseas, for 
use in operations in support of the United Nations. It was a policy of isolation and the 
consequences of such a radical strategic shift were not yet clear. A few months later, the 
Supplementary Statement followed up on this change in policy, and made it clear that the 
security of the country lay ‘fundamentally in Europe’ and had to ‘be based on the North Atlantic 
Alliance’.9 Sokolsky has a very good summary of the British shift in strategic focus: ‘The 
establishment of the NATO command structure and the development of seapower directed 
towards the defence of the north Atlantic region coincided with the retreat of British seapower 
from its global position’.10  
It did coincide, but the gradual changing NATO strategies and the rise of the Soviet Navy in 
home-waters also had a gradual and indirect effect on British strategists and politicians, and thus 
made the economically motivated rationale seem reasonable.   
The Royal Navy had to leave its global role and concentrate on its home-region. However, the 
memory of great times and a lingering desire to return as a major and global power still 
persisted. As Rear Admiral Lewin expressed it:  
 
I hope that in the future the navy will have an opportunity to range the oceans and seas of 
the world… One of the most important parts which we have played in NATO is to 
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persuade the Europeans that there are important countries and important things going on 
in the world outside Europe.11 
 
As Geoffrey Till noted, even though the East of Suez role had attracted the most focus during the 
1960s, European security had still been the top priority even before the dramatic decision of 
1968 to end Britain’s permanent presence in its former empire.12 This statement may easily be 
defended; of course home defence role had top priority. It is however striking that all the great 
procurement programmes during the 1960s rested their rationales mainly upon challenges and 
commitments East of Suez.  
The new Government of 1970 
The Conservative Party under leader Edward Heath won the next general election on 18 June 
1970. This was for many a surprise victory. However, economic problems had dogged the 
Labour Government throughout their reign in the 1960s. The devaluation of sterling in 1967, 
rejected application for membership of the European Economic Community, poor industrial 
relations, the feeling that the Government had been backing the American war in Vietnam upset 
many. Edward Heath stated clearly that he wanted to address the problems of rising prices, high 
unemployment, and not least the increasing tax burden.  
Once the new government had been established in 1970, the defence policy was altered. From 
September until the end of October 1970, the new government worked on a new short Defence 
White Paper outlining the new course.13 The first and most important objective was to:‘…enable 
Britain to resume, within her resources, a proper share of responsibility for the preservation of 
peace and stability in the world’. The first two concrete strategic priorities centred on committing 
a ‘military contribution to Five Power defence arrangements in South East Asia’ and a re-
examination of the carrier issue and the need for new anti-ship missiles for the Navy. Again, 
British forces should be a balanced one – first of all covering the needs of NATO and the home-
waters, but also honouring obligations to protect territories overseas and to CENTO and SEATO, 
as well as contributing to peace and security in the Gulf, and giving solid support to United 
Nation operations.  
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However, as only one carrier would be available in the 1970s, new British efforts to become a 
world-Navy did not really involve more forces than those assigned by the former government.  
The British presence on and around the Arabian Peninsula and the policies regarding the Gulf 
States were to end in late 1971. This was according to decisions made and the diplomatic work 
done by the former government in 1968. However, the new government argued for a revised 
policy. The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Sir Douglas-Home, 
presented a report made by Sir William Luce to the Cabinet (DOPC) in December 1970. This 
report outlined the new strategic aims for the Arabian region. The strategic objectives of the 
British were:14 
 
(a) to contribute by all possible means to the creation of conditions which would ensure 
peace and stability;  
(b) to preserve as much influence as possible with a view to maintaining that stability and 
to limit communist influence in the area to the greatest possible extent; 
(c) to maintain the uninterrupted flow of oil on reasonable terms; 
(d) to increase British exports to a rapidly growing marked.  
 
Therefore, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office recommended that the Cabinet should support 
a British attempt to make new agreements with some nations (especially Bahrain, Qatar and 
possible the Union of Arab Emirates), or even a new union with these nations, as all the old 
agreements were about to end.  However, the Secretary of State tried to limit any potential new 
obligation of forces for such a revitalisation of commitments East of Suez, as this would not be 
possible without vitiating the amphibious forces for flank enforcement and the Mediterranean 
forces dedicated to NATO operations.15 In the end, an interdepartmental study-group was 
ordered by the Prime Minister to examine the foreign policy and defence questions regarding the 
Persian Gulf. A preliminary report was presented in late December by the Secretary of the 
Cabinet, Sir Burke Trend.16 However, the group did not come to any significant conclusion, 
other than confirming that China, to a degree, but particularly the Soviet Union, had intensified 
their deployments in southern Asia and Africa after 1968.  
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Chapter 7-B: Britain, the Soviet Navy and NATO strategy 
As for a study of British maritime strategy, the British were fully occupied with East of Suez 
tasks and rationales for new forces. As for the home-waters, little happened on a national basis. 
The British followed NATO developments from the late 1950s. 17 
However, this slowly began to change in the late 1960s. Still, NATO and USN were clearly 
leading the way. The 1968 Defence White Paper stated that: ‘Britain’s defence effort will in 
future be concentrated mainly in Europe and the North Atlantic area’.18 NATO strategy had, with 
the approval of MC 14/3, officially changed to a ‘Flexible Strategy’ in 1967, and the timing was 
perfect for the British to play a part in the next stage of drawing up military plans and deciding 
upon future force planning.  
First home to the Mediterranean    
The decision to retreat from a global role made large forces available for NATO. Both the 
challenge posed by the Soviet naval build-up and the emerging trend of détente came into focus. 
The 1968 Defence White Paper had pointed the way forward. However, as this clearly was a 
hasty decision, the details and consequences were not discussed. The Supplementary Defence 
White Paper of July 1968 followed up on this, and made clear Britain’s new direction. A small 
naval force would be kept in the Mediterranean from 1968; a squadron of long-range maritime 
reconnaissance aircraft (first the Shackleton, later the Nimrod) from 1969, from 1970 a guided-
missile destroyer would be added permanently, and a commando carrier for part of the year to 
the new maritime force stationed in the Mediterranean  
Most of the other forces were arranged as mobile assets based in Britain. However, maritime 
exercises, patterns, and the new greater commitment to NATO were focused initially on the 
Mediterranean.   
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Readjusting, and looking to the North Atlantic and the High North 
The British national debate was preoccupied with carriers and the East of Suez roles until 1968, 
when attention turned to the Mediterranean. As for NATO’s strategy in 1967-69, maritime 
strategy was heavily debated in Brussels and within SACLANT. SACLANT’s perspectives on 
maritime strategy clearly gained strong support within the central leadership of NATO. 
However, the British involvement in the debate was remarkably passive. Sometimes they 
supported SACLANT, often they were opposed to American proposals.19  
However, despite Britain’s lack of involvement in the early changes of NATO maritime strategy 
in the mid-1960s, it is very clear that the final ‘Flexible Response’ strategy of 1967 had a great 
effect on maritime strategy and the balancing of and requirement for new forces – the British 
included. Naval vessels, as well as organic and land-based air power, became important both for 
anti-invasion and sea control in support of the flank-nations.  
NATO’s concept-study; ‘A Concept for External Reinforcement of the Flanks’, constituted a 
great shift for NATO’s navies.20 SACEUR led the implementation of this concept, which started 
late in 1968. From the beginning he drew UK forces into the concept. By November 1968 
SACEUR had made proposals to the UK, that with their newly declared amphibious forces and 
the Mobile 3rd Division they offered support in specific areas on both the Northern and Southern 
Flanks.21 The British supported SACEUR with a UK commando carrier in Exercise Sunshine 
Express the following year. In addition, in 1968 proposals were made by NATO to the UK for 
elements of 3rd Division to deploy to the Northern Flank for exercise purposes in 1969. This was 
now possible as the British were ending their world-wide military role. In fact, the British 
Defence and Overseas Policy Committee agreed that it was important to demonstrate the reality 
of their intention (made with the 1968 Defence White Paper) to contribute more to NATO 
challenges.22  
As for the maritime threats that had emerged in home waters, these consisted of Soviet long-
range aircraft, surface ships, and submarines. In the mid-1960s the focus was on the eastern 
Mediterranean, while from the late 1960s, the focus turned to the High North. The first large 
Soviet naval exercises were conducted in north Norwegian waters from mid-1960s, but the great 
exercises in the late 1960s and early 1970s attracted broader attention. The Soviet forces 
                                                 
19
 See for instance: NATO IMSWM-055-68, ‘Memorandum dealing with “Maritime strategy”’ (25 March 1968).  
20
 NATO MCM 23-68. 
21
 NATO Record MC/CS 42. 
22
 NAUK CAB 148/35.  




            
   
 
 
operated even as far as the GIUK and around the British Isles.23 The great threat discussed was 
whether the Soviet forces could win the air and land war at this flank of the Norwegian coast. 
Further, the question remained whether or not they then would be able to move their forces 
forward with long-range air power and seriously threaten continental Europe and Britain, as well 
as covering large portions of the northern Atlantic. The Soviet forces would be able to secure 
their other maritime forces with air cover, as well as working offensively with their heavy 
armament of long-range air-to-surface missiles.  
This describes the core difference that the new strategy of Flexible Response meant for maritime 
forces and maritime air power. The conventional struggle on land, both in central Europe as well 
as along the flanks, was at the centre of this strategy, and thereby the maritime tasks were to 
protect the flanks and protect the sea lines of communication in support of a land-war. The flanks 
further had a special focus, since they were viewed as the most likely areas of limited Soviet 
attacks because of the risk of nuclear escalation along the central front.24  
Regarding British security, and the British perspective on Norwegian waters and northern land-
areas, Admiral Sir William Staveley, First Sea Lord (1985-89), explained: 
 
Considering the situation if we were to relax our guard in this strategically important 
area, putting at risk the sparsely populated region of North Norway, then Iceland and the 
Faeroes and thus placing the North Sea and the United Kingdom so much closer to the 
front line of Soviet forces, needlessly exposing ourselves to a greater threat which would 
make warfighting a much more daunting prospect for NATO. Put another way, if we 
were to permit the Soviet Navy free reign north of the Greenland-Iceland-Norway Gap, 
their front line would be closer to this country than the inner German border: that is a 
prospect which I would not relish. 25 
 
Staveley further stated: ‘Recognizing the vital importance of the Northern Flank to the conduct 
of maritime operations in the Norwegian Sea and Atlantic as well to the defence of the United 
Kingdom itself, we commit substantial resources to the defence of the region’. Northern Norway 
and the Norwegian Sea were important during this era of powerful missile carrying nuclear 
submarines and missile armed long-range aviation.   
To demonstrate this new focus, British maritime forces sent the commando carrier HMS 
BULWARK to northern Norway for the 1968 ‘Polar Express’, the largest yet of the 
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reinforcement exercises at the Northern Flank.26 With this, and the ‘Strong Express’ exercise of 
1972, it was ‘crucial for the Royal Navy and Royal Marines to emphasise their role on NATO’s 
flanks after the withdrawal from East of Suez’.27 This new search for rationale applied to both 
the Royal Navy carriers and amphibious forces. As Grove has put it; ‘Asserting a role in Norway 
was vital to provide a continued rationale for the two British assault ships (LPDs) completed just 
as Britain was abandoning the “East of Suez” role for which they were built’.28  
This was a delicate and difficult issue; what place did carriers and landing-ships have in the new 
strategic reality? Since 1956 their heritage, from Mountbatten’s time as First Sea Lord, was 
found in the East of Suez missions, and not in nuclear Cold War war scenarios.  
 
Chapter 7-C: The fate of the carrier task force concept 
The new government, and the question of keeping the old 
The new Conservative Government under Edward Heath, which took power on 19 June 1970, 
brought change to the defence sector. The new Secretary of State for Defence, Lord Carrington, 
with his naval background as First Lord of the Admiralty (1959-1963) under Macmillan, 
introduced some important changes.29 He considered it undesirable to reverse the policy of the 
previous administration of transferring the fixed-wing sea-borne aircraft from the Royal Navy to 
the RAF. However, he considered it urgent that the Royal Navy should get new weapon-systems 
and capabilities to make them less dependent on land-based air power. The first step was to 
negotiate with the French for a joint production of their Exocet surface-to-surface weapon. The 
Royal Navy needed this in order to have some effective capability against the rising Soviet Navy 
and their increasing numbers of missile armed surface combat ships.  
Despite the focus on NATO, decided upon in 1968, the new government also found a reason for 
keeping a limited presence East of Suez. As carriers were not an option for the future, the British 
proposed, in 1970, to contribute a limited force of naval ships and some aircraft to future 
Commonwealth defence arrangements. The force-proposal included a naval force of five 
frigates/destroyers, including afloat support, one UK battalion with an air platoon, one artillery 
battery, one flight of six Whirlwind helicopters and up to four Nimrod aircraft. In addition, staff, 
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engineers, and logistical support were needed. After pressure from allies in the region, a limited 
air defence force was also proposed.30 
The greatest change introduced by Lord Carrington concerned the fate of carriers. As it would 
take time for the Royal Navy to rebuild an independent capability, it was crucially important that 
the phasing out of at least one of the remaining fleet carriers was halted. He argued they could 
well last out the 1970s. The decision of the previous government to phase out the two last 
carriers as the retreat from East of Suez was completed in late 1971-early 1972 was still 
standing. However, in terms of their hull life, both HMS ARK ROYAL and HMS EAGLE could 
last out the 1970s. HMS ARK ROYAL had recently had an extensive three-year refit, and 
operated the modern Phantom and Buccaneer aircraft. HMS EAGLE, on the contrary would 
require a refit just to keep her going past 1972, even with the older aircraft and then a further 
extensive refit to be able to operate the newer aircraft. On the other hand it was clear that a 
continued operation of both the carriers would cast a heavy manpower burden upon the Navy, 
and would probably have serious consequences for the rest of the Navy. Lord Carrington 
therefore recommended that only HMS ARK ROYAL would be kept in service until the late 
1970s, by which time the new missile systems could be operational for the Navy. In addition, it 
would give the Navy time to examine whether it would be worth-while to provide the new 
cruisers with a V/STOL capacity.  
Lord Carrington’s proposal made sense, as the Navy would not waste the money just spent on 
the extensive refit. Keeping HMS ARK ROYAL would not require any additional capital 
resources, and thus involved only minimum financial cost and adjustment of the present plans 
decided by the previous government. Lord Carrington played his hand with political skill. He did 
not open a fight with the RAF, as he argued for the RAF to man the naval aircraft. He further 
asked for the continuation of HMS ARK ROYAL to fill the gap in capability, until new systems 
would take over late in the 1970s. Finally, he argued that this solution, which in fact involved 
only small costs, would ‘…be a valuable politico-military advantage in relation to NATO and 
also our Commonwealth Allies’.31 
Once there emerged the possibility of extending the life of the existing carriers, the Treasury 
again became involved, as this would involve cost, manpower, aircraft and ships.32 The cost of 
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running the carriers in 1970 was about £13 million, and retaining the carriers longer would at 
least cost the same, probably more as refits and more maintenance would be needed. This cost-
estimate did not include the 5,500 men required for the carriers, which would cast a great strain 
upon the Navy. Further, if the Navy was to retain their aircraft, the RAF would probably need 
some additional aircraft for their own tasks.   
In the end, the HMS HERMES was converted into a commando carrier, becoming operational by 
1973. Soon, she also began to operate the new Sea King ASW helicopters, as well as the Sea 
Harriers when they became operational in the mid-1970s. The veteran HMS HERMES thus 
became a small, but fully worthy aircraft carrier with a balanced airwing. The HMS EAGLE was 
to be scrapped as planned by 1972. HMS EAGLE left Singapore on 31 October 1971, for her last 
journey back home. This may be seen as the end of the Royal Navy’s permanent presence East 
of Suez. HMS ARK ROYAL was retained until the late 1970s.33 She lived off the spares of the 
retired HMS EAGLE and was the backbone of the Fleet until her retirement in 1978. With her 
retirement, the Fleet lost its AEW capability.  
Not a new carrier – but a ‘through-deck cruiser’ 
By 1966, the MoD, with the naval ‘Future Fleet Working Party’, was carefully looking at the 
possibility of using V/STOL aircraft to give the fleet some independent striking capability. The 
prospect of operating the new RAF V/STOL aircraft, the Harrier,34 was more specifically studied 
from 1968 onwards. And it was officially discussed in the House of Commons for the first time 
in February 1969. The Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Navy, David Owen, 
then confirmed that successful trials had been conducted with the RAF V/STOL aircraft from the 
existing carriers and commando ships, and that they could also be operated from the Tiger-class 
cruisers after a conversion had been done. He further stated that the design studies for the 
planned new surface ships would take into account this development.35 
The new government of October 1964 had cancelled the Royal Air Force P.1154a, and the 
objection to V/STOL aircraft continued. Denis Healey personally argued for a cancellation of the 
P.1127 throughout 1965 and up to the presentation of the Defence Review in February 1966, this 
mainly on the grounds that it was ‘not essential operationally’. His motivation was most likely a 
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wish to get the defence budget below the £2,000 million limit the Government had set in late 
1965. The cost of the P.1127 was estimated at £60-65 million for the research and development, 
and a unit cost of £0.75 million.36  
However, the Cabinet could not go ahead with this recommendation, as the Prime Minister only 
a year previously had, during his announcement of the cancellation of the P.1154 aircraft, 
strongly stated that there was an ‘urgent need’ for an operational version of the P.1127 as the 
replacement. This became prestigious, not least because this was the first VTOL fighter aircraft 
for close support of land forces. It was also a clear promise to the defence industry.37 In the end, 
the P.1127 could not be cancelled: ‘For reasons of time-scale and cost, the deliberate decision 
was taken right at the start to go for the minimum operationally viable aircraft; to eschew all 
unnecessary elaboration of the requirement; to accept the consequent performance limitations; 
and to have the aircraft in service at the beginning of 1969.’38 
The evaluation of the P.1127 continued with the 9 P.1127 Kestrel aircraft evaluation from 1964, 
and as the P.1154 was cancelled a modified P.1127 Kestrel was ordered as the Harrier GR.1. The 
Royal Air Force argument that this would be a ‘unique and flexible aircraft’ had won acceptance. 
The Defence and Oversea Policy Committee (DOPC) authorised an initial order of 60 aircraft 
and an option for 40 more in March 1966.39 A two-seater version was also decided upon 
(primarily) for training purposes. The Cabinet approved this order of 60 single-seat and 10 two-
seat P.1127’s, now called the Harrier aircraft in December 1966, after disagreement with Denis 
Healey. This order was expanded to 77 Harrier GR.1 single-seat and 13 Harrier T.2 two-seat 
aircraft in 1968, as a consequence of the cancellation of the planned F.111 purchase from the 
Americans in February that year.40  
Even though the Royal Navy had decided to go for the Phantom instead of a British design 
V/STOL early in the 1960s, the V/STOL aircraft continued to be tested from the carriers. 
However, this was not a process driven by the Royal Navy, but rather by the industry, the 
Ministry of Industry and the Treasury, for the potential of export. For instance, the P.1127 had 
demonstrated successfully various V/STOL operations from the HMS ARK ROYAL in 1963, 
and later the commando carriers.41 This proved successful, and the aircraft was subsequently 
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exported to the US Marine Corps and others, and brought into service with the Royal Navy in 
due time.42  
However, there was no intention to extend the life of either of the existing carriers for the sake of 
operating V/STOL aircraft. From a MoD perspective, it was also emphasised that if Harriers 
were deployed from ships after 1972, they would be operated by RAF aviators, as it clearly 
would be more cost-effective to keep all fixed-wing aviation within one service.  
However promising the concept of V/STOL aircraft for use from naval ships, the general case 
was proceeding at a low pace, at least within the Royal Navy. There were some studies under 
way, but those focused primarily on a possible anti-surface ship strike role.43  
In the late 1960s, proposals for a conversion of HMS ARK ROYAL and HMS EAGLE into 
‘combined carriers’ – operating both helicopters and commandos, as well as the new ‘jump-jets’ 
(what the Press often called the Harrier V/STOL aircraft), still kept appearing as an alternative in 
the Press.44 Clearly the Navy was working to restore the future carrier capacity, but this had to 
proceed by unofficial channels. As Admiral Henry Leach stated in a recent interview, within the 
Navy caution was taken not to use the ‘carrier’ term in relation to the new ships. Officially they 
had to be called ‘through-deck cruisers’, even though they clearly could carry fixed-wing 
aircraft.   
In 1969, Mountbatten reappeared on the public scene arguing for carriers.45 He argued that they 
could well be operated beyond the present planned date of scrapping. He further argued for the 
new possibilities that had emerged; the prospect of operating the new V/STOL Harriers from far 
cheaper ships than had been the case in the past. The option of extending the life of the old fleet 
carriers, for filling the gap until the new ‘through deck cruiser’ would be operational, was now a 
reality.  
The INVINCIBLE-class 
Following the cancellation of the CVA-01 and the decision to go forward with a navy without 
carriers in 1966-67, and the tumult that followed, work started on the large ASW helicopter 
capable cruiser for the NATO EASTLANT area of operations. The design and political process 
went through several phases. Two designs competed; an ASW cruiser of 12,500 tons capable of 
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carrying missiles and six helicopters, and a larger 17,500 tons ASW cruiser fully capable of 
filling the role as a command and control platform for naval forces. The project ended up with 
the ‘through-deck cruiser’ design of the INVINCIBLE class. It was then officially known as 
‘Through-Deck Command Cruisers’ (TDCC). However, as part of the re-evaluation of defence 
policy, including the future of the structure of the Royal Navy under the new government, the 
ship was not ordered until 1973. The new ‘through-deck cruiser’ design had then evolved into a 
19,000 tons ship, officially called a ‘helicopter carrying heavy cruiser, ‘CAH’. The first ship,  
HMS INVINCIBLE, was laid down by 1973, launched in 1977 and became fully operational by 
1980 – just in time for the Falklands War. HMS ILLUSTRIOUS was laid down in 1976, 
launched in 1981 and became operational by 1982. The last ship, carrying the ARK ROYAL 
name after the last fleet carrier, was laid down in 1978, launched in 1981 and became operational 
by 1985.46  
The INVINCIBLE-class was originally intended as a pure ASW ship for the North Atlantic 
challenges posed by the Soviet naval build-up, but the ship saw many changes both in its design 
and intended roles. For example, the Russian concept of long range reconnaissance and strike 
aircraft, armed with long range missiles, led to the requirement of a self defence force for naval 
forces at sea. The RAF Harrier STOVL aircraft had matured, and suited the ship perfectly. By 
1973 the air defence Harrier had been fully integrated into the Armed Forces. By 1976, the 
commando role was again included in the ships’ capacities. From the beginning of her 
operational duty – the HMS INVINCIBLE had evolved into a new, small multi-purpose carrier 
carrying ASW forces, Commando forces as well as a flight of Sea Harriers.  
 
Chapter 7-D: The fate of the land-based air power option 
The last garrisons and the islands 
Several events marked the hasty retreat from British roles East of Suez. The retreat was not free 
of political criticism and debate, but the British broadly followed their plans. After the end of the 
confrontation between Malaysia and Indonesia in August 1966, 10,000 British servicemen were 
withdrawn from Borneo. There were considerable discussions and criticism of Britain’s role in 
the area after the crisis of Rhodesia (declaring independence in 1965) and Britain’s inability to 
persuade Israel to give up her conquests after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Finally, Britain did not 
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in the end, commit to defending South Arabia after her independence in 1968. By then the retreat 
was fully decided upon, and the decision was followed up by a withdrawal.  
One may say that finally the national strategy was to adopt the realities of Britain’s financial 
situation. From the late 1960s a new strategy emerged – based on more commitment to 
continental Europe and areas closer to the British Isles and on maritime nuclear deterrent, as well 
as balanced conventional forces. Britain only maintained a few of its garrisons around the world. 
It was no longer a global power, but a regional power.  
The main part of British forces and infrastructure East of Suez were scaled back. Certain military 
obligations were still there and the services would have to be prepared to deploy limited forces. 
For this purpose, the British decided in 1968 to keep Gan and Masirah in order to keep route 
options open.47 However, in the end, this never came to reality. 
By 1971 all British resident forces in the East of Suez region had been withdrawn. The former 
treaties had been terminated, but new treaties of friendship had been signed with Bahrain, Qatar, 
and the United Arab Emirates. British naval and air forces would visit the area on a regular basis. 
A force of six ships was intended to be stationed more or less permanently as a contribution to 
the Five Power arrangements and the ANZUK Force. The Beira Patrol of the eastern African 
coast was also to be upheld, as well as a guard ship at Hong Kong.48 The British still had 
interests in the region.   
The land-based forces 
Since land-based air power won the political battle in 1966, the 1966 and 1967 Defence White 
Papers were very promising for the RAF, even though the Supplementary Defence White Paper 
of July 1967 decided on some force reductions. The development of the P.1127, now officially 
known as the Harrier, was well underway and the first squadron was estimated to be operational 
by 1968-69. The F.111K, the British variant of the American aircraft, was proceeding, and a 
number of the V-bombers, which were losing their strategic role to the Polaris submarines, were 
planned to enter service as tactical strike aircraft. The world’s first turbo-jet maritime 
reconnaissance aircraft, the HS 801 project (later named the Nimrod) was also proceeding. This 
successful story was the same for the transport fleet of aircraft.  
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As the planned date for ending the carriers approached, the last existing naval Buccaneer and 
Phantom aircraft were to be transferred to the RAF.49 The 68 naval Buccaneers would make up 
six squadrons. Three squadrons would keep a maritime strike role, and be assigned to NATO. 
Half of these aircraft, making up three squadrons, were to be modified to carry the Martel missile 
for Air Force duties. In case of the Phantoms, all the aircraft would be assigned to maritime 
defence roles. 
However, the Royal Air Force would soon be hit by constant increasing strains on the defence 
budget. Also the planned F-111 buy from the Americans, as well as a large portion of the RAF 
Transport Command were cancelled with the 1968 Defence White Paper.50 In addition to the 
downsizing of the forces, the Supplementary White paper of July 1968 went further in specifying 
the new role of the forces: The new prime role of Transport Command was to move the UK-
based mobile force and reserves to Germany or to the flanks of NATO as emergencies were 
unfolding.51 In a short time, roles had changed from a global, mainly East of Suez focus, to a 
NATO focus.  
In the end, the ‘Island Strategy’ and land-based air power concept had also lost. All British 
forces were to focus on primarily Europe and NATO, and as NATO’s maritime strategy was 
drawn to the challenges posed by the Soviet naval build-up discussed in the former chapter – so 
too was British maritime strategy.  
 
Chapter conclusion  
The last part of the Healey defence reviews was not completed until the presentation of the 
‘Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1968’. The process had by then involved a thorough 
review of foreign commitments. Clearly, the decision to leave East of Suez and to make 
substantial savings by cancelling major equipment orders for the Royal Navy and the Royal Air 
Force, and reduction of Army strength, were interrelated.  
Which one came first is almost impossible to distinguish. The Armed Forces were cut because 
their rationale was cut, and the decision to leave the East of Suez was made because the 
investments and the running-costs of the Armed Forces became unbearable. Economic problems 
had accumulated and a hasty retreat from former colonies and foreign bases thereby became a 
reality. Throughout the 1960s these issues of economy, the East of Suez and nuclear strategies 
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stayed central to discussions on British policy, and laid the foundation for inter-service rivalry. 
Both the Conservative and Labour Governments of the period thought that Britain had an 
important role to play for international peace and security in the Middle East and in the Far East. 
The politicians were crushed between the economic realities and pressure to keep up with 
traditional tasks and assignments. It has been well described by M. Dockrill:  
 
… Harold Wilson’s Labour government after 1964 attempted to hold down defence 
expenditure and at the same time cling on to Britain’s role east of Suez. Wilson’s effort to 
square the circle came to grief in 1967-8 when a succession of serious financial and 
economic crises forced the government to abandon its role east of Suez and concentrate 
its defence efforts on the West European theatre.52 
 
The Royal Air Force was happy in the 1966-68 period. They had ‘won’ the inter-service rivalry 
as the politicians had chosen the land-based air power option in order to maintain influence on a 
global scale. However, the good times soon turned. As the economic realities, or partially 
perceived difficulties, evolved to the extent of devaluation, the Royal Air Force were also about 
to lose most of the prospects promised. The planned F-111 purchase from the Americans, as well 
as a large portion of the RAF Transport Command, was cancelled with the 1968 Defence White 
Paper,53 and the Supplementary White Paper went further in specifying the new role of the 
forces: Transport Command was to move the UK-based mobile force and reserves to Germany 
or to the flanks of NATO as emergencies unfolded.54 By 1968, the new strategic challenges had 
indirectly influenced the British. British policy and the roles of the Armed Forces changed from 
a global to a NATO and home-water focus. In the end, the ‘Island Strategy’ and land-based air 
power concept, which had argued it could fulfil the global commitments, had also lost. The inter-
service rivalry and political battle saw no winner. All British forces were to focus on Europe and 
NATO, and as NATO’s maritime strategy was drawn to the challenges posed by the Soviet naval 
build-up, so too was British maritime strategy.  
Within this altered framework, the new Secretary of State for Defence in 1970, Lord Carrington, 
with his naval background as First Lord of the Admiralty, altered the planned fate of the carriers. 
In his view, it would take more time for the Royal Navy to rebuild a missile-navy capable of 
operating without land-based air power. He won support for his argument that it was crucially 
important that the phasing out of at least one of the remaining fleet carriers was halted. The 
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existing carriers could well last out the 1970s. However, Lord Carrington recommended that 
only HMS ARK ROYAL was kept in service until the late 1970s, by which time the new missile 
systems could be operational for the Royal Navy. This gave the Royal Navy time to examine 
whether it would be worthwhile providing the new ‘through-deck cruisers’ with the new 
V/STOL capable Harrier aircraft – now argued with reference to the home-water challenges.  
Politically Lord Carrington played his hand with great skill. Most importantly, he did not initiate 
a new or continued inter-service rivalry, as he argued for the Royal Air Force to man the carrier-
based aircraft. He further only asked for the continuation of HMS ARK ROYAL to fill the gap in 
capability, not least for NATO’s demands, until new systems would take over late in the 1970s.  
In the end, the HMS HERMES was converted into a commando carrier, becoming operational by 
1973. HMS HERMES operated Sea King ASW helicopters, as well as the Sea Harriers when 
they became operational in the mid-1970s. The veteran HMS HERMES became a small but fully 
worthy aircraft carrier. The HMS EAGLE was scrapped in 1972 after her last deployment, an 
event that may be viewed as the end of the Royal Navy’s permanent presence East of Suez. HMS 
ARK ROYAL lived off the salvage of the retired HMS EAGLE and made the backbone of the 
fleet until her retirement in 1978. Now a new era started with the INVINCIBLE class of 
‘through-deck cruiser’, which was in reality a small carrier with a balanced complement of 










            
   
 
 
Chapter 8: Conclusion 
The underlying aim of this PhD dissertation has been to bring forward one of the most 
controversial issues of maritime air power, the land-based air power versus carrier air power 
debate, a question which has been raised over and over again, both in Britain and among other 
larger navies since the earliest days of aviation. Arguably, the most thorough and deep ranging 
debate on this issue occurred in Britain in the 1960s, including the controversial cancellation of 
the projected fleet carrier CVA-01 and the build-up of an alternative carrier force of ‘through-
deck cruisers’ with Harrier aircraft. The cancellation of CVA-01 in 1966 has attracted much 
attention by those involved at the time, as well as by later academics. The general perception has 
been that this cancellation came as a result of the poor economic status of Britain and the retreat 
from the former colonies. The dissertation set out to conduct a broad historical research of this 
fascinating British story, which so many have referred to, but at the same time few have 
conducted research into. It is clear from the arguments presented that the individual services, the 
Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, with their differences in policy and opinions, and the inter-
service rivalry over maritime strategy that followed, also influenced the outcome of the many air 
and naval procurement programmes of the 1960s and the subsequent restructuring of the military 
forces  
Largely, probably due to the inherent naval interest in this explicit CVA-01 story, former 
research has overlooked the underlying conceptual debate on alternative military strategies. The 
hypothesis was that this conceptual debate; the sincere difference in professional opinion 
between the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force as experts and advisors to the politicians, 
influenced the outcomes of the military procurement programmes and, to a degree, the changing 
foreign policy. A further important overarching result of this research is that the numerous 
studies on defence policy and military projects and suggestions, as well as the preliminary 
decisions and final decisions that were conducted throughout the 1960s have here been put in 
order and context. This will hopefully help other researchers when examining concrete issues of 
these turbulent years for the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy.  
 




            
   
 
 
The services’ policy and opinion and the story of the ‘inter-service rivalry’. 
The British maritime air power debate of the 1960s was principally on the conceptual question 
about land-based air power versus carrier aviation, but it is also a fascinating story of deep-
ranging inter-service rivalry and how the military services and the rivalry managed to influence 
British policy making. The dissertation has had no intentions of trying to explain the greater 
question of the British retreat from its former empire; however it is clear that the alternative 
military concepts of land-based air power and carrier task forces argued by the services were 
fully integrated with and influenced the debates on foreign and defence policy. It was a de facto 
line of arguments of the Royal Air Force that were echoed in Secretary of State Healy’s famous 
White Paper of 1966, when cancelling the CVA-01 and the carrier fleet. By 1966, the British still 
wanted to keep political influence East of Suez as the former garrisons were built down, but now 
with the use of land-based air power instead of carrier task forces.  
The British maritime air power debate of the 1960s is perhaps the most comprehensive and 
pictorial case-study for the greater question of land-based versus carrier air power. During this 
decade long narrative, most arguments for- and against land-based air power and carrier air 
power were brought to the table for debate. As the research has shown, it was not ‘just the 1960’ 
– but a story that evolved over the course of three distinct periods:  
• The first period, 1960-63, started with the need for a carrier modernisation. This set the 
scene for a conceptual debate on ‘Carrier Task Forces’ and a concrete land-based air 
power alternative ‘Island Strategy’.  
The story originated in the late 1950s, when the Royal Navy wanted to modernise its carrier 
fleet. The existing carriers would last until the 1970s, but it was clear that new larger carriers 
were needed for operating new and larger jet aircraft. By 1960, this evolved into the concrete 
question of the building of new fleet carriers for the 1970s. This was initially generally accepted 
within political circles. However, as this clearly would involve great strains on an already 
pressed economic situation for the Royal Air Force, they soon confronted the Royal Navy in a 
vigorous inter-service battle. In addition to the economic reason for this political battle, the 
Royal Air Force was genuinely convinced that carrier aviation was not a cost-effective way of 
exercising air power. The Royal Air Force alternative became the ‘Island Strategy’. This was 
originally conceived as a concept of staging islands for politically safe air-transport links to get 
around countries that denied the British overflight rights. However, it soon became a definite 
concept of providing distant air power for intervention operations and support of maritime 




            
   
 
 
forces. The first records of the ‘Island Strategy’ becoming a direct alternative to the carrier task 
force concept date from January 1962. During the 1960-63 debates, the Treasury and Air 
Ministry criticised the carrier task force concept, while the Admiralty and the Chief Scientific 
Advisor, Zuckerman, criticised the ‘Island Strategy’. Lord Mountbatten, as the Chief of the 
Defence Staff was clearly in support of the naval case. Lord Mountbatten and Zuckerman were 
friends and shared ideas, and proved to have great political influence. The political end of this 
debate, which was particularly intense in the winter and autumn of 1963, came with an approval 
for carriers by the Cabinet in July 1963. The period saw a constructive discussion, where both 
the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force managed to argue well for their concepts of air power. 
The detailed narrative of and line of arguments in this discussion are most interesting, and should 
give valuable inputs to any future discussion on these topics. However, as for political influence, 
the Air Ministry and the inter-service rivalry of 1960-63 seem to have had less importance.  
• The second phase of the debate came with the CVA-01 controversy in 1965-66, where 
the Royal Navy constantly had to fight for the continuation of the programme approved 
of in 1963.  
In late 1964, the Royal Navy and the carrier programme again came under heavy political 
attacks. There had been a shift of government, and there had been attempts to alter NATO 
strategic thinking in Europe. The new Secretary of State for Defence, Denis Healey, soon 
focused on ‘the rationalisation of air power’ and future challenges. Initially, he ordered several 
joint service studies, however, later to focus more on independent studies by the services as the 
joint studies proved to be too much of a compromise. For the debate on land-based versus 
carrier-borne air power, the single service studies for arguing their case, as well as studies for 
criticising the others, were seen as effective. All the arguments for and against both these 
military strategic concepts were thus put forward. Healey played a great political game, 
constantly pitting the services against each other. For the debate on land-based air power and 
carrier-based air power, the decision to cancel the CVA-01 in February 1966 is not in and of 
itself particularly interesting. However, the way the Government and Healey argued that land-
based air power would fill the previous roles of the carriers is important. The cancellation of 
CVA-01 was a great blow to the Royal Navy, and has therefore naturally been much debated by 
enthusiasts and historians. There are many reasons why the project was cancelled. The obvious 
one being economy, however, the explanation is more complicated. As often perceived, the 
cancelation of CVA-01 and the carrier fleet was not argued from a need or wish of changing 
policy. The politicians were not ready to abandon the responsibilities and possibilities East of 




            
   
 
 
Suez by January 1966. Further, the costs of the CVA-01 programme were not far from being 
within the economic limits set by the politicians. Thus, it is hard to say whether the programme 
would have been cancelled if the Royal Navy had better argued their case, but we may conclude 
that the cancelation was not inevitable. This dissertation has shown how the Royal Air Force’s 
constant repetition of the arguments for land-based air power as a viable alternative gradually 
won influence, and de facto was used as a rationale in the Defence White Paper of 1966. Former 
researchers have not given rightful attention to the land-based air power option constantly argued 
by the Air Ministry and the Treasury from 1960 until 1966. However, it is not possible to 
conclude that Healey was convinced of the land-based air power option, but at least it 
represented an alternative, and was clearly a way out of the costly carrier programme for the 
politicians. It is clear that the Air Ministry and the land-based air power arguments won political 
influence.  
• The third and final part of the story concerns the planned gradual phasing out of the old 
carriers, a story that evolved from 1966 until 1972.  
I began my research with a hypothesis that the Soviet naval build-up in the High North 
influenced the British retreat from its global role. However, the research proved that the British 
focused surprisingly little on this build-up. Thoughts on maritime strategy for the home-water 
region were simply put to NATO from the late 1950s until the early 1970s. Therefore, it may be 
concluded that the Soviet developments do not give justification for the decisions to cancel the 
CVA-01, nor for the hasty retreat from the global role that was decided in 1967-68. However, the 
Soviet naval build-up was important for NATO strategy in the last half of the 1960s. NATO 
maritime strategy changed with the Flexible Response strategy of 1967. NATO took a new and 
increased focus on the flanks and the threats posed by the Soviet Navy. These changes were first 
and foremost driven forth by SACLANT. The greatest flaws he saw regarding NATO 
capabilities were the maritime surveillance and anti-submarine warfare capabilities. This context 
greatly influenced British developments around 1970, both the balance of forces and shift in 
policy and strategic focus in the early 1970s, and not least the development of the new ‘through-
deck cruisers’ and the use of the Royal Air Force VTOL aircraft in the maritime theatre. The 
land-based air power option and the rationale for carriers had, out of the East of Suez challenges 
throughout the 1960-68 period, been fully argued through. However, in the period 1969-1972 the 
course was adjusted to involve a broader argument, including more anti-submarine warfare and 
island defence. The fate of the carriers and the land-based air power option became something 
else than envisaged in 1966-68. The ‘through-deck cruisers’ became small carriers with a small, 




            
   
 
 
but balanced, complement of aircraft and capabilities. The VTOL technology the Royal Air 
Force had used in their prospect of ‘Island Strategy’ made this possible.  
The impact of the ‘inter-service rivalry’ and the influence of the leadership 
It is clear that British economy and the fight for resources contributed to the rivalry between the 
services, and thereby both set the scene for and influenced the land-based air power versus 
carrier task force debate. The cancellation of CVA-01 came first and foremost as a result of the 
Wilson Government’s reaction to financial distress. This is not a controversial, nor an original 
finding. However, the British were not yet ready to abandon the East of Suez involvement in 
1965-66, therefore the CVA-01 programme was not deemed to be cancelled. As this research has 
shown, the line of arguments for the ‘Island Strategy’ of 1960-63 and the later arguments for the 
greater ‘cost-effectiveness’ of land-based air power in 1965-66, greatly influenced the politicians 
and the decision. In the end, the cheaper, but arguably viable and realistic land-based air power 
alternative became an attractive alternative. 
It is not possible to say to what extent the politicians truly believed in the prospects of land-based 
air power argued by the Royal Air Force, but at least it became their ‘scapegoat’ for cancelling 
the CVA-01 and the carrier fleet. Land-based air power was far cheaper, and military (air) 
experts said it was a viable and realistic alternative. The politicians were thus able to use the 
expert advice of their choice. The Royal Air Force won great political influence by the power of 
ideas, constantly repeating the viability of the alternative to and the cost-effectiveness over 
carrier aviation during a period of 6 years.  
This period of study saw two very different organisations of military leadership. For the first 
period, the Chief of the Defence Staff had great influence. Lord Mountbatten had a good 
relationship with the defence ministers Sandys, Watkinson and Thorneycroft. Still, Lord 
Mountbatten’s influence was not complete as Chief of Staff. As the former First Sea Lord, 
clearly in favour of carriers, and eager for a greater political career as leader of a stronger and 
more centralised Ministry of Defence – he constantly had to show balanced co-operation and 
respect for both the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force. Daily, he had to downplay his true 
support for the navy case, but on the unofficial scene he clearly remained a naval officer. As for 
the period from 1964 and onward, Secretary of State for Defence Healey was in a stronger 
position. Largely, under the leadership of Healey, Lord Mountbatten and Zuckerman who had 
been the leading figures in the early 1960s lost influence. The same happened to the Chief of the 
Defence Staff in general. With the great politician in power, the individual service chiefs gained 
more influence. This largely because Healey effectively played the services off each other, in 




            
   
 
 
order to get all the raised arguments for and against the questions in discussion. As Sir Henry 
Leach described it: ‘He [Healey] was very skilled, but used extensively a ‘divide and conquer’ 
tactic in politics’.1 Generally, by such a strategy, politicians always find a military expert’s 
advice to support either case they want. In addition to the comprehensive debate on maritime air 
power of land-based versus carrier alternatives, British military services should remember these 
organisational lessons of the past.  
The prime rationale of this PhD research has been to examine the controversial debate on 
maritime air power between the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy in the 1960s. The decisions 
made are evident from the unclassified and annual White Paper. However, this dissertation has 
researched and showed the underlying conceptual debate that occurred and casted additional 
light on the decisions that were made. This research set out to contribute to an important 
conceptual debate about land-based air power and carrier aviation. However, I have made no 
attempt to conclude this debate, as there are times for carrier aviation as well as times for the 
land-based option. There is no clear answer to this conceptual question, but the broad ranging 
debate that has been lined out in this dissertation may well be used as a starting point in any 
future discussions on the issue. Regarding the main lessons to be learned from the political 
process; this study shows that defence procurement programmes of great magnitudes must be 
constantly defended and rationalised. The Royal Navy successfully argued the case of carriers in 
the early 1960s, but failed to do so in the later half of the 1960s. Secondly, the services should 
have some common ground, thereby decreasing the opportunities for inter-service rivalry. This is 
better organised in contemporary Britain, where the Royal Air Force provides much of the 
aviation resources and aircrew. Thirdly, the service arguing for expensive procurement 
programmes should be strategically foresighted. This is of course difficult, but one should then at 
least avoid dependence on a narrow line of rationale and try to keep open a wide range of future 
defence policy challenges. It is questionable to what extent the Royal Navy is successfully 
managing this today. The rationales for the new planned HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH and HMS 
PRINCE OF WALES fleet carriers are much the same as in the mid-1960s… 
The controversial debate on maritime air power and ‘inter-service rivalry’ of the 1960s was, and 
still is, an important part of Royal Air Force and Royal Navy history. Perhaps, the insights from 
this historical study, both the narratives of the historical study and the conclusions made, may 
help the services to avoid (or win) such battles in the future.  
                                                 
1
 Sir Henry Leach, interview 24 January 2007. 
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AAR    Air-Air Refuelling  
AD   Air Defence.  
AEW   Airborne Early Warning. 
AJP   (NATO) Allied Joint Publication.  
ASuW   Anti-Surface Warfare. 
ASV   Air-to-Surface-Vessel (radar). 
ASW   Anti-Submarine Warfare. 
AWACS  Airborne Warning and Control System. 
BAOR   British Army of the Rhine. 
CAP   Combat Air Patrol. 
CAS    Chief of the Air Staff. 
CINCHAN  Allied Commander in Chief, Channel. 
CNS    Chief of the Naval Staff. 
CODAR   Correlated Detection And Ranging. 
CVA   Aircraft Carrier, Attack.  
DCAS   Deputy Chief of the Air Staff. 
DCNS   Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff. 
DPC   Defence Policy Committee. (NATO)   
DPWG  Defence Planning Working Group. (NATO) 
DRPC   Defence Research Policy Committee. (UK MoD) 
ECM   Electronic Counter Measures.  
ELINT  Electronic Intelligence.  
ESM   Electronic Support Measures.  
FAA   Fleet Air Arm. (UK) 
GIUK (gap)  Greenland Iceland United Kingdom (gap). 
HAS   Helicopter Anti-Submarine.  
HMS    Her Majesty Ship. 
HU   Helicopter Utility. 
ICBM   Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile.  
ISR   Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. 
LOFAR  Low-frequency Analysis and Recording.  




            
   
 
 
LRMR   Long Range Maritime Reconnaissance.  
MAD   Magnetic Abnormality Detection.  
MC   Military Committee. (NATO)  
MCM   Mine Counter Measures.  
MoD    Ministry of Defence. 
MPA   Maritime Patrol Aircraft.  
MW   Mine Warfare. 
PS    Permanent Secretary. 
RAF   (British) Royal Air Force. 
RN   (British) Royal Navy.  
SACEUR    Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. 
SACLANT  Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic.  
SAM   Surface-to-Air Missile.  
SLBM   Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile. 
SLOC   Sea Lines of Communication.  
SOSUS  Sound Surveillance System. 
SSBN   Ballistic missile submarine, nuclear.  
STANAVFORLANT Standing Naval Force Atlantic. 
STOL   Short Take Off and Landing. 
TVD   Teatr Voennekh Deistvii.  
UAV   Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.  
VCAS   Vice Chief of the Air Staff. 
VCNS   Vice Chief of the Naval Staff. 
VTO   Vertical Take Off.  
VTOL   Vertical Take Off and Landing. 
AAP   Allied Administrative Publication. (NATO) 
AAR   Airborne Air Refuelling. 
AAW   Anti-Air Warfare. 
 
 
 
 
